Lebanon 2006

by Lt. Col David Eshel (retired)

from Tank Magazine December 2006

Merkava Mark IV

The Merkava Mk IV is the very latest version of Merkava (Chariot) and as with earlier models it armour and survivability
have been given very high priority. Fully operational since 2004, it has a combat weight of 65 tonnes. Its front-mounted
1,500hp diesel engine is new, with an improved top speed and power-to-weight ratio over the 1,200hp diesel that
powered the Mk III. The driver sits to the immediate front of the turret on the left side (he has a camera for improved
reverse driving), the turret contains the rest of the crew and the 120mm smoothbore gun (48 rounds carried) and a
coax MG, plus an internally mounted 60mm mortar. Additionally there is a roof-mounted MG that can be fired by the
commander from under armour. The main gun has a new compressed gas recoil system and a thermal sleeve. The
Tank Sight System (TST) provides video coverage of the surrounding terrain day and night, through 360dgrees, via
four cameras in hardened cases. The Merkava Mk V is already under development and it is thought to be armed with
a 140mm gun.

The Battle of Wadi Saluki

This battle will be remembered as one of the fiercest fights of the second Lebanon War, one in which
Merkava IV proved its mettle in its first, but ultimate combat test.

It was during the push to the Litani River - a few hours before the UN-brokered cease-fire went into effect - that a
column of Merkava tanks from 401 Armoured Brigade began crossing Wadi Saluki in the face of fierce Hezbullah
resistance. The battle order described the canyon like Saluki as the "gateway to the Litani river", an essential objective in the hurried sweep across southern Lebanon placed before the brigade, before the cease-fire went into action- a fateful
decision by the political decision-makers, which would have crucial repercussions after the war.

Military experts criticised the "Battle of the Saluki" as a microcosm of all the mistakes that were made during the war
in Lebanon. Soldiers waited for a week, like sitting ducks, for orders that were twice received and twice cancelled, reflecting
a total lack of clarity and confidence within the General Staff, and the political echelon directing the war.

Crossing the Saluki meant the troops and tanks had to climb a steep hill while exposed to attack from mountains on
every side. Understanding the risk to his tanks, Brig-Gen Guy Zur, commander of Division 162, deployed Nahal Brigade
infantrymen on the high ground outside the villages Andouriya and Farun, to provide cover for the armoured
column advancing below.

Commanded by Colonel Moti Kidor, 401 Armoured Brigade Merkava tanks had been waiting for the push to the
Litani for close to a week. Twice, they had received the word to go, but were immediately ordered to stop, as soon as they
started rolling. At last, on August 11, just before 1500 hours, orders came, but made no sense to the brigade staff: 'why
push to the Litani hours before the UN was set to approve a cease-fire? However, orders were firm and by 20,00 Hours
the tanks began to move.

The problem was, that during the passing week Hezbullah fighters were waiting, watching every step that Kidor's forces
made. Knowing the ground, the guerilla commanders realised that the only way westward would have to cross the
steep wadi slopes, where they had deployed their advanced Russian-made AT- 14 Kornet anti-tank missiles en-masse in
excellent firing positions.

Hezbullah had prepared well for this kind of warfare. On 22 November 2005 when Hezbollah attacked the village of
al-Ghajar in an attempt to capture IDF soldiers. The then commanding general Udi Adam said in his after action report,
that " it was the first time that Hezbollah used its entire tactical arsenal", revealing that one of his Merkava tanks
received no less than seven hits from different anti-tank missiles, none of which penetrated its armour and all the crew
escaped unhurt. Iranian instructors had taken the al-Ghajar incident very seriousely and reacted by sending antiarmour
specialists from Tehran to their training base located in the Lebanese Beka'a valley. Iranian tank experts examined
Hezbollah video shots from the action at al-Ghajar, clearly displaying hits on the Merkava tank, carefully studied these
displays by looking for "blind" spots in which Merkava could be vulnerable to AT- 14 Kornet and RPG-29V fire, which they
wished to introduce in future engagements.

As the tanks started moving downhill into the Wadi, two tanks of the leading company were immediately hit, one of
the tank commanders mortally wounded, caught in the sights of scores of Kornet anti-tank missiles with their lethal tandem
laser-beam warheads penetrating the advanced armour of the Merkava Mk 4. It was the first engagement this tank had
faced. A reserve commander rushed to the rescue with six tanks leading them to climb up sheer slopes to the top of the
gorge, an ascent angle few other tanks, than Merkava Mk 4 could navigate. By now all hell was breaking lose from the
high ground as hundreds of missiles were pouncing on the advancing tanks, now moving up the far slope. In all. two
companies, some 24 tanks, participated in the operation. and 11 were hit by anti-tank missiles.

The Hezbullah fighters were firing missile after missile from vantage positions at the
vulnerable points in the armour. Tank commanders were frantically calling for air and artillery support, but because of
the large number of Nahal infantrymen present, Northern Command refrained from calling for assistance from artillery
or helicopter gunships, fearing to hit friendly forces. The tanks were left to fend for themselves until they reached the top and
stormed the Hezbullah anti-tank positions. When this was achieved, the brigade commander making his rounds, found
to his surprise, that in all, only four crewmen were killed, but scores wounded, fortunately most of them suffering minor
wounds. Later summing up the battle of Saluki, Colonel Kidor said that it had been "an unqualified triumph of his Merkava Mk 4. Had those tanks been of an earlier generation, not equipped with state-of-the-art technology and active self-protection mechanisms, 50 crewmen might well have perished", the colonel emphasised with satisfaction.

Two rather remarkable incidents happened in the heat of battle and are worth recounting: one Mk 4 tank was hit by a
tandem missile which penetrated into the rear compartment, hitting a stored HEAT round setting it on fire, which activated
the automatic fire suppression system, but wounding two of the turret crew, who were evacuated and replaced by a reserve crew - the tank then continued to fight. Another tank had its main armament 120mm barrel blown off by a "lucky" shot, but the crew managed to drive it back to the border, where a field ordnance repair team exchanged the barrel and sent the tank back into battle within hours.
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