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Опытные, экспериментальные и редкие образцы БТТ 1

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Спасибо!

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https://sdelanounas.ru/i/z/n/v/ZnVuY3Rpb24ubWlsLnJ1L2ltYWdlcy91cGxvYWQvMjAxNy9mMTg3NjBmZjQ3ZmYyN2UwY2Q5YjhjMWVlYjU2YWJmMy5qcGc_X19pZD05NjA5OQ==.jpg

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skylancer-3441 написал(а):

ЧБ фото выше есть, а вот цветное фото пушки, с ЕвроСатори-92, из ATM 1992-09

в статье http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/cased-tel … nt-system/ нашлись ещё цветные фото её же
(без понятий откуда взятые, впрочем если подумать - кандидатов хватает, ведь в интернете по настоящий момент не доступны журналы Jane's International Defence Review, Jane's Defence Weekly, Soldat und Technik, Jahrbuch der Wehrtechnik и прочие там Eserciti E Armi за те годы)
https://i.imgur.com/4LAzzrBl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/jqPe7N0l.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/6iuJjEQ.jpg
(первые две картины кликабельны)

UPD:
Из ATM 1996-08 цветное фото разрезного макета снаряда
https://i.imgur.com/AcrqlLr.jpg
и текст (гуглоперевод с чешского):

CTA International Company presented the M911 automatic cannon caliber of 45 mm designed for shooting so-called telescopic ammunition. It is a compact cartridge whose bullet is inside the cartridge and is either partially or completely surrounded by propellant dust. This solution significantly reduces the length compared to conventional charge. The picture is a charge with a sub-caliber, an anti-bullet missile with arrow stabilization, detachable guide parts and a footstool. The new weapon system, developed by the French company Giat and British British Aerospace (joint venture CTA Int.), Should complete the project phase at the end of this year, with several cannon systems being completed over the next three years and produced around 15,000 pieces of telescopic ammunition


про эту же автопушку ещё статья всплыла из Jane's IDR за 1992 год

Отредактировано skylancer-3441 (2018-01-10 09:09:55)

304

вполне распространённое фото Моваг Пумы, в музее:
https://i.imgur.com/WY9vqakl.jpg
...вместе с табличкой. В интернете фото табличек из музеев почему-то попадаются реже, но тут нагуглилось:
https://i.imgur.com/ypPsx3ml.jpg
Ещё о этой машине есть немного в книге "Nutzfahrzeuge der MOWAG Motorwagenfabrik AG", и из 4 страниц судя по оглавлению посвящённых ей, мне попалось на одной из онлайн-барахолок фото первых двух (на верхнем фото справа заметно что управляемыми у машины являются 1 и 3 пары колёс, и понятно что имеется в виду когда в иных местах упоминается что из опыта с Пумой потом вырос Моваг Шарк, 8миколёсная машина с 1 и 4й управляемыми парами колёс):
https://i.imgur.com/YqK7e4xl.jpg
текст слева еле читаем, но насколько я смог разобрать и ввести в гуглопереводчик (плохо, ибо языка не знаю и достроить слово по нескольким буквам не могу), он представляет из себя цитаты из рекламной листовки по Пуме, и кроме некоторых цифр всё остальное там - разбавлено обычным для таких листовок и пресс-релизов языком про "непревзойдённое сочетание..." и т.п:
https://i.imgur.com/AGtYSKg.jpg
20-тонная машина с гп в 6 тонн это НЯП тот так и не построенный 8x8, старший в предполагавшемся семействе образец, который упоминается в некоторых других текстах о Пуме, например в дойчевики https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mowag_Puma

Кроме листовок Пума упоминалась и в журналах тех же лет, в том числе тех архивы которых всё же вполне доступны в сети.
фото из швейцарского журнала Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift за сентябрь 1967:
https://i.imgur.com/8ACxjfTl.jpg
(гуглоперевод подписи: Figure 6. The company Mowag has developed a buoyant armored wheeled vehicle that can be used as an armored personnel carrier or weapon carrier. The illustrated version shows the "Puma" as an armored infantry fighting vehicle with two machine guns on top launcher.)
и ещё из того же журнала, из июньского выпуска за 1968 год:
https://i.imgur.com/uL5uK07l.jpg
гуглоперевод основного текста:
The Swiss company Mowag has developed a 6x6 armored infantry vehicle "Puma" as a prototype. The vehicle, which weighs around 15 t, has a 320 hp engine. It is equipped for a crew of 1 + 10 men. The water is powered by two screws behind the rear wheels. In the pictures you can see the various armament options: 20 mm cannons, 80 mm twin rocket launchers. The vehicle looks similar to the Soviet BTR-60P and the Czech OT-64. («Soldat und Technik No. 1/1968», see also ASMZ No. 9/1967, p. 529)

...
добавлено 02.01
Согласно ATM 1996-05, макет EVA возили и на арабскую IDEX-95, а не только на Евросатори.
https://i.imgur.com/0XcnVTGl.jpg
(кликабельно)

Отредактировано skylancer-3441 (2018-01-02 13:16:42)

305

попадающееся в сети фото макета, напечатанное в своё время и в ЗВО 1998-12:
https://i.imgur.com/f8hOAKzl.jpg

Он упоминается в книге The TARDEC Story: Sixty-five Years of Innovation 1946-2010 с.242-243:
https://i.imgur.com/PUXFqH7l.jpg

и ещё в журналах Raport WTO 1998-05, 1999-12 и Wojskowy Przeglad Techniczny i Logistyczny 2001-05 попались такие рендеры и рисунок:
https://i.imgur.com/d2xPY77l.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/wqhVZ22l.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/NilwleIl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/uJwJxx1l.jpg

(картинки кликабельны)

макет показывали в одной из передач по Дискавери, ну, это наверное многие видели.

Отредактировано skylancer-3441 (2018-01-29 09:58:09)

306

Ещё из ЗВО, 2005-09, фотография макета колёсной 8x8 машины FCS-W, ещё упоминается как Pegasus
https://i.imgur.com/OtwBouVl.jpg

с текстом

В  рамках  НИОКР  по  созданию  лазерного оружия американская компания «Нортроп-Грумман»  провела  на  ракетном  полигоне Уайт-Сэндз  (штат  Нью-Мексико)  испытание лазерной  системы  (химический  лазер), предназначенной для защиты от ракет и минометных мин. Ее основное отличие состоит в  том,  что  предложена  новая  компоновка оборудования, которое монтируется в стандартных  транспортных  контейнерах  (ISO), обеспечивающих  определенные  преимущества.  Одним  из  недостатков  химических лазеров,  как  отмечают  западные  специалисты, является то, что они используют такое количество химических соединений, что для их  подвоза  требуется  несколько  грузовиков.  Поэтому  корпорация  «Нортроп-Грумман»  совместно  с фирмой UD работает над созданием мобильной системы на основе полупроводникового лазера, не имеющего такого недостатка.
На снимке показан макет одного из вариантов твердотельного лазерного тактического оружия, названного TALON(Tactical Laser Operational Needs). Вооружение планируется включить в состав боевой системы будущего – FCS-W (Future Combat System-Wheeled), которая должна монтироваться на колесном шасси.

потом в ЗВО 2007-03 был рисунок:
https://i.imgur.com/wOrsrhal.jpg

с текстом

В США активно проводятся НИОКР по созданию лазерного оружия различного назначения. Как ранее сообщали некоторые западные СМИ, уже прошел полевые испытания первый прототип  лазера, получивший  обозначение THEL (Tactical High Energy Laser) и предназначенный для борьбы с низколетящими воздушными целями, в том числе крылатыми ракетами. В настоящее время специалисты компании «Нортроп-Грумман» приступили к разработке высокоэнергетического твердотельного лазера, который планируется установить на боевую бронированную машину, создаваемую в рамках национальной программы «Боевая техника будущего». Программа создания его опытного испытательного образца энергетической мощностью 100 кВт рассчитана на три года, а стоимость работ в соответствии с подписанным контрактом составляет 85 млн долларов США. По мнению разработчиков, такие лазеры можно будет использовать в перспективных системах ПВО и ПРО в качестве их боевого элемента, а также для уничтожения оперативно-тактических и крылатых ракет, артиллерийских снарядов с увеличенной дальностью стрельбы и некоторых типов БЛА.

