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The Soviet Anti-Tank Debate
By Philipp A. Karber
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy
Vol. 18 1976-03

On 21 June 1339, an outnumbered group of Swiss Infantry, armed with hand-held pikes, stood up to the cream of feudal armour, unseated the knights from their armoured chargers and ushered in a new era of warfare. The battle of Laupen was a tactical innovation which not only established the defence superiority of light infantry over the shock action of mobile and heavily armoured forces, but also announced a political and social revolution. With striking similarity this "democratization of warfare" was repeated 634 years later in the opening days of the 1973 Middle East War, when an Arab infantry force armed with anti-tank weapons met and brought to a halt an Israeli tank offensive.
The implications of the Arab success have been widely discussed in the West. Numerous commentators have agreed that the balance has swung against the tank, which has dominated the battlefield since World War II. Many have taken heart that the same weapons which provided the Arab success, the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) and the hand-held anti-tank grenade-launcher, would give NATO a greatly improved chance of offsetting the Warsaw Pact's tank superiority in Central Europe. Indeed one study has claimed that the ground forces of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union are tank-heavy, even tank-dependent, suggesting that "Soviet tables of organization are unduly influenced by experiences gained in a war of 30 years ago and that a certain amount of "battleship thinking" permeates their military intellectual environment." (1)
Another study concludes that Soviet reliance on tanks as the core of the Army's shock and initial striking power is not likely to change. 'The debate in Western military circles that Soviet reliance on tanks as the core of the Army's shock and initial striking power is not likely to change. "The debate in Western military circles that followed the Yom Kippur War over the viability of armour in a battlefield environment dominated by precision-guided munitions has had no visible parallel in the USSR..." (2)
These conclusions reveal a naivete about Soviet force structure and ignore recent Soviet doctrinal literature. The Soviet Union is not only aware of the implications of the 1973 Middle East War - after all, it was Soviet antitank weapons that the Arab forces used - but demonstrates a deep appreciation of the potentials of anti-tank technology for the modern battlefield in professional military writings. Changes in Soviet doctrine and force structure reflect this concern and the implications are important for Western defence.
In mid-November 1974 a military science conference of the ground troops was held at the Malinovsky Tank Academy. (3) Participating were more than 200 marshals, generals and officers of the central apparatus, military districts and groups of Soviet troops stationed abroad, commandants and instructors stationed at military academies and representatives of scientific institutions. Their purpose was to discuss the tactical implications of the 1973 Middle East War, with particular focus on the future viability of armoured vehicles on the modern battlefield. Subsequent discussions raised doubts about the perpetuation of Soviet offensive doctrine. This conference was followed by an unprecedented second conference in January 1975 at which A. A. Grechko, Minister of Defence and I. G. Pavlovsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Troops strongly emphasized the lessons and implications of the October War, fiercely criticized current Soviet operational exercises, and called for a doctrinal debate on the implications of anti-tank technology. To date neither conference has been reported - let alone analysed - in the West. Marshal Grechko's comments were incorporated in the second edition of his recent book:

(1) Col. E. B. Atkeson, "Is the Soviet Army Obsolete?" Army, May 1974, pp.10-16
(2) Jeffrey Record, Sizing Up the Soviet Army (Washington: Brooking's Institute, 1975), p.48
(3) Reported in Red Star, 16 November 1974, p.1; see also Military Herald, No. 1, January 1975, p.16
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"Combat actions in the Middle East, unleashed more than once in the last 10 years by the aggressive circles of Israel, have put anew the question of the relationship of offence and defence of ground troops, and have disclosed a number of characteristic phenomena in the struggle of offensive and defensive means and in methods of waging the fire battle.
It is noteworthy that modern defence, in connection with the appearance in troop armaments of powerful firing means, has acquired greater stability. This is being caused first of all by the fact that the main striking force of the attackers - tanks - has become more vulnerable, and the use of them on the battlefield, more complicated. The continuing process of perfecting the anti-tank weapon has placed before science and technology a serious task in the business of tangibly raising the viability of tank troops and developing more effective ways and means of reliably suppressing anti-tank defence.'' (4)
Grechko's provocative comments signalled the beginning of the Soviet anti-tank debate, and within the last year Soviet journals have published more than fifty analytical articles discussing the implications raised by the effectiveness of anti-tank weapons as demonstrated in the Middle East conflict. (5)
While debate has been mainly confined to the pages of the professional military journal Military Herald, concern over anti-tank technology is reflected in the increased coverage of the subject in wider-circulation media such as Red Star (6) and Soviet Military Review (7) (the latter published in English). Given the quantity of writings, the high level of authorship, and the clear expressions of concern, the Red Army evidently feels it has come up against a problem.
However, before NATO embraces the ATGM as a deus ex machina, several points arising from the Soviet anti-tank debate need to be outlined:
-The current Soviet concern over anti-tank weapons, and particularly ATGM, is not a feature of the last year only, but dates from the Khrushchev period.
-The Red Army has not been putting all of its offensive "eggs" in the tank "basket": the basic trend in Soviet force structure over the last decade has been just the reverse - a scaling down of the tank in favour of other combined arms elements.
-Ironically, the system the Army perceives as most threatened by anti-tank weapons is not the tank but their infantry combat vehicle - the BMP.
-The Soviet debate over anti-tank weapons is not really a debate over anti-tank weapons per se - the capabilities and defensive potential of these weapons have been generally accepted. What is being discussed is how to deal with the increased anti-tank threat while maintaining the Soviet doctrinal preference for the offensive.

