предисловие
by CPT Joseph D. Schmid
Military professionals throughout the globe have witnessed Russia’s ability to systematically project “annihilation
fires,” leveraging nascent unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) teamed with massed rocket and cannon artillery during
the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The debilitating effects of the Russian UAV/fires teaming was detailed in the
article “Russia’s New Generation Warfare” by Phillip Karber, president of the Potomac Foundation, and Joshua
Thibeault, a member of the Russian New Generation Warfare Study Team. “Ukrainian units have observed up to
eight Russian UAV overflights per day,” Karber and Thibeault wrote. “The increased availability of overhead
surveillance combined with massed area fires [produced] … approximately 80 percent of all casualties.”1
Russian UAV/fires teaming served the dual purpose of instantly attriting whole battalions of Ukrainian mechanized
infantry and had the uncanny effect of disrupting the Ukrainian observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop decision
cycle.
2
To put this in perspective, imagine a U.S. combined-arms brigade (CAB) “in a three-minute period … [suffering] a
Russian fire strike, destroying two mechanized battalions with a combination of top attack munitions and
thermobaric warheads.”
3
Following the almost instantaneous loss of two mechanized-infantry battalions, the
imagined CAB would likely no longer be able to perform basic warfighting functions. Consequently, its remaining
combat power could no longer successfully close with and destroy a comparatively sized adversarial near-peer
formation. This troubling observation from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has hastened U.S. UAV interoperability,
especially at echelons above battalion.