Сама машина (это конечно не единственный вариант рассматривавшийся в FCS-W, они и на AHED смотрели, о чём попадаются иногда рендеры в презентациях) во всяких проспектах на тему перспективных материалов корпусов бронетехники периодически упоминается:
https://i.imgur.com/qgH6xg2l.jpg https://i.imgur.com/in0to7Tl.jpg
в одном из каковых так же попалось фото из нередко встречающейся по Пегасу фотосессии "на бетоне", растягиваемое до приличного разрешения:
https://i.imgur.com/d8RByycl.jpg

там заявляется что руку к созданию приложила вездесущая Тимони

в Raport WTO 2002-12 попалось несколько фотографий, включая внутренности, и схема с размерами:
https://i.imgur.com/m2tcs8wl.jpg https://i.imgur.com/u9d2Okcl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/mFWdqMrl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/zeEIRD9l.png

ещё остались в сети некоторые пресс-релизы об испытаниях и слайды:
https://i.imgur.com/kExaRfRl.jpg https://i.imgur.com/UsIfwsql.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/3lnfYL6l.jpg
(картинки кликабельны)

и Пегас тоже попал в передачу, в этот раз на канале Хистори, от которой доступен фрагмент, а целиком, как и многих таких рубежа 90/00х, в сети нигде нет:

...
вообще, по ютьюбу разбросаны всякие ролики по FCS, включая те рекламные, псевдодокументальные, показывающие как удобно будут проходить с участием FCS всякие операции в будущем, от военных до гуманитарных миссий. Но обычно те видео все паршивом качестве. Но оказалось что фирма которая те ролики делала - выложила их в весьма приличном качестве на своём канале в Вимео https://vimeo.com/cti

Отредактировано skylancer-3441 (2018-01-29 09:48:22)

307

https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_cont … EePb4E79_U
уран-9 с 30 мм АП .....

308

В журнале Army Logistician в нумере за май-июнь 1973 года в двух разных сканах попались фотографии макетов неких бмп:
https://i.imgur.com/TszdZ7ll.jpg https://i.imgur.com/ICWI9bMl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/33YGIMRl.jpg
и ещё в документалке Meeting Tomorrow's Challenge 1970 года - ещё один макет:
https://i.imgur.com/DR7ah0sl.jpg
(картинки кликабельны)

Тут вспоминается что в журнале Infantry в нумере за июль-август 1981 года в статье "БМП будущего" за авторством начальника одного из ТАКОМовских отделов-лабораторий есть такой тест:

Unfortunately, no one seemed to be quite sure how far they wanted to go in achieving “improved protection, firepower, and mobility.” Between 1963 and 1972, therefore, the Advanced Concept Group generated approximately 145 vehicle system concepts with supporting analytical work and an equal number of mini-layouts of subsystems and the technical integration of these subsystems into various types of concepts.
From these system concept layouts, at least eight wooden mock-ups were built and reviewed in response to the changing requirements that were being proposed and in an attempt to resolve what at that time represented essentially the best technical approach. It must be remembered that during this period the Army was doing a bit of real soul-searching trying to determine how far it could go, technically, in sampling all the opportunities that appeared to be there for the taking. During this same period, the armor community and others were going through the same technological “binge.” Evidence of the inevitable hangover from all of this was the curtailment of the MBT-70 XM803 tank program in December 1971.
During this period, too, the Advanced Concept Group explored the entire spectrum of technological alternatives, including concepts for vehicles as small as 16,000 pounds, and as heavy as 100,000 pounds for those with NBC protection. It explored half-squad vehicles and two-squad vehicles: front power plants, rear power plants, centrally mounted power plants, and split power plants; engine rear, transmissions in front, and just the opposite. It explored various levels of armor protection, with automatic components to match each weight resulting from the selected armor level.

хотя может это и что-то другое

...
MICV-65 и изготовленная по этой программе XM-701.
Armor за июль-август 1965:
https://i.imgur.com/jfrSdG6l.jpg
(у Ханниката в книге про Бредли на с. 274 тот же рисунок вида сзади дан вместе со схемой изображающей вид сбоку https://i.imgur.com/Y6VAXGx.jpg , и видно куда менее коробчатую форму предполагавшегося изначально носа машины, и на фотографии на с.277 https://i.imgur.com/OQBLq7z.jpg заметно у машины с открытым надмоторным люком что это... ну, видимо такие здоровые встроенные поплавки.)
Army Information Digest за ноябрь 1965:
https://i.imgur.com/zRKiYnWl.jpg
швейцарский журнал Allgemeine Schweizerische Militarzeitschrift, июнь 1967 года (а в 65м они перепечатали о этой машине заметку Армора):
https://i.imgur.com/6LuFgXTl.jpg
в сети попалось цветное фото машины в комплектном состоянии:
https://i.imgur.com/eU2Ut2Bl.jpg

про ЗСУ GLAADS с использованием одного из прототипов в принципе известно http://strangernn.livejournal.com/359710.html
ну вот разве что ещё фото
https://i.imgur.com/QJdS0mq.jpg

и в Jane's World Armoured Fighting Vehicles за 1976 был такой текст

GLAADS USA—Early in 1976 trials started with a GLAADS at Fort Bliss, Texas. This consists of a XM701 MICV chassis with a new turret armed with tw'in 25mm guns. The system was developed under the direction of the United States Army Armament Command and the Rodman Laboratory at Rock Island, and Frankford Arsenal. Design work was carried out by Aeronutronic-Ford Corporation at Newport Beach. The twin 25mm guns are fed from two feed chutes (i.e. two per gun). The advanced fire control system includes a fully integrated and stabilized optical, infrared and laser sensors. The sensors feed data to a computer developed by Rockwell (Autonetics), and this computers the necessary lead and elevation angles.

...

XM-701 в её нынешнем виде

https://i.imgur.com/uOTlEAxl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/oKGoyaN.jpg
[https://i.imgur.com/dep6XP9.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/9rrC6Zwl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/Td4sbIjl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/MDY6tbnl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/Pkh1Ij4.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/BIM2Dhx.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/xURwnZVl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/1q2laBN.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/qPIzWdD.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/rZmzpbgl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/sTOaSpyl.jpg
или там все в одном альбоме https://imgur.com/a/uPffy

как я понимаю, два образца XM-701 сохранилось и поныне, в процессе стояния под открытым небом в запасниках и музеях оба малость облезли и был помяты. Но говорилось что американская армия собиралась кучу прототипов и серийных машин в один музей собрать и восстановить до неходового но внешне полностью комплектного состояния, чтобы - в первую очередь для своих служащих - проводить экскурсии рассказывая о прошлых разработках своего ВПК.

...
И вот на фоне этого всего, включая доступные схемы и фотографии, в известном отрывке из известного фильма Пентагоновские Войны XM-701 взяли и вогнали в прокрустово ложе нарратива заявлявшего что хотелось совсем другое. Включая не обращение внимания на то что там уже были амбразуры, и оттого появился рисунок 6



Фильм в чём-то дословно передал историю Бредли так, как её показал реальный полковник Бёртон в книге Pentagon Wars, и кроме того там попытались это проиллюстрировать. Кажется, художник рисовавший для фильма не очень понимал что именно требовалось бы рисовать чтобы проиллюстрировать подающуюся идею что изначально хотели БТР, что-то типа М-113 но получше, а получили БМП и ещё и с амбразурами в бортах.