Each of these points needs more detailed examination:

The Anti-Tank Threat
The Red Army has long been aware of the potentials of anti-tank weaponry. It was in fact one of the first armies to deploy ATGM in large numbers, and to mount them on armoured vehicles. As early as 1964 (upon seeing a firing demonstration of an ATGM against a tank),

(4) Marshal A. A. Grechko, Armed Forces of the Soviet State, 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1975), p. 198
(5) For instance, Marshal G. Peredelsky, Commander of Rocket Troops and Artillery has warned: "Combat actions in the course of the Middle East conflict testify that modern anti-tank defence is the pivot of all defence. It includes ATGM (anti-tank guided missiles), anti-tank guns on a tracked base and recoilless guns (as a rule self­propelled), tanks, self-propelled units, BMP (mechanized infantry combat vehicles), grenade-launchers. Now not only each sub-unit has anti-tank means but each soldier." "The Experience of War - Into Training Practices", Military Herald, No. 7, July 1975
Major General of Tank Troops I. Skorodumov writes that "More effective methods must be found for combating anti-tank weapons having various firing ranges - ATGM, grenade-throwers, recoilless guns and helicopters armed with anti-tank weapons. These have become formidable weapons for use against tanks and other armoured vehicles having various armour thicknesses." "An Attack at High Speed", Military Herald, No. 3, March 1975
Lieutenant-General Koritchuck states categorically: "The anti-tank guided missile projectile (ATGM) is the basic anti-tank means in contemporary battle. Their combat qualities are constantly being improved: the range of firing is growing, the minimum range of launch is being reduced, and their reliability is being raised by the wide introduction of automation." "The Struggle with Anti-tank Means in the Offensive", Military Herald, June 1975.
(6) For example - see four article series by Col. A. M. Latukin "Weapons Against Tanks", Red Star, 22 October 1975; 12 November 1975; 4 December 1975; and 13 December 1975
(7) B. Antsiz "Antitank Guided Missiles in Defense", Soviet Military Review, No. 7, July 1975; Lt. Col. Y. Volodin, "Antitank Means in Defense", Soviet Military Review, May 1975.
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Khrushchev noted: "It hurt. After all, we are spending a lot of money to make tanks. And if ... a war breaks out, these tanks will burst into flames even before they reach the battle-line." (8)
Throughout the intervening decade Russian writers have often studied anti-tank weapons and shown a keen interest in the state of the art in Western ATGM technology. In 1967 Soviet military writers noted "serious changes" resulting from the technological improvements to ATGM: "A qualitatively new method of combating tanks has appeared - the anti-tank guided projectile, which can destroy any tank at a distance of up to several kilometers." (9)
In 1972 the classic work Antitank Waifare (10) appeared, which paid particular attention to ATGM, noting their significantly greater range and armour-penetrating power in comparison with tanks, their high kill probability, and that under operational conditions ATGM vehicles could achieve a favourable exchange ratio of 4:1 against tanks and double this against armoured personnel carriers (APC). In 1973 the authors of a book titled Tanks pointed out that "no little danger for tanks is presented by ATGM". (11) Following the Middle East War (but in advance of the current debate) Soviet authors were quick to recognize that: "Guided anti-tank missiles gave to the infantry that which it never had: the probability of destroying tanks with one shot before the tank could use its own weapons against the infantry." (12)

