http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/s … art007.pdf
Критика IBCT и вывод о необходимости моторизации легкой пехоты.
the infantry brigade combat team (IBCT), the lightest of the Amy’s maneuver brigades, has been revealed to be an organization of severely limited tactical and operational utility. This deficiency stems mainly from a dearth of organic vehicular transport within the light fighting formations. It results in rifle battalions and companies that are ill prepared for the diverse challenges of warfare in the twenty-first century.The mobility deficit limits the combat potential ofthe Army’s 14 infantry brigades (approximately 62,000 soldiers) expected to remain after overall brigade combat team reorganization. The deficit will stem from an equipment allocation that will provide a minimal quantity of unarmored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and light medium tactical vehicles to move rifle companies to a given tactical line of departure for dismounted operations.
As evidenced by the recurring need to equip every IBCT that was fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan with varying sizes of theater-provided, up-armored vehicle fleets, IBCT formations remain ill prepared for operations requiring rapid and secure mobility.
The answer to this dilemma is relatively simple: the fighting formations of the IBCT must be organically equipped with armored and digitally networked wheeled platforms that can rapidly transport infantry to a tactical point of departure.
Equipped with such vehicles, the resulting motorized IBCT would benefit from marked tactical enhancement to internal capabilities while allowing graduated ranges of operational utility.
Moreover, vehicle distribution throughout the light formations would negate the need for the heavy weapons company now in the IBCT structure, which is the only mobile combat element in rifle battalions.
The recent operational experience in Iraq, and to a lesser—but also relevant—extent in Afghanistan, validated the need to complement light infantry with protected mobility within the fighting formations of the IBCTs. For maneuver brigades to wield maximum influence over their area of operations, commanders needed the tactical versatility to project both mounted and dismounted elements over long distances to produce synergistic effects. In contrast,the current vehicular support structure employed by the light brigades limits their potential to dominatethe full range of military operations.
Отредактировано Realist (2017-10-02 14:45:20)
Мы же за Ми-26?
Хотя если использовать БМД-2, то какой смысл в старом люминевом картоне? Уж проще выдать штатные броневики, если больше не зачем использовать дефицитный ресурс тяжолых вертолетов.