собственно рисунки:
1) 0:20 (дальше его показывают на 0:30, 0:40 в сюжете о 1968 годе)
https://i.imgur.com/t2y4Opvl.jpg
2) 0:27 (собственно заставка о 1968 годе)
https://i.imgur.com/eVvon5Ql.jpg
3) 0:46
https://i.imgur.com/rwkdANEl.jpg
4) 0:59 (идёт рассказ о 20мм автопушке)
https://i.imgur.com/fU9gkgsl.jpg
5) 3:26 (1972 год, как я понимаю - 12 августа)
https://i.imgur.com/G9pQQgwl.png
6) 4:55 (согласно сюжету фильма пририсована башня с автопушкой и амбразуры)
https://i.imgur.com/LRwi6iBl.jpg
(1 рисунок - очевидно изображает просто финальный корпус Бредли, 5й рисунок - тоже, но такого размера и формы бортовые экраны с разнесёнкой у неё не с левого а с правого борта)

...
из сборника статей американской прессы о неэффективности отечественного (американского) ВПК "More Bucks Less Bang - How the Pentagon Buys Ineffective Weapons", на английском две статьи о Бредли:

Барахло за 13 миллиардов

==13======
The $13 Billion Dud
by William Boly
California Magazine
February, 1983

One sun-filled afternoon last fall, I saw a Bradley Fighting Vehicle in action for the first time, my reward for skulking around the edges of FMC Corporation's sprawling 120-acre industrial complex on Coleman Avenue beside the San Jose Municipal Airport. Sporting an Afrika Korps-style paint job in tones of olive drab and tan, its turret bristling with the latest implements of destruction, the tanklike apparition came clattering out of the final assembly plant onto West Brokaw Road, intantly boxing in my Fiat 128 with its 25-ton bulk. FMC has a reputation for taking plant security seriously — uniformed guards patrol the various gates, and remote-control cameras scan its yards constantly — but this seemed like what the army calls an "overmatch". To my relief, the driver wheeled to the left and disappeared in the direction of the FMC test track. Appearances to the contrary, the Bradley is not a tank, but rather the latest and most rococo version yet devised of that once humble battlefield performer, the troop carrier. It is named after General Omar Bradley, commander of the European theater during World War II. Bradley was known as the "soldier's general" because of his concern for the welfare of his troops. This is a trait that the weapon named after him does not share. To the contrary, in combat the Bradley Fighting Vehicle will be a rolling death trap for the squad it carries. The vehicle's armor is made of aluminum, a metal whose chemical energy when oxidized is ten times greater than that of TNT. When hit by the right type of grenade, mortar
==14======
mine, or rocket, this aluminum can be counted on to kill the American soldiers whose lives it is supposed to protect. Both FMC and the army have conducted classified tests that show the murderous, explosion-amplifying effects of aluminum armor. And yet production of the Bradley continues.
The full story of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle's development is one of venality and bureaucratic inertia triumphing over common sense. In a time of unprecedented peacetime increases in weapons procurements, it is a cautionary tale about how the government provides for the common defense. The army expects to spend $13.4 billion over the next several years to acquire 6,882 of these machines. According to one munitions expert, each one could be knocked out with an M-42 grenade— price $2. There will always be arguments about how much to spend on defense. One thesis most everyone can agree on, however, is that those systems we do buy ought to work.
If you have never heard of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle before, you're in good company. At last year's appropriations hearing in the House Armed Services Committee, with $800 million in 1983 Bradley funds at stake, a subcommittee chairman interrupted the Pentagon briefing to demand a photograph. "Why don't you show us the vehicle here, General?" Congressman Samuel Stratton (Democrat, New York) asked "I would like to see what the thing looks like. What is it supposed to do? We don't just automatically rubber-stamp this stuff." But Congress went on to approve the purchase of 600 Bradleys this year, bringing the total ordered so far to 1,700. Next month the fighting vehicle is scheduled to begin its first tour of duty at Fort Hood in Texas, and by next September, to join the Seventh Army Training Center in Vilseck, West Germany. The Bradley is a perfect example of the dominant trend in defense spending — the tendency for simple, relatively cheap weaons systems to be replaced by exponentially more complex and expensive ones. The Bradley is destined to succeed the M-113 armored personnel carrier (APC), which is also built by FMC. The M-113 was a workhorse in the Vietnam War, noted for its mechanical reliability and (briefly, at least) for the fact that Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem was assassinated in the back of one. It looks like a metal box on tracks, carries eleven infantrymen, and has a machine gun mounted on top.
In its heyday, it cost around $80,000. (Since 1979, the price of an M-113 has gone to $179,000.) In 1970 the army rejected an early version of the Bradley, generically known as the infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), because it was not “austere” enough and because the price tag of $151,000 seemed too high. But with the end of the Vietnam War, the army got over its austerity bugaboo and in 1977 declared itself well pleased with an even fancier prototype projected to cost $338,000 per vehicle. That was a lot to pay for a troop carrier, but 14 army Lieutenant General Howard Cooksey assured a worried congres-
==15======
sional committee that the cost figure was firm. By 1982 the actual program cost per vehicle had turned out somewhat higher — $1,94 million a copy. Massive cost overruns such as that attract attention. The Military Reform Caucus in Congress had the Bradley on its hit list for this fiscal year. The Congressional Budget Office also proposed a cutback on the Bradley buy. When budget director David Stockman was still fighting Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's plan for across-the-board increases in 500 defense programs, he submitted a "slow growth" (7 percent per year in real terms) defense budget alternative for President Reagan's perusal. Stockman's secret proposal deleted only two major weapons systems. The Bradley was one of them. Luckily for FMC, Stockman's advice was ignored. Mainly on the strength of the Bradley, the company's San Jose division has quietly become one of the largest defense contractors in California, bigger in 1981 federal dollars than such notables as McDonnell Douglas, Litton Industries, Ford Aerospace and Communications, TRW, or Northrop. FMC has invested about $50 million in tooling up for Bradley production and employs about 5,500 workers to build it and an updated M-113 in San Jose. Every afternoon when the shift changes, Coleman Avenue becomes a monstrous tangle of cars waiting to be metered out onto the freeway. Having staked the future of its San Jose plant on a single weapons system, FMC is anxious to avoid controversy. A mid-September letter to the company's local director of communications, Paul Bush, explained this magazine's interest in the Bradley and requested a background interview. "Due to travel unavailability of key management people" a definitive answer was not forthcoming.
Phone calls during the next two months established further that, because of the pressing workload at the plant, no one at FMC could be sprung loose to talk about cost programs of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. "We're not trying to give you the runaround," Bush said in a phone conversation. "And I know that's probably what it looks like to you." In lieu of an interview, FMC forwarded a copy  of a narrated promo movie of the Bradley in action. The fifteen-minute videotape is titled Second to None! It shows the Bradley leaping ditches, climbing 60 percent grades, and barreling across the country to the upbeat strains of what sounds like Jethro Tull as arranged by John Philip Sousa. The Bradley's "awesome" 25-mm cannon blasts targets while on the move; its TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) missile unerringly incinerates tanks at a range of two miles. Inside the turret, the gunner manipulates his "push-button controls" while the commander spots enemy positions using the integrated sight unit. This system, the narrator says, provides a "TV-quality image", day or night, through smoke, light fog, or brushy camouflage. There is also a sequence showing squad
==16======
members riding in the rear, firing their automatic rifles while peering through their custom-tailored viewing ports. They look like cowboys defending the fort, only the fort is moving through the Indians. The film's overall effect is to inspire a sense of well-being bordering on the invincible.
Unfortunately, the literature on the Bradley — notably the transcript of the fiscal year 1978 IFV hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee — tends to dispel this Panglossian mood. There is the "too tall" problem. The army is abandoning production of the M-60 tank in favor of the low-riding M-1 supposedly because its height made it too easy to spot on the battlefield. But the Bradley, at ten feet, is just as tall as the"unacceptably" high M-60. "If it gets blown up because of sticking up there where everybody can see it, it doesn't make any difference how sophisticated its gun is, or anything else," argued Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat, Georgia). There is the "too fat" problem. In order to fit aboard a C-141 Starlifter, the mainstay of the military transport fleet, the Bradley's side armor must be unbolted and the vehicle chained down on its springs to make it shorter. Once that's done, it won't roll, so it has to be winched on board. The whole process takes more than an hour at either end — not a virtue in wartime. There is even a "too small" problem. All those high-priced weapons take up a lot of space. Aside from the commander, gunner, and driver who stay with the vehicle, there is only enough room for six soldiers — half a squad. It is the infantry fighting vehicle minus the infantry. At the senate hearings, the army shrugged off these complaints. The point, asserted General William DePuy, then commander of the army's Training and Doctrine Command, was that the army had a "very poor vehicle" as things stood. The M-113 was a mere battlefield taxi, capable of ferrying troops close to the fight but not much else. What the army needed was a real fighting vehicle, so that the infantry could keep pace with and cover for tanks. It was a question of tactics on the "modern, mechanized battlefield." Russia, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Yugoslavia — all had IFVs. "Almost every army you look at is ahead of us as far as taking care of our infantry," DePuy told the panel of senators. "I think that is a crime."
The truth was even worse than DePuy could manfully admit in open session: the Russians invented the IFV. They had unveiled their brainchild at a Red Square military parade in November of 1967. It had everything — room for a full squad, firing ports, an antitank missile, light armor-piercing cannon, night sight, and low, sleek lines. They called it bronevaya mashina pehotnaya— BMP for short. That's Russian for "infantry fighting vehicle."
Our army, its budget tied up in Vietnam, could only watch in envy and dismay as the Soviets stamped out thousands of BMPs. In 1980, when Congress faced the production go-ahead decision on the Bradley, Forbes
==17======
ran a piece on the "IFV gap," bitterly complaining about Soviet BMPs "racing down the highways of Afghanistan" while our version languished on the drawing boards. Shades of Neville Chamberlain's umbrella. Were we, or were we not, a superpower? The FMC promo movie provides the answer: with the Bradley, we can once again think of ourselves as second to none. Just past the guardhouse, as you approach the Aberdeen Proving Grounds northeast of Baltimore, a fascinating display appears along the roadway's center divider. One by one, an elephant's boneyard of armored vehicles from two world wars rolls by: vintage halftracks, howitzers, and field artillery. There are tanks of every nationality and design: British Mark IVs, German Tigers, Russian T-30s, American Shermans. The ghostly column stretches out for more than a mile, mute testimony to mankind's diligence in the art of making war. For the last six months on its thousands of acres of lowland meadows and forests beside Chesapeake Bay, the army has been testing the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. FMC has its own testing grounds in California, of course, but since the company had placed my request to see the real thing on indefinite hold, I had prevailed upon the army for an up-close look. Major Wayne Heringer, my host for a tour "behind the fence" at Aberdeen, had already explained the program. Several Bradleys hot off the assembly line are being driven cross-country 6,000 miles on the grounds and their weapons periodically fired to make sure they perform according to contract specifications. This morning, the test engineers are preparing Bradley Fighting Vehicle 027 for a trial of its most complex and lethal weapon, the tank-killing TOW precision guided missile. From atop a reinforced concrete blockhouse, Heringer squints into the morning sunlight and surveys the firing range. "That's our target," he says, pointing down an aisle of brilliant viny maple and birch to a shimmering patch of white, almost two miles distant. As he gestures, a deer picks its way across the prospective line of fire, ears alert, before slipping into the woods. If all goes according to plan, the TOW will pop out of its twin-pack tube alongside the turret and sprout fins. Trailing wires that allow the gunner to guide it from inside, it will cruise off on a ground-hugging course that should put it through the bull's-eye twenty seconds later. The system's creator, Hughes Aircraft of El Segundo, advertises that the TOW accomplishes its mission more than 93 percent of the time. The Bradley also has an expensive built-in electronic test circuit to warn of any latent bugs. Still, Heringer is plainly a little on edge about the outcome. "Let's get it right," he shouts over to the technicians. "We got the press here today, gentlemen." A siren sounds and an oddly soft-spoken voice comes on over the loudspeaker, notifying all personnel to take cover. As the countdown begins, Heringer claps his hands over his ears and warns me to watch out
==18-20======
for gravel from the back blast.
"Five, four, three," the voice intones, "two, one," followed by ... nothing at all. Hands lower warily. Birds chirp. "Man, that sumbitch if faaast," somebody cracks, breaking the tension. Word filters back that we will try it again. "Five, four, three, two, one," the voice repeats, and this time a terrific boom punctuates the count, followed by a lesser explosion. Some 300 yards down the course, 1.8 miles short of the target, black smoke billows skyward. "Looks like we dug a hole," says the chagrined major. Two Hughes engineers begin checking the strip chart, a paper record of the system's vital signs. The TOW flubbed its signal plainly enough. But why? In the afternoon we visit the trench warfare range to watch the 25-mm chain gun in action. The cannon flawlessly reels off its full load of 300 rounds, each the size of a fat Havana cigar. After the exercise the guts of the cannon are removed, and Heringer takes advantage of the opportunity to show off its workings. "Fantastic," he whistles, in honest admiration. "We've traditionally been on our ass in this country on this type of thing, compared to the Belgians and Germans and Israelis. This shows what an American company can do." The mechanism is then placed in the back of a pickup truck to be returned to the Aberdeen arms room for safekeeping. Apparently, the Bradley is putting in all those miles with its chain gun locked up in storage. "Is that a good test of the gun's reliability in combat conditions?" I ask. "No, it's not," says test director Jeff Pierson. "Our security people are a little stringent." "This stuff is just too pilferable," adds Heringer. "You lose that, it's a career ruiner." Next up is the 7.62-mm machine gun. "I wouldn't want to be downrange with that little hummer shootin'," Heringer says. The idea is to reel off about 2,400 rounds. However, the ammunition doesn't feed properly. The gun is barking in bursts of five, then seven, then two, with long pauses in between. Finally, the ammo "hangs up" completely. "Ah, shit," says Heringer. "Let's go see the maintenance shops." The next morning we drive out to the Ferryman test area with Buck Kelly, a turret test engineer, to take a ride in a Bradley. Kelly was born and raised in Aberdeen, and his father worked on the base before him. As we move along, he points out some of the landmarks — where the train full of munitions blew up during World War II, for instance. The site is marked with NO HUNTING signs. "You could never clean it all up," Kelly says. Aboard the Bradley everyone wears a helmet, both for protection and to communicate over the internal headsets. My speaker is out of order, but I am mainly listening, anyway. As we get under way, with Kelly in the commander's seat and me in the gunner's, the dominant sensation is that of traveling blind. The armor provides protection at the expense of your field of view. The integrated sight unit, a telescopic affair with a padded forehead-rest to steady yourself against, gives a fine rifle's-eye view but no panorama. As with all armored vehicles, when the Bradley's hatch is down, locating targets will not be easy.
We switch on the infrared night-sight unit and attempt to track a two-and-a-half-ton truck. The system has a glitch, however — three red static bars run across the lower part of the image, blocking it out. Kelly puts the turret into its "stabilized" mode. As the Bradley swivels around corners beneath us, we stay trained in the same direction like the needle on a compass. This provides a mild vertiginous thrill. According to the army, it also enables the gunner to shoot accurately on the move. Once he has found his target, of course.
Army spokesmen admit that the rifle-firing ports in back have more psychological than combat value, and a short ride in the rear compartment demonstrates why. Over cross-country terrain, the periscope viewing ports pitch from sky to earth and back again. The soldiers are seated at right angles to their rifles, which are mounted a couple of feet below the ports. Very much of this treatment, I suspect, and the average sharpshooter will be concentrating on keeping his breakfast down.
The real fun aboard the Bradley is in the driving. The Perryman course is sculpted like a mogul field at Tahoe, but the Bradley's 500 horses push it through the wallows and over hillocks with pace to spare. Remember Elvis Presley chasing rabbits with his tank in West Germany? Now I understand the temptation. When you're in a tank, who is going to stop you? Overall, Aberdeen left me with the impression that, so far, the Bradley can deliver on most of its promises only part of the time. Buck Kelly put it this way: "This program is a little bit rushed. The government wants it yesterday, and they are getting it with some bugs still in it." With a machine this intricate, there is an awful lot that can go wrong. But even if the Bradley were to perform as designed, questions about its military value would remain.