Soviet Emphasis on Tanks
While the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact allies have a decided advantage in tanks vis-a-vis NATO, the Soviet Army has not neglected the other combat arms. In fact, contrary to opinions frequently expressed in the West over the last decade, the Soviet Army has actually reduced the importance of the tank in relation to the other combat arms - particularly motorized infantry and artillery. In the early 1960s the ratio of tank to motorized rifle divisions was 1 to 1,8. By 1974 the Soviet Army had increased by 20 divisions - all motorized rifle - decreasing the ratio to 1 to 2,2.
The increased Soviet emphasis on combined arms has run parallel with the doctrinal shift from "one variant" nuclear war to the adoption of conventional options for the theatre forces and was preceded by changes in Soviet ground force organization and command. (13) In the late 1950s the Soviet Army was reorganizing to meet what were deemed to be the new demands of nuclear warfare. The artillery branch gave way to the nuclear rocket forces and infantry was de-emphasized in favour of tanks, which might survive on a nuclear battlefield. However, with the conversion of the infantry forces to full mechanization, a rival branch to the tank troops, motorized rifie, (14) was formed in 1963. At the same time the concept of the "offensive in depth", which emphasized mechanized infantry, was re-instated. (15) This had been developed by Tukhachevsky in the 1930s but purged by Stalin. In 1967 the Soviet Army brought back the position of Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces with the appointment of I. V. Pavlovsky, who had been in charge of the build-up of Soviet motorized infantry forces on the Chinese border. In the same year the Soviet Union conducted her first exercise emphasizing conventional rather than nuclear combat, and from then on numerous Soviet writers have stressed the importance of ground force arms other than tanks, and there was even the suggestion that the tank divisions be merged with motorized rifle divisions.
Contrary to Western expectations and predictions, it took the Soviet Union 15 years to deploy a new main battle tank in Central

(8) Cited in T. W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 175
(9) Col. General A. S. Zheltov (ed.), V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1967), p. 264. Col. General Zheltov is head of the Lenin Military Political Academy
(10) Major General G. Biryukov (Artillery) and Col. G. Melnikov, Antitank Warfare (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972)
(11) Y. A. Kosyrev, Y. M. Orehkov and N. N. Fomin, Tanks (Moscow, 1973)
(12) Col. N. Nikitin, "New in the Struggle with Tanks", Banner Carrier, May 1974. See also Col. Nikitin and Col. S. Petrov, "Israel: Aggression in October 1973", Military History Journal, November 1974
(13) See John Erickson, Soviet Theatre - Warfare Capability: Doctrines, Deployments and Objectives (Monograph), March 1975; and his Soviet Military Posture and Policy in Europe (Stanford Research Institute, 1974)
(14) I. S. Lyapunov, "Motorized Rifle Troops", Bolshaya Soviet Encyclopedia, 3rd ed., 1970
(15) A. B. Kadisher (ed.), Questions of Strategy and Operational Art in Soviet Military Work 1917-1940 (Moscow 1965). See also Col. P. Matronov, "Offensive Battle in Depth", Soviet Military Review, October 1970
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Europe following the introduction of the T-62. (This is the T-72 which is now undergoing initial deployment.) Yet over the same period she designed, developed and deployed five major battlefield air defence systems, five major artillery systems and numerous armoured personnel vehicles - in particular the BMP. Unlike its Western counterparts or previous Soviet models, the BMP is not just an "armoured taxi" but wields considerable firepower. This is not only for use against infantry and other armoured personnel carriers, for the BMP also contains three systems for combating tanks: an ATGM, a turret-mounted 73mm anti-tank gun and at least one RPG-7 anti-tank grenade-launcher, carried by a trooper inside.
This emphasis on combined arms is also reflected in the build-up of Soviet forces in Central Europe over the last five years; for while the Soviet Union has increased the number of her tanks in East Germany, artillery, logistics, anti-tank and air defence capabilities have been increased by larger margins. (16)

