Кроме того, в результате боевой работы РОК подавлено 3 ротных огневых пункта с выводом из строя не менее 30% личного состава и боевой техники

Огонь переносился на непоражаемые участки площадной ,( гигантской группово цели  )цели.

Bursting the Russian integrated air defense system bubble
By Col. Rick Ullian. He is a Council on Foreign Relations military fellow and former 19th Battlefield Coordination Detachment commander in Europe.

Conventional wisdom suggests if Russia were to attack NATO, it would like-
ly do so in the Baltics. While NATO considers the probability of such an attack
to be low, if it’s wrong the alliance will have to solve an early combined and
joint Fires problem. If Putin were to send little green men into his Baltic neigh-
bor’s backyard, they would fight inside a Russian integrated air defense system
(IADS) bubble that is one of the most formidable in the world. Russian fourth
generation, double-digit surface-to-air missile systems (e.g., SA-21 Growler) and
long-range rocket artillery (e.g., SS-26 Stone) enable Russia, with the flip of a
switch, to isolate NATO’s Baltic allies and deny the alliance access to assembly
areas and debarkation points from which an allied operation to remove Russian
forces would optimally begin. Consequently, the success of any such allied op-
eration is entirely predicated on first bursting this IADS bubble.

-snip-

NATO’s essential fire support task
Rolling back the SA-21 and SS-26 range
rings that stretch this bubble across not only Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but also
the Baltic Sea and deep into Poland, would require allied air and ground forces to
work closely together to deliver combined and joint suppression of enemy air defense
(C/JSEAD) Fires in a well synchronized exhibition of speed, timing and firepower.
An essential fire support task NATO has spent very little time training on since the
collapse of the Soviet Union. With no peer competitor on the European continent to
contend with, NATO’s C/JSEAD skills have atrophied in places like Afghanistan and
Libya where allied air and ground forces encountered little or no integrated air de-
fenses and easily established air dominance over its third-world enemy. In the Baltics
however, NATO will not enjoy this luxury.

NATO’s numbers problem
According to the RAND Corporation, the Russian advantage over NATO in can-
non artillery is 4:1, in long-range rocket artillery 16:1, in long-range air defense ar-
tillery 17:1 and in short-range air defense artillery the Russians outnumber NATO an
astounding 24:1. For NATO, these grossly uneven numbers render thoughts of estab-
lishing air dominance over the Russians across the Baltic region unrealistic. Instead,
the alliance will likely find itself fighting hard just to establish temporary air supe-
riority over the Russians in a single Baltic state. That said, if NATO hopes to set even
these limited conditions on a battlefield in Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania in the future, it
needs to start conducting routine C/JSEAD live-fire training today.

-snip-

For nearly a week, a small coalition of the willing (Poles, Americans and Roma-
nians) planned, coordinated and supervised the delivery of combined and joint
operational level cross domain Fires using fixed- and rotary-wing fire support sys-
tems, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and cannon and rocket artillery
on a range purposely built to replicate the SA-21’s footprint. The exercise’s realis-
tic design, large number of dissimilar fire support systems and multi-national con-
tribution offered its participants a sobering glimpse at the many challenges, both
enemy and friendly, the alliance will likely encounter if ever called on to suppress a
fourth generation, double-digit surface-to-air missile system. Among these challeng-
es, the FCX identified several NATO should consider attending to immediately.

-snip-

In the event Article 5 is invoked, the allied joint force commander would be
responsible for the deep fight to include establishing air superiority, an operation-
al level task Gen. Frank Gorenc once suggested would take “weeks, not days” to
accomplish. Given the former NATO Air Command commander’s estimate assumed
a level of C/JSEAD proficiency at the time of incident which does not currently exist
in the alliance, establishing air superiority over the Russians in the Baltics could in fact
take months, not weeks and cost the alliance dearly in additional lives.

Current State of the Air Force ISR Enterprise
The current ISR enterprise evolved within the context of Operations Enduring Freedom
and Iraqi Freedom.  Between 2002 and 2003, the U.S. military transitioned from major combat
operations to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq.   This transition called for fewer kinetic
effects and far more assets to find and fix high value, time-sensitive, human targets.1  With long
loiter times, full motion video (FMV), and communications links direct to the end user, aircraft
like the MQ-1, MQ-9, and MC-12 were well suited for this type of complex, irregular warfare. 
Since 2001, the Air Force expanded its ISR capacity to 65 full-time aircraft orbits and the
Department of Defense (DOD) spent over $44 billion on ISR capabilities.2  As a result, the
current ISR enterprise provides an impressive ability to collect, process, exploit, and disseminate
imagery and signals intelligence (IMINT and SIGINT) in low-threat, uncontested airspace.  With
20,000 Airmen at 33 locations, the Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS)
collects, processes, analyzes, and disseminates over 1.3 million megabits of information and
1,000 hours of FMV every day.3  Even with this massive investment, the Air Force ISR
enterprise was unable to fill the DOD’s demands for FMV.