They call themselves "cheap hawks." They are a loose-knit network of combat tacticians and military thinkers mainly based in the nation's capital, iconoclasts in the temple of the military-industrial complex. Some work above ground; others, often with excellent lines into the Pentagon, act as moles, leaking key bits of information to marshal public opinion. They have in common a skepticism of a weapons procurement process skewed toward gee-whiz gimcrackery at the expense of simple, workable systems. Unwise defense spending, they say, is actually weakening our military preparedness. Their world view was decisively promulgated in James Fallow's widely read treatise, National Defense (Random House, 1981). Paul Hoven, a self-described cheap hawk of the broad daylight variety and a partner in Summit Simulations, Inc., a military consulting firm based in Minnesota, is a coauthor of the most extensive critique extant of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. A helicopter pilot in Vietnam, Hoven came by his suspicion of high-tech warfare the hard way. He remembers going on "sniffer patrol" in Vietnam — flying low-level nighttime missions, following a grid pattern with a machine designed to detect the presence of urea. "Lots of signals, and you put the infantry in on them," he recalls. "That lasted about a month, until Charlie figured out all he had to do was pee in a can and leave it lying around. We kept inserting on the cans." Summit Simulations' 92-page study traces the history of armored troop transports, and its conclusions don't flatter the Bradley. "What they've done is design a fighter, bomber, cargo plane," Hoven says. "It's called an infantry fighting vehicle, except it carries only half a squad. Take a light tank, which is what this thing really is, fill it with soldiers and put it on the offensive the way the army is talking, and all I see is a lot of dead people." Hoven considers the concept of an IFV basically misguided. If the army insists on the idea, however, his report recommends the Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle (AIFV), a souped-up version of the old M-113. The Dutch and Belgian armies have bought more than 1,000 of them from FMC. "There's no such thing as a wunderweapon in conventional war," Hoven says. "If you run out of tanks, or infantry, or artillery, you lose. The key thing is you can buy four AIFVs for the price of one Bradley."
"That's an idea whose time for raising has come and gone," rebuts Justice White ("Jud" to his friends), staff member of the House Armed Services Cimmittee. White pads cheerfully about his roomy Rayburn building office in fire-engine red slippers, his vest opened a comfortable apres-lunch notch or two. "We've got the Bradley in production," he says. "Now's not the time to inject risk into the program." Jud White is an ardent supporter of the Bradley and a battle-wise bureaucrat grown impatient with cheap-hawk complaints. "That bunch of troglodytes," he scoffs. "The field marshal-types over on the Senate side? Well, they didn't know how to fight, did they? We just lined up and got the votes and shot it through." White is referring to the Bradley's political moment of truth in 1978, when negative reports from both the General Accounting Office and Office of Management and Budget led President Carter to "zero it out"of the 1979 budget. "Basically, we saved it in the House," White recalls. The trick was a time-honored Washington gambit: slip in enough money to keep it alive for the fiscal year, then hope for a brighter day. The Ayatollah Khomeini and President Reagan took care of the rest. White blames the recurrent criticism of the Bradley on the "old wounded-duck syndrome" — the tendency to go after a program that has been criticized in the past. "You don't see any of these dilettantes taking on the Navy," he says, warming to the argument. "They spend more on spare parts for their jets than this whole program costs. The army lost a decade to Vietnam. They're facing wholesale obsolescence of their 20 equipment. You think the Bradley cost overrun is bad?" he says, taking
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out a sheet of the latest Department of Defense procurement estimates. "Look at this!" It shows figures for the Navy's F-14 and F-18 fighter jets and for the Trident submarine, each tens of billions of dollars over their original estimates. "Let's face it," White says, "If there's a war with the Soviet Union, the Navy's gonna play a secondary role. I mean, the Sovs are an Asian land power. The war's gonna be fought on land. And we're the only major army in the world that doesn't have an infantry fighting vehicle. Russia, Germany, France, Poland, you name it."
"Israel?"
"Except Israel."
Our session has run a bit long, and the next visitor is waiting at the door as we part. "Well," says White, "here's a man you oughta meet," and makes a quick introduction. It's John Mullett, FMC's top military affairs lobbyist. Over the phone, Mullett has already declined to be interviewed on the subject of the Bradley's political history. He seems taken aback at this chance encounter but recovers with the natural elasticity of a salesman. “I've spoken with our people in San Jose," he says. “I’m sure they can answer all your questions. Bill."
As Jud White grudgingly admitted, the Israeli Defense Force, the leading exponent of maneuver warfare in the world, does not field an infantry fighting vehicle. Israel's opponents in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egypt and Syria, had the Russian BMP at their disposal. Since the BMP set off the worldwide IFV fad, the question arises: How did the BMP perform in battle? "Basically, it was a disaster," says Paul Hoven. "In the Golan, the Syrians tried to maneuver them. If you look at battlefield pictures, you see a whole bunch of BMPs with their turrets blown off." Hoven may sound like a biased source, but his study reflects the findings of the Russians themselves. Following the Yom Kippur War, the Soviets convened a military science conference at the Malinovsky Tank Academy in November of 1974, and another in January of 1975, to discuss the BMP problem. Subsequently, according to an article by Phillip Karber in a defense journal, more than 50 analytic articles have appeared in Soviet military journals expressing a consensus that the BMP was the weakest link in its armed forces. Several writers proposed simply abandoning it in favor of having troops ride into battle on the backs of tank, as they had in World War II. The problem with the BMP was straightforward: it was vulnerable to practically everything on the battlefield. By comparison, a dug-in squadron of foot soldiers presents a formidable military threat. They are difficult to spot and, particularly with the new generation of hand-held antitank rockets, have the firepower to knock out heavy armor. Put the same soldiers inside a fighting vehicle, though, and they become a much more prominent target and a lot easier to destroy. Apparently, the Israelis appreciate this fact. Following the recent
==22======
Israeli victory in Lebanon, Paul Hoven called to alert me to an interview of General Israel Tal in the International Defense Review, a Swiss military trade journal. When the interview came around to armored personnel carriers, Tal, who directed Israel's devastating armored attack in the 1967 Six-Day War, unleashed quote a salvo. The popular trend toward the infantry fighting vehicle begun by the Russian BMP was "based on a complete fallacy," Tal said. The job of the APC was to "carry the infantry to the start line for their dismounted assault," not function as a rolling fort. As a species, fighting vehicles were little more than "second-rate tanks," he declared. "The best APC in the world is the worst tank, just as the best tank in the world is the worst APC." Tal called the attempt to hybridize the two "a great mistake." "Don't listen to me," Hoven said after quoting these excerpts. "This guy's only won four wars, you know." Obviously, the relative vulnerability of the Bradley's armor will help determine its battlefield effectiveness. Are we building another BMP? On this score, a cheap hawk of the sub rosa school furnished some distressing information.