Soviet Motorized Infantry are More Vulnerable than Tanks
The threat to the Soviet combined arms build-up is of major importance in relation to the new Soviet anti-tank debate. What is clearly illustrated in recent Soviet writings on anti-tank weapons is not so much concern over the survival ability of the tank, as of the operational viability of motorized infantry. The army had previously assessed APC to be twice as vulnerable as tanks. Apparently, in exercises and field tests since the Middle East War, the army has found that the BMP is even more vulnerable to the new generation of anti-tank weapons than was previously believed. Yet Soviet writers recognize that the success of a conventional offensive is highly dependent upon the protection and mobility of motorized infantry. Until recently the army assumed that the infantry, mounted in combat vehicles and with the support of massed indirect fire artillery, could over-run NATO defenders, and thus maintain a high rate of advance. However, recognition of the increased vulnerability of the BMP to anti-tank weapons starts a chain reaction which seems to threaten the entire structure of Soviet offensive doctrine.
If BMP are significantly more vulnerable than the tanks they are accompanying, they may be destroyed at a much faster rate; the infantry may then have to dismount in order to carry out the attack on foot, which makes the infantry more vulnerable. (17) Since infantry on foot are much slower than tanks, the tanks either outrun the infantry and arrive at the defenders' lines unescorted, or they must reduce their speed and that of the attack. (18) In either case the tanks become more vulnerable. Artillery can suppress anti-tank defences, but this raises the possibility of a long drawn-out "slugging match" with lower rates of advance, greater ammunition expenditure and higher logistics requirements. Even more critical, the vulnerability of one component of the Soviet combined arms force places more strain on the other elements and greatly magnifies the problems of command and control in small units - a traditional Soviet weak point reflected in recent exercises. (19)

(16) Erickson, op. cit. See also John Erickson, "Soviet Military Capabilities in Europe", RUSI, March 1975; R. Meller, "The Intensive Re-equipment of Warsaw Pact Forces Since 1969/70", International Defense Review, April 1975; and testimony of General A. J. Goodpaster, "To Consider NATO Matters", Hearing before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Ninety-third Congress, 19 February 1974
(17) "When nuclear strikes on the front edge are not used, a battalion breaks through the enemy's defences, as a rule, on foot. This is explained by the fact that modern defences are saturated with great quantities of anti-tank weapons and engineer obstacles, having high resistance to fire or artillery and aviation strikes ... On foot, however, the automatic riflemen, machine gunners and grenade-throwers will be subjected to withering fire from all types of enemy artillery units, small arms and anti-infantry mines." Lt. Col. V. Pishakov and Major L. Kirpach, 'The BMP in Battle', Military Herald, No.6, June 1975
(18) The problem is so severe that several Soviet writers have proposed forgetting the BMP and mounting the troops on the backs of tanks as in World War II. See Lt. Col. M. Tychko, "The Launching of Riflemen Mounted on Tanks", Military Herald, No. 1, January 1975
(19) "...it would be an unforgivable mistake to keep silent about the lacks in combat training and specifically in field training ... commanders and officers of staffs have still not learned to firmly control the actions of subordinates in battle, to manoeuvre with them, and did not always correctly use armoured transporters and combat machines of the infantry (BMP) in breaking through a prepared defence, poorly organized cooperation of means of fire suppression, and did not take energetic measures to destroy ATOM and enemy anti-tank guns." General of the Army I.G. Pavlovsky, "The Field ­ The School of Combat Mastery", Military Herald, No. 1, January 1975
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Ironically then, the recent Soviet concern over anti-tank weapons has actually raised rather than lowered the status of the tank. Practically all of the articles have emphasized the greater vulnerability of the BMP. (20) It is the BMP, not the tank, which is perceived as the weak link in the combined arms chain.

Maintaining the Offensive
It is perhaps misleading to classify the recent Soviet writings as an anti-tank debate, for there is really no argument over whether anti-tank weapons are effective, and there is an apparently universal recognition that a tactical revolution is being brought about by the deployment of ATGM. Nor does there seem to be much disagreement between Soviet commentators over the implications - they generally agree that the ground force component most threatened is the motorized infantry, which in turn raises serious problems for the tempo and coordination of the offensive. What is being debated is how to overcome the challenge of anti-tank weapons and retain a high rate of advance against a strengthened NATO defensive capability.
While Soviet writers do not offer neat "policy" packages, several patterns appear to be emerging. Reminiscent of the debates over the reduction of ground forces in the Khrushchev era, opinion groups seem to form around service branch rather than on the basis of personality cliques or modernist-traditionalist arguments. The various options can be grouped into three major categories:

