Даже на танк Т-62А (а это 1961 уже год)

замечу, ТШ2-41. А вовсе не -32

А про БКС для Д-54 я вообще не слышал, да и нафиг он ей нужен.

Если опираться на куму то пушка Д54 не имеет никаких преимуществ перед Д10... В таком случае я не думаю что этот прицел имел отношение к серийным ТШ2(А,Б)-32-П второй половины 60-х

Возможно это просто был экспериментальный прицел для экспериментального снаряда с некоей экспериментальной баллистикой, который поставили на опытный танк с совершенно другой артсистемой от отчаяния.

125 mm POCISK PODKALIBROWY
TYPU APFSDS-T

  PODSTAWOWE DANE TECHNICZNE:
   Kaliber                                     125 mm
   Długość                                    570 mm
   Masa pocisku                           7,6 kg
   Masa pocisku na torze lotu        3,65 kg
   Przebicie płyty pancernej           >= 500 mm RHA
   Średnia prędkość początkowa  1650 m/s

120 mm POCISK PODKALIBROWY
TYPU APFSDS-T
 
  Nabój z pociskiem APFSDS-T
   masa pocisku na torze lotu               3,5 kg,
   prędkość początkowa pocisku        1650 m/s,
   odległość strzału bezwzględnego      2310 m,
   przebicie na odl. 2000m                  500 mm RHA

1979-1982 were the years I spent as a Tank Platoon Leader in the former FRG (first with M60A1 RISE/Passive tanks then with M60A3 TTS tanks). A question I've asked myself many, many times over the years is simply...how would my tanks have done had the "balloon gone up?" My biggest concern looking back on those days is not the plan we had (as part of a much larger General Defense Plan [GDP], each tank in my platoon had primary, secondary and alternate fighting positions with pre-planned artillery targets, etc.); my biggest concern was the main gun ammo my tanks were carrying. My first basic load of 105mm ammo was based on a mixture of M392A2 and M728 APDS rounds. After we transitioned to the M60A3, we were issued the new M735A1 (DU) APFSDS round.

According to Gen. Donn Starry (June 1980):
"The Army is again faced with a disappointing turn of events in tank ammunition development with the recent in-bore projectile breakups of XM774 APFSDS-T. This represents a continuation of past tank ammunition development/production problems."
"This problem first surfaced in the early 1970s with the discovery of in-bore breakup of M392 APDS-T. The first APFSDS-T round (M735) continued the trend so that today there are more M735 rounds being held in CONUS ammo plants as a result of lot failure than there are deployed in USAREUR. The latest XM774 failure could significantly delay its fielding date. XM833, the third-generation round, is still some years away (1983–1984). However, its problems may be beginning with the recent BRL acknowledgment that it may not achieve its predicted muzzle velocity."
According to the now unclassified report, "U.S. Intelligence and Soviet Armor" (1985):
PK/H (Probability of a Kill given a Hit, firer and target stationary, target fully exposed, 0-degree azimuth [front]):
M735 vs. T-72 LB (Lower Bound/best case) = .22; vs. T-72 UB (Upper Bound/worst case) = .22
M774 vs. T-72 LB = .71; vs T-72 UB = .50
"To sum, whether one uses informed U.S. or Soviet calculations, the conclusion is that NATO can expect, through 1984, no advantage over the Soviets in quality of armor or anti-armor weapons, and only a modest redressing of its present quantitative disadvantage."
So, would my tank crews in the 1979-1982 time frame, have found themselves in a very similar situation to that experienced by US tankers going against superior German tanks during WWII?