Once you sign in the logbook and insert a magnetically coded security card in the proper slot, the door to the inner precincts swings open. A ritual of our times is about to unfold: the "on background" interview. The phrase has a particular meaning in the news business. The speaker may be quoted but not identified except in a general way. No telling physical or biographical details may be divulged. So, for protocol's sake, we are in the offices of a nationally prominent defense think tank in Washington, D.C.; the speaker is an engineer whose experience inside the Pentagon spans two decades and includes a study of the M-113. In measured tones, he outlines his argument. Since the 1960s, he says, FMC has manufactured all of America's track-mounted troop carriers — the M-113, the Marine Corps' amphibious landing vehicles, and now the Bradley. Among the troop carriers of the world, ours are virtually the only ones made out of aluminum. But, my informant asserts, aluminum armor when hit will help kill the soldiers it is supposed to protect. "In Vietnam, the Yom Kippur War, and Lebanon, commanders have been absolutely unable to make their troops ride inside M-113s," he says. "You see them in photos — always on the roof or, at most, standing in a hatch. These soldiers are trying to tell us something." Namely, that inside is not a healthy place to be. There is the danger from mines (hitting your head on the roof can be fatal), but with aluminum there is the added danger from the "shaped charge," or high explosive antitank (HEAT) round, carried by the modern foot soldier. As the defense analyst explains it, the problem is that aluminum is a reactive metal. In powdered form, it is used in rocket fuel. When a HEAT round such as the Russian-made RPG-7 hits armor, it works like a blowtorch, its superheated gases boring a hole through the metal. With
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steel, which is basically inert, those few ounces of material become "spall"— fragments that injure or kill in a well-defined cone of destruction on the other side of the wall. With aluminum, the displaced metal forms spall at the edges but vaporizes in the center. This vapor literally becomes chemical fuel for the explosion, intensifying the deadly effects of the blast.
"The British have conducted the best study of the action of a HEAT round on steel and aluminum armor," he says, brandishing a copy. "This work was done at the Chemical Defense Establishment Laboratory in Porton Downs. You're welcome to have a copy. "The study, published in 1980, claims that, beyond the spall danger presented by all metals, aluminum armor helps kill soldiers three ways. First, blast overpressure from an antitank-size round is twice as high behind aluminum as it is behind steel, reaching levels that would be expected to kill a man by rupturing his lungs. Second, a fireball develops with an associated blinding flux of light (the equivalent of several hundred flashbulbs), causing localized third-degree burns. Third, the extreme temperatures and pressures inside the chamber produce concentrations of oxides of nitrogen thousands of times higher than those encountered during a Los Angeles smog alert. "The Israelis keep very good track of their casualties," the analyst continues. "In the Yom Kippur War, they deployed troops mainly in steel-armored half-tracks, but they also had 500 [aluminum] M-113s. When you look at the casualty figures, you find that an Israeli infantryman in that war had a fourfold higher chance of being wounded or killed in action in his M-113 than in the old half-tracks. "Our army and FMC both know they have a problem with aluminum. They've known that at least since Vietnam. FMC has done shaped-charge testing against the M-113 in California. I've read the reports. They were trying to find a liner that would suppress the vaporific effects, and they did — they found a perfectly practical one made of Kevlar [a synthetic fiber manufactured by DuPont]. But the army doesn't want to ask for money to fix up the M-113 because they're afraid that might draw attention to the aluminum problem. They're afraid Congress will start asking. What about the Bradley? "Here's where it gets very interesting. The Bradley has thicker armor than the M-113, probably about twice as thick. But that just makes HEAT that much more lethal to the soldiers inside it. This is important. If you're going through twice the depth with a HEAT round, you're going to vaporize more aluminum. You're adding fuel to the blast. The army doesn't want to admit that, so they've contrived not to find it out. They've tested the Bradley armor against machine guns, mines, and artillery, but they will not fire a shaped charge into it. I think they've decided that's too fraught with danger to the whole program." The HEAT round is ubiquitous on the modern battlefield. Literally millions of antitank rockets have been manufactured and are out there. We know from the Middle East wars what this has
==24======
done for the infantry. Half the Israeli tanks lost on the Golan Heights in 1973 were knocked out by infantry carrying hand-held RPG-7s. For the army to ignore this threat in the Bradley's armor design is totally asinine and totally irresponsible."
The Pentagon consultant escorts me back out through the security maze to the elevator. Just before the doors close between us, he gives one last piece of advice. "Remember, they're perfectly capable of lying to you," he says. "Don't listen to the bar talk. Ask them to show you their evidence."
Officially, the army claims that the vehicle's armor "can defeat 91 percent of all weapons likely to be encountered in battle." At the army's Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) in Detroit, spokesman Captain Joe Yakovac was unable to locate a study supporting this claim. Deputy project manager Charles Salter denied that Bradley politics had aborted the decision to put Kevlar into the M-113. "That's just not true," he said. "If the army saw the need for it, they would put it in." However, Walt Storrs, mechanical engineer at TACOM with primary responsibility for the Bradley armor, did confirm the main assertion of of my Pentagon source: the army has not tested the Bradley armor against the HEAT round, nor does it have any immediate plans to do so. "Are we curious? Yes, we're curious," Storrs says. "But it costs money to satisfy your curiosity, and we just haven't got it to spend." The aluminum issue surfaced in the press briefly a year ago. Although he was not aware of the British evidence, Paul Hoven mentioned the generic problem in his Bradley study, and a military procurement journal, Defense Week, picked it up from there and ran a brief item. The Pentagon issued a rebuttal, calling the vaporific effect "secondary" to spall as a cause of crew casualties. Like every army position, this one has a paper trail, which, if you follow it long enough, ends up at the desk of Dr. Joseph Prifti, of the army's Materials and Mechanics Research Center in Watertown, Massachusetts. Since 1975, Prifti has served as the principal investigator in research efforts aimed at dampening the vaporific effect in the M-113. Reached by phone, Prifti is extremely reluctant to answer questions. "I might get in trouble," he says. "People in the research and development community are going to wonder. Why did you, Joe Prifti, talk to this guy?" When he eventually submits to an interview, several interesting facts about his research emerge. His work had very little to do with quantifying the vaporific effect. "It may sound as though our study was flimsy," Prifti says, "but it wasn't. We weren't trying to document things like the British were. We were materials oriented to suppress spall." Consequently, his group did not monitor at all for the nitrogen dioxide poisoning effect. To record the fireball effect, mercury-cadmium cells were installed to measure luminosity,
==25==
"somehow there was a screw-up" and the cells did not function correctly. "We threw up our hands," says Prifti. As for overpressure, measurements were obtained, but they were less than half those shown by the British tests. In a universe of constant physical laws, how could that be? The answer is simple, and revelatory of the army's penchant for tinkering with adverse results. In measuring overpressure, Prifti and associates simply threw out the instantaneous peak that occurs within the first few thousandths of a second after the explosion, and instead recorded the much lower "duration pulse" that follows. "The instantaneous peak is very difficult to measure," Prifti explains. "And it's not meaningful, anyway. According to the experts in the field, the body doesn't even feel it. It happens to fast."
Not quite all the experts. Our own Navy has conducted extensive tests of overpressure effects on animals at the China Lake Naval Weapons Center in California. The Navy concluded that the only significant blast effect comes in the first two milliseconds — the instantaneous peak. It's a highly technical point, except for those who will be called upon to serve in the Bradley. In describing blast effects as "secondary," Prifti's group used an overpressure value — 30 pounds per square inch — that might rupture the lungs, but the actual overpressure that would be encountered — 78 psi — is enough to kill outright. The main point remains — the army has no data on how the Bradley armor will stand up against the weapon most likely to be used against it. In a $13.4 billion program, common sense suggests that money could be found for the purpose, if that were what the Pentagon wanted. But in the army's official argot, HEAT rounds are considered "overmatching" against the Bradley and so, under the "user specifications" handed down by Training and Doctrine Command, the Bradley armor is not required to stand up to them. The reason, Walt Storrs says, is that "the army doesn't expect to encounter HEAT where it's going to use the vehicle." Neverthless, the army and FMC tout the Bradley's "ability to move forward at speed under attack in the combat area" and its role "to support the main battle tank in ground-gaining offensive combat." Plainly, the army is trying to have it both ways. The RPG-7 is carried by every rifle squad in the Warsaw Pact armies, but the RPG-7 has been declared an "overmatch"; therefore, don't worry about the RPG-7. As a weapons material, aluminum is not completely a bust. Its proponents point out the good job it does stopping small-arms fire and shrapnel. Plus, because of its greater rigidity, aluminum does not require internal bracing the way a steel Bradley would, making it cheaper to build with. But the original decision to use aluminum for the M-113 — reached in the late 1950s — reflected as much as anything the fact that the nation's aluminum industry was in a terrible slump at the time. Subsequently, FMC gained an expertise with the stuff unmatched outside the airline industry. This helped the company solidify its position as the sole supplier of
==26==
armored personnel carriers to the United States Army. In the process FMC also became the biggest buyer of aluminum plate in the country. FMC has been aware of the vaporific problem associated with that material for a long time. Even before the Vietnam War, the explosion- amplifying effect of a shaped-charge grenade against the M-113's armor had been demonstrated to company officials. In Vietnam, the M-113 proved so vulnerable to homemade land mines that drivers resorted to lying on the top of the roof and manipulating the controls with sticks. About this time, FMC became interested in mines and conducted a series of tests to see what metal would make the most effective liner for a shaped charge. Of all materials tried — copper, steel, alloys of aluminum— the one that worked best was the particular aluminum alloy used in the construction of the M-113. Aluminum alloy 5083 produced the highest temperatures and pressures within the experimental chamber. Eventually, FMC dropped the idea of making land mines, but it is still using aluminum alloy 5083 — in the armor of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Charles Johnson, FMC vice president and manager of its defense equipment group, would neither confirm nor deny alloy 5083's explosive properties. He acknowledged that shaped-charge testing went on over the years, but disclaimed any special knowledge. "The army interprets the data," he says. "We were the contractor carrying the testing out." Johnson's defense of aluminum armor is this simple: "The army handed down the requirements [which did not include HEAT protection], and we certainly met them 100 percent.