The Nuclear Option
For 30 years the keystone of Soviet strategic and operational concepts for the employment of ground forces has been the "offensive". Starting with a massive bombardment of firepower, the ground forces would break through the prepared positions of the defender and massive tank armies would follow to engage the opponent's mobile reserves. At the end of World War II the breakthrough phase was to be conducted by the massing of artillery fires. By the late 1950s the massive conventional artillery barrage had been replaced by multiple nuclear strikes; by the late 1960s the Soviet doctrine again considered the possibility of a conventional breakthrough. Despite three decades of doctrinal and technical development, the armoured forces were still thought to be the prime means of exploiting a breakthrough. But ATGM technologies threaten the Soviet Army with a tactical revolution and the potential abandonment of the armoured offensive. There is consequently a strong incentive for the Soviet Union to return to her earlier dependence upon nuclear weapons as a means of overcoming anti-tank defences.
Traditionally, the Soviet Union has not mirrored NATO's penchant for low-yield tactical nuclear weapons fired from self-propelled artillery, depending rather on higher-yield and less accurate rocket-delivered warheads. However, the last few years has seen a new interest in, and admiration for, self-propelled artillery in Soviet writings, with some linking of this with low-yield artillery-fired tactical nuclear weapons. (21) In addition several Soviet writers have argued recently that the problems which anti-tank weapons pose for the BMP do not apply in a nuclear environment. The first reason put forward is that, in anticipation of nuclear fires, the defender will have to disperse his forces in case they fall victim to nuclear effects. (22) Second, with the use of highly accurate nuclear fire against the defensive positions, the infantry do not have to dismount from APC and the attack can proceed at a high rate of advance. (23)
Evidently the Soviet Union only sees anti-tank weapons as a threat "when nuclear weapons are not used". Yet Soviet ground force commanders are clearly unwilling to discount the anti-tank problem by relying solely on nuclear weapons. For the present, the nuclear solution seems to have been ruled out by both political and operational considerations.

The Artillery Option
In countering anti-tank weapons particular

(20) Over half of the fifty articles covering the current anti-tank debate have focused on the BMP vulnerability exclusively. In fact when tanks are mentioned, it is usually in a favourable context - i.e. that tanks are less vulnerable, or that they should lead the assault. The only tank­dedicated article within the last year was Col. N. Shaporalov "Teaching Crews to Combat Tanks, Self­propelled Artillery and ATGM", Military Herald, No. 6, June 1975
(21) Col. P. Grigoryev, "Development of Cannon Artillery", Soviet Military Review, August 1971
(22) Col. V. Savkin, "Features of Modern Combat", Military Herald, No. 3, March 1974.
(23) Pishakov and Kirpach, op. cit.
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importance is attached to the role played by the artillery. Many Soviet authors, particularly those from the artillery branch, argue that only massive suppressive fire from artillery "is capable of reliably destroying an enemy's anti-tank defence. During the conduct of combat operations not involving the use of weapons of mass destruction such a task rests almost entirely upon the artillery". (24) The artillery branch apparently relishes this new role for two main reasons: that within the Soviet Army supervision of ATGM falls under the artillery branch; and that this is a major opportunity for artillery to regain its pre-Khrushchev influence and command over resources.
In the anti-tank debate, the pro-armour writers insist that traditional indirect artillery fire is not sufficient to suppress anti-tank weapons. (25) The artillery advocates recognize this and repeatedly point out that artillery fire against anti-tank positions is much more effective when fired in a direct rather than an indirect mode. (26) But to be truly effective in the direct fire mode, artillery will have to be decentralized in battery-sized units down to battalion level and "many direct fire weapons are needed to penetrate a defence".(27) To ensure that the artillery weapon has tactical mobility and enable the crew to survive in close proximity to the tactical battle, the artillery must be armoured and self-propelled. In fact within the last year the Soviet Union has deployed two new self-propelled large calibre artillery pieces with direct fire capability. This emphasis upon decentralized direct fire self-propelled artillery demonstrates a major shift in traditional Soviet thought which hitherto emphasized massed indirect artillery barrages fired from towed equipment. (28)
As the Soviet experts themselves are well aware, parcelling out artillery in battery-sized units and attempting to coordinate the artillery with tanks and infantry is not without its potential disadvantages: even a small-unit tactical assault is rendered enormously complex. Battalion staffs - traditionally lean in personnel ­ will have to be expanded and even greater strain will be placed upon an already frugal logistic structure. The artillery itself becomes much more exposed and its decentralization becomes a major problem in coordinating massed fires.