To meet the joint force’s increasing appetite for ISR, the Air Force began employing
fighter and bomber aircraft outside their traditional roles as strike platforms.  In 2004 and 2005,
fighter aircraft gained the capability of transmitting FMV via Sniper and Lightning advanced
targeting pods.  Using an unsecured, line of sight Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver
(ROVER), F-15/16/18s, A-10s, and B-1/52s can now send electro-optical (EO) and infrared (IR)
video directly to ground forces.4  These aircraft provided significant contributions as ISR
platforms, leading the Air Force to formally define NTISR as a functional concept in 2007.   This
first definition described NTISR as “employing a sensor not normally used for ISR as part of an
integrated collections plan developed at the operational level for preplanned, on-call, ad hoc,
and/or opportune collection.”5  Since 2007, this definition has expanded to include formalized
tactics and tasking procedures.

-snip-

A2/AD Impacts on ISR
Contested battlespace is radically different from the permissive environments in which
the Air Force ISR enterprise has grown and flourished.  A2/AD focuses on both preventing
movement to a theater and restricting maneuver within the theater.  Potential adversaries use a
multi-domain approach to deny access and degrade operations; combining effects of air-to-air
and surface-to-air missiles, electronic attack, counter-space, and cyber warfare.9  Unlike the
United States’ experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, A2/AD threatens the military’s ability to
employ forces and systems in the manner for which they were designed, organized, trained, and
equipped.  Cyber-attacks may prevent timely execution of time phased force deployment,
ballistic missiles and submarine warfare can deny access to intermediate staging bases, electronic
attack can disrupt data and communications links, and Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS)
can prevent aircraft from flying near adversary controlled territory.

A2/AD operations can be particularly disruptive to aircraft operations.  In Vietnam, the
United States lost over 3,000 aircraft to North Vietnamese air defenses, primarily anti-aircraft
artillery and MiG-21 fighters.10   In 1999, during Operation Allied Force, Yugoslav helicopters
shot-down 15 NATO Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) using door gunners and IR missiles.11 
These systems pale in comparison to a modern IADS with Surface to Air Missile Systems
(SAMS) like the SA-5 and SA-10 with ranges in excess of 100 miles and effective altitudes over
90,000 feet.12  Adversaries equipped with these systems can challenge U.S. air superiority,
denying operational access to traditional ISR platforms with limited self-protection systems, poor
maneuverability, and no offensive capability.

A2/AD operations present challenges to the ISR enterprise beyond aircraft limitations. 
Current ISR command, control, and doctrine depend on uncontested access to all domains.  A
single RPA sortie requires a line of sight data link between the aircraft and the 
Launch-and-Recovery Element; voice and data communications between the RPA crew, end
user, and DCGS; satellite data link between the aircraft and ground based receiver; and fiber
optic connection between the receiver, RPA crew, and DCGS.  This command and control
architecture requires massive bandwidth and loss of any single link can threaten the entire
mission.13  The same adversaries capable of denying physical access to airspace also possess
electronic attack and cyber warfare capabilities that threaten this fragile communications
architecture.  This complex system, which has worked so well in uncontested irregular-warfare,
is poorly matched against an adversary who can attack any number of critical communications
nodes.

Полный текст: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-ijqXT … p=drivesdk

Проведя расчеты, получаем, что при отсутствии противодействия со стороны ПВО и мероприятий по снижению заметности прикрываемых объектов, один разведывательный полет группировки микро- и мини-БЛА противника, включающей в себя 10 аппаратов, повлечет за собой вскрытие до 300 объектов типа образца вооружения и военной техники (ВВТ). Потенциальными целями для разведки с помощью БЛА в общевойсковом формировании будут являться РЛС, ЗРК и другие бронеобъекты ВВТ. С точки зрения оценивания эффективности группировки ПВО по прикрытию общевойсковых формирований при проведении оперативнотактических расчетов используется такое понятие как типовой объект. В качестве типового объекта рассматривается мотострелковая (танковая) рота. Как правило, в состав типового объекта (типа рота-батарея) входит около 10 основных образцов ВВТ. Если в общевойсковом формировании, насчитывается до 75 типовых объектов, получаем, что один разведывательный полет группировки микро- и мини-БЛА вскрывает до 30 типовых объектов, что в свою очередь составляет 40% от всех типовых объектов, расположенных в зоне ответственности общевойскового формирования.

Источник: https://function.mil.ru/files/morf/Sbor … ii_bla.pdf (А.А. Логинов, ОЦЕНКА РАЗВЕДЫВАТЕЛЬНЫХ ВОЗМОЖНОСТЕЙ БЛА. Стр. 157)