Military historians observe that the dominant technology of the battlefield has changed several times in this century. The massed-cavalry charge gave way to the invention of the machine gun. The trench warfare stalemate brought about by the machine gun yielded to the tank. Most recently, the World War II tactic of rapid tank maneuver has been neutralized by the quantum leap in the potency of the HEAT round. Antitank missiles and rockets are not a cure-all, but, as evidenced in the Middle East, they have given the defense a decided advantage. It wasn't diplomatic pudeur that kept Ariel Sharon from pursuing Yasir Arafat into East Beirut last summer; it was the military facts of life. The Palestinian Liberation Organization had RPG-7s. Using them, the PLO turned back an Israeli tank assault at the so-called museum crossing on August 4. Armed with HEAT, the infantryman has become a match for the tank on the modern battlefield. The response of the U.S. military to this development — a heavy investment in a lightly armed fighting vehicle - seems downright perverse. The Bradley will not be the first blunder in the history of war preparations. Germany, England, and the United States had one thing in common at the start of World War II: all three navies had developed torpedoes that wouldn't explode when they hit enemy ships. Designing weapons without the imminent possibility of their use seems to be the
==27==
biological equivalent of a species evolving in the absence of natural predators: you end up with the dodo bird. Nearly 40 years without a major land war in Europe, and the United States places its infantry inside land transports armored with aluminum.
To be sure, our military persistently speaks and writes about the next war with the Soviets in the indicative mood. At Aberdeen, Major Heringer talked about such a showdown as "inevitable." But does the army really believe it? In practice, a good conventional war is hard to come by. In Europe both sides have deployed nuclear warheads down to the artillery level. Both sides say they will use them to stem a conventional reverse. "Why don't you ask me about the neutron bomb?" Joe Prifti asked, nettled at all the questions about shaped-charge rounds. "The Bradley armor doesn't work against the neutron bomb, either." The underlying fantasy in a discussion of the Bradley's merits is that victory in a full-scale conventional war in Europe is still possible. Having made that leap, ignoring the existence of the HEAT round is a relative breeze.
Maybe it is the original thesis — that the weapons we buy should work — that needs revision. At one time "battleship thinking" was military shorthand for failing to recognize gross obsolescence and vulnerability when you saw it. Today we are taking four battleships out of mothballs and refitting them at a cost of several hundred million dollars each. In Washington, the foreign policy talk for the last couple of years has been about showing the Soviet Union we have not lost our resolve. The measure of resolve is what percent of our gross national product we are willing to spend on defense. By that standard, even weapons that don't work make us stronger.