The Manoeuvre Option
As might be expected, officers of the tank troops strongly disagree with the artillery branch. Rather than slow the offensive down they want to speed it up. Arguing against holding the armoured forces back as the infantry launch a dismounted attack, General Bukharenko of the tank troops states: "It would seem that in modern fast moving combat when each minute is precious, that this is not the best way to use such high speed military materiel." (29) Tank Troop General Skorodumov goes even further and attributes the vulnerability of Soviet APC to the slowness of attack. (30)
These rejoinders by high-level tank officers raise some interesting points. First, they do not attempt to deny the effectiveness of anti-tank weapons. Second, where the tank advocates take exception to the artillery proponents is not in the use of fire suppression but the restrictions such dependence places upon the speed of the attack. Third, while the BMP was originally perceived as a potential competitor to tanks (having many of the characteristics of a tank and closely associated with the meteoric rise of the rival motorized infantry branch), recently the tank branch has closed ranks with their armoured brethren and become the most ardent defenders of the BMP. Basing their

(24) Col. A. Rodin, "Struggle Between Artillery and Anti-Tank Weapons", Military Herald, No.5, May 1974
(25) "In actual combat, as soon as our artillery lifts its fire into the further reaches of the defence, the opponent could issue from cover, re-occupy his position, cut off the MR [motorized rifle] troops from the tanks by fire, and pin them (the former) to the ground. And this would lead to large unwarranted casualties in materiel and in personnel." Lt. General of Tank Troops A. Bondarenko, "On the Utility of BMP's in Battle", Military Herald, No. 10, October 1975
(26) Direct fire is over open sights, when the gunner can see the target; indirect fire is directed on to the target by an observer, displaced some distance from the guns
(27) Col. V. Selyavin, "Direct Fire", Soviet Military Review, November 1975. See also Col. V. Selyavin, "Artillery Breaches [anti-tank] Obstacles", Soviet Military Review, August 1975
(28) The original proponents of self-propelled artillery came from the tank branch, which argued that these weapons should fall under their jurisdiction; apparently they lost. For a detailed discussion see Marshal of Tank Troops Pavel A. Rotmistrov, Time and the Tank (Moscow, 1972), pp. 265-9
(29) Lt. General Bukharenko "On the Utility of the BMP in Battle", Military Herald, No. 11, November 1975.
(30) Skorodumov, op. cit.
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arguments on the BMP's superior speed and anti-tank armament, the tank commanders hold that not only should the infantry remain mounted but that independent BMP units should be used in daring surprise raids, deep in the enemy rear. (31) But how can the vulnerability of BMP units to anti-tank weapons be reduced by placing greater emphasis upon them? The key to this question may lie in the Soviet interest in the growing "density" of anti-tank deployment. Soviet writers have long held that density - the ratio of force to space - is the key variable influencing rate of advance. The greater the quantity of force in a given area the slower the movement, and conversely with a low force-to­space ratio the battlefield becomes granular rather than linear, fluid instead of static. Instead of nuclear weapons to disperse the defence, the armour advocates call for pre-emptive manoeuvre - attacking the defence before it mobilizes and deploys a dense anti-tank defence. Soviet writers note that surprise attacks with conventional weapons offer the same opportunities as nuclear strikes for low force densities: fluidity of manoeuvre, and a high initial rate of advance.
There are then several indications that in the event of conflict with NATO the Red Army would prefer to launch a surprise attack without needing to rely upon massive mobilization of the rear echelon divisions in the Soviet Union or filling out under-strength forces of the Warsaw Pact. Such an attack, with in-place theatre forces, might have a prospect of catching NATO before, or in the process of, mobilization, thus preventing the West from establishing a linear and dense forward-deployed anti-tank defence. This would permit the Soviet Union to concentrate her forces in the weakest zones of the defence and so maintain their potential for a rapid rate of advance. Soviet commentators often make the point that NATO ground forces, particularly the West German and American armies, are not geared to a prepared defence in depth, which would make the most favourable use of anti­ tank weapons, but remain committed to the doctrine of a mobile defence based on brigade and division-level armoured counter attacks. Thus while the West still seems to believe that the tank is the best means of ariti-tank defence, Soviet military writers are beginning to stress the offensive use of anti-tank weapons.

(31) "In order to employ effectively small units equipped with BMP, it is necessary to appreciate that such manoeuvrable small units, strengthened in firepower, are designated for daring raids into the depths of enemy defences with the goal of circling around their strong points and exiting on the defender's flanks and rear. To this the special attention of the Minister of Defense and the erne Ground Forces is directed." Bondarenko, op. cit.