Раскритикованное оружие: новый транспортёр пехоты - примечательный - так же как его история и цена

Embattled Weapon: A New Troop Carrier Is Remarkable — So Are Its History and Cost
by John J. Fialka
(John J. Fialka is assigned to special projects for the Wall Street Journal. Formerly, he was the Pentagon correspondent for the Washington Star. He won the Worth-Bingham award in 1979 and the Raymond Clapper Award in 1980 for investigative reporting on the Pentagon.)
The Wall Street Journal
February 17, 1982
CAMP ROBERTS, Calif.— A shepherd is slowly moving his flock down a rutted hillside when suddenly there is a great roar and a large tank-like vehicle jumps over the crest of the hill behind him. For a moment, all 25 tons of it are airborne. The technician driving it chooses that moment to send the vehicle's huge turret spinning crazily in a 360-degree arc. It is truly an improbable sight. But the shepherd does not turn around. He moves on with the air of a man who has seen many improbable things here. This is the main testing ground for the Army's new Bradley Fighting Vehicle, designed to carry infantrymen into combat, and visitors here regularly see it jump over hills. The BFV, as it is called, can move down the same rutted hillside and go pam-pam-pam-pam-pam, shooting on the move, pumping 200 rounds a minute from its 25-millimeter cannon into a target a mile away without missing once. And it can do that even at night. The Army is extremely proud of the BFV and the improbable things it can do; "an infantryman's dream," a spokesman calls it. But White House budget experts, the General Accounting Office and defense specialists on Capitol Hill worry about another improbable aspect of the BFV: It is emerging as the most expensive armored personnel carrier (APC) the world has ever seen. At the end of this decade, when the Army finishes buying 6,882 of them, the Bradleys will have cost $ 1,880,000 apiece, more than 12 times what earlier, far simpler plans assumed. By 1983, when the first BFV is scheduled to join U.S. forces in West Germany — the battlefield for which it was designed— it will have taken the Army 20 years to field a vehicle that was once supposed to be a relatively simple, "low-risk" weapons system ready for production in 1965. The vehicle now suffers an identity crisis. "The Army has tried to build a duck that squawks and a chicken that swims," remarks one frustrated critic. "Is this an APC or is it a tank?"

Flattening the Opposition
The story of the BFV — as pieced together from the Army, from the prime contractor and from its friends and enemies in Washington — is a crazy quilt of constant design changes, military doctrine changes, galloping price increases raising the total program cost to $13 billion, and
==29==
a steady bureaucratic momentum that has allowed the project to roll over its critics time and again, even though their ranks have included a President and powerful committees on Capitol Hill.
According to a recent report by the GAO, which has blazed away at the BFV for years without visible effect, the story of the BFV isn't unusual. There are 13 other weapons coming in the Army's $68 billion modernization program and they all share, to one degree or another, the problems of the BFV. From the outset, the vehicle was oversold and underpriced.
What the Army wanted initially was something quick, something that could be built from the parts of a self-propelled howitzer in production in 1963 when the Army began its search for a "mechanized infantry combat vehicle." The effort was dubbed MICV-65.
But by the time 1965 rolled around, the Army wasn't pleased. Three 52,000-pound prototypes had been built by Pacific Car & Foundry Co. (now called Paccar Inc.) in response to a request for an armored amphibious vehicle that would carry a 12-man squad into battle and could fire a cannon on the move.
The Army found the vehicles to be under-powered, too heavy and to stiffly sprung. It also found one of them winding up on the bottom of the Columbia River after a test failure. MICV-65 was abandoned.
The Vietnam war intervened, and sources of research and development money temporarily dried up. But by 1968 Army planners were at work on something smaller, something that would weigh 44,000 pounds, carry 10 men, swim and zip along the landscape at 45 miles an hour, fast enough to accompany the new tank that the Army was designing.
But Gen. Bruce Palmer Jr., the Army's vice chief of staff, scrapped that project. He called it too expensive (at $151,575 a copy), too heavy and "too sophisticated."
An Army panel then came up with a third vehicle that would be lighter and slower and would carry 12 men. It would cost about $270,000, though, and in 1970 the Army decided to look for something still cheaper, the "austere MICV."
The planners were feeling some pressure then because three years earlier the Soviet army had fielded an armored, cannon-packing, amphibious vehicle that could carry 11 men into combat and be dropped by parachute. So by late 1971, the Army began calling for developing to start "at the earliest possible date." Enter FMC Corp. During World War II, it had won an Army contract to produce a tracked amphibious vehicle called the Water Buffalo. The company built 11,000 of these vehicles, and they came rolling off the assembly lines within six months after the contract was signed. Later, FMC had designed and built the boxy M113, the predecessor of the MICV, a vehicle that Jane's Weapon Systems calls "one of the most successful vehicles ever in the U.S. Army service." In 1972, FMC sent the Pentagon a foot-high stack of documents and a
==30==
wooden mock-up of a vehicle with angled, laminated aluminum armor and a one-man gun turret. It would cost $272,000. The Army liked it, and FMC won a development contract calling for production to begin by September 1976.
FMC brought proven skills to the MICV project — in metal bending, welding and mechanical engineering. But Washington had changed. "What we're dealing with now is a multiheaded customer," one company official said. Several of the heads were in the Army. There was the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Ga., which wanted something to haul infantrymen into battle in a way that would allow them to fight from the vehicle. There was the Armor Center at Fort Knox, Ky., which wanted a heavy vehicle that could kill tanks. Then there was the cavalry, which was developing a light, three-man armored scout vehicle — later abandoned in favor of a variant of the MICV.

Many Problems
When FMC began to deliver test vehicles to the Army, there were problems, a lot of them. To keep up with the new tank, the MICV would have to move faster than 30 miles per hour over uneven terrain without injuring its troops. According to FMC, the strain was such that the test rigs were continually throwing tracks and breaking their suspension systems. That wasn't the worst problem. The General Electric transmission developed for the MICV couldn't go more than 50 miles before breaking down. According to FMC, the transmission problem alone caused a two-year delay. By late 1975, Washington was clearly getting impatient. The National Security Council was toying with the idea of dropping the U.S. project and buying a $400,000 West German vehicle called the Marder. In the summer of 1976, as the testing continued to flounder along, the then-Secretary of the Army, Martin Hoffmann, stopped everything. Army officials had come to agree that the MICV, as it stood, would have to be better armed to survive on a modern battlefield.

Changes Advocated
In October of that year, a high-level Army study group reported there would have to be major changes: The MICV should be refitted with two wire-guided TOW antitank missiles and a night-vision system. It should have a stabilized 25-mm cannon and a two-man gun turret. These changes were so impressive that in 1977 the Army renamed the MICV the Infantry Fighting Vehicle. FMC was awarded a contract for the revised vehicle. It estimated then that while the MICV could have
==31==
been built for $305,000, the IFV could be had for $397,000.
But the Senate Armed Services Committee was becoming openly critical of the vehicle, and not just on grounds of cost. It invited a series of witnesses who said that the aluminum armor was too thin and that the IFV was too big — two feet taller than the M 1 tank and 2 1/2 feet taller than its Soviet counterpart.
"If it gets blown up because of sticking up there where everybody can see it, it doesn't make any difference how sophisticated its gun is, or anything else," argued the chief Senate critic Democrat Sam Nunn of Georgia.

Critical Report
The unrest on the Hill provoked the GAO in December 1977 to publish a report that called the vehicle too slow, too big, too complicated, too heavy and too costly. "While the M113 may be inadequate, the Infantry Fighting Vehicle, which is nearly four times as expensive, thus far has not shown to be much of an improvement," the report said. At about the same time, the Office of Management and Budget was raising another argument. The new two-man turret had taken up so much space on the IFV that its crew of infantrymen had to be cut from eleven men to nine. Moreover, now the driver, the gunner and the commander probably would have to stay with the vehicle on the battlefield, leaving it with a deployable infantry unit of only six men. The OMB concluded that the project should be dropped.
Just before Christmas in 1977, President Carter agreed. The Army was told that the IFV was a "dead issue."
But it wasn't. The following summer, softened by a barrage of lobbying by FMC and the Army and distracted by a debate over whether to buy another aircraft carrier, Congress slipped money for the IFV back into the defense authorization bill.

Climbing Price Tag
Meantime, though, the price tag kept climbing. In January 1979, FMC announced that the cost of the IFVs would be $495,000 apiece and not the previously stated $397,000. "We had never built an electrical turret before, and we grossly underestimated its cost," explained FMC's Rex Vaughan, deputy manager of the IFV project. The production numbers had to be rejuggled. Instead of buying a total of 9,261 IFVs, the Army decided on 6,882. Instead of getting 170 vehicles in the year ahead, the Army suddenly found that it had money for only 87. After frantic back-and-forth with the Defense Department, FMC's board of directors eased the problem by advancing $50 million in company money to buy modern machinery needed to produce IFVs in volume.
==32==
"It was a gutsy decision," says Mr. Vaughan, noting that neither the Army nor the Defense Department had yet given final approval for production. Final approval required more testing. And in November 1979, after running 1FV prototypes over the rugged terrain at Fort Carson, Colo., the Army's Operation Test and Evaluation Agency filed a decidedly mixed report. It said that the IFV's night sight had image "flutter," that the electrical system broke down, that the IFV didn't seem able to keep up with the new U.S. tank in battle and that the commander in the vehicle would have difficulty deploying the troops outside. Moreover, the agency noted, it takes 72 minutes to prepare an IFV for airlift on a C141 transport and another hour and 21 minutes to load it because it has to be partly disassembled, squashed down on its springs and winched aboard. Nevertheless, the Army approved full production in December 1979, and the Defense Department agreed the following February. In the summer of 1980, the cavalry proudly rolled out its version of the IFV for testing in front of Maj. Gen. Louis Wagner, other dignitaries and a local television crew at Fort Knox. It drove into the Ohio River and promptly sank. Something was wrong with a latch related to a rubberized nylon collar that should allow the vehicle to float. The embarrassment was nothing compared to the uproar the following December when it was reported that the total cost of the IFV program had risen from $7.4 billion to more than $13 billion in one year. This time it was the Defense Department that had underestimated. Unrealistically low inflation estimates were blamed for half the increase; the rest was laid to further engineering changes and the Army's desire for more ammunition, spare parts and exotic electronic equipment. The House Appropriations Committee is still spinning around about that. Last November, shortly after the Army changed the IFV's name to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (after the late Gen. Omar Bradley), the committee ordered the Army to begin "side-by-side field tests" to see whether some other vehicle might take over the BFV's mission. The Senate Appropriations Committee has since watered that down, saying merely that the Army might consider such tests.

Another Broadside
In December, the OMB took another shot at the Bradley. It noted that for the price of one Bradley you could buy eight improved versions of the trusty M113. But such a substitution was rejected by the White House after the Army said it would protect the Bradley by taking budget cuts in other programs. FMC — which provides about 37% of the labor and hardware in the Bradley — has become extremely sensitive about the cost issue. Although
==33==
the simplest way to calculate each vehicle's cost is to divide the total number ordered by the program's total cost ($13 billion divided by 6,882 equals $ 1,880,000). FMC uses what the Pentagon calls "rollaway costs," which leave out the costs of development, extra parts and ammunition. By this measure, the Bradley costs either $1 million (in 1982 dollars), $1.2 million (in future "performing-year" dollars) or $880,000 (in constant 1980 dollars). Sometimes these figures are used interchangeably. A reporter who was briefed on the Bradley costs by a battery of FMC experts said he found them confusing. "Well goddammit, he ought to be confused," remarked C.H. Johnson, the head of FMC's Defense Equipment Group, "because we are."

Отредактировано skylancer-3441 (2018-02-26 22:32:34)

309

Из, гмм, сочинения "Army Acquisition System vs The Media" 1987 года - той или иной степени полноты и точности пересказ-хронология событий разработки американской БМП окончившейся в виде Бредли. На английском.

Свернутый текст

APPENDIX B
HISTORY OF THE BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE ARMY DEVELOPMENT

1957
US Army Armor Policy Conference stated a requirement for an infantry carrier which would permit fighting while mounted.

1958
Infantry School completed a study which recommended an infantry fighting vehicle that supported mounted and dismounted operations.
- Firing ports.
- Antitank capability.
- Two automatic weapons - 20 mm cannon and 7.62 mm machine gun.
- Squad size of 5 plus driver.
- 6 to 8 Tons.
CONARC requested approval from Chief of R&D on Statement of Requirements, O&O Concept, and Qualitative Material Requirement on IFV.
Chief, R&D disapproved because expected employment not clear.

1963
FMC presented several concepts for armored infantry fighting vehicles to the German Army.
Germany said it needed an IFV but would not start a coproduction program unless it was adopted by the US Army.
JCS endorsed the need for an armored infantry fighting vehicle in NATO.
Combat Developments Command study, Alternatives for a Post-1965 Infantry Carrier Program completed.
- M113 incompatible with envisioned main battle tank.
- Three alternatives examined: M113, substantially modified M113, and new armored carrier.
- Must be more than a "battle taxi."
- Protection from shell fragments (155mm), small arms fire, antipersonnel mines.
- Air transportable.
- Recommended development of new armored personnel carrier.

1964
US/FRG Nechanized Infantry Doctrine for the 1965-1975 Time Frame study was approved by DA. Recognized mounted infantry doctrine.
Six prototype vehicles (AIFV-65 or MICV-65) ordered. Vehicles were also referred to as the XM701.
Vehicles were too big, too slow, and too heavy.

1965
Contract awarded to Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory to conduct a parametric design/cost effectiveness study.
- 49 design concepts were examined.
- Results were the Tentative Operational Characteristics for MICV-70.
- Single element, full track vehicle preferred.
- Aluminum armor better protection.
- Turret better than pedestal-mounted main armament.
- Stabilized main armament more effective.
- 12-man crew with 20 mm cannon most cost-effective.
Cornell Labs also commissioned to examine impact of putting TOW on MICV. Results inconclusive.

1967
Contract to FMC for two experimental carriers based on the M113. Designated the XM765.
Cornell Labs contracted to compare three vehicles: the XM765, a conceptual MICV and a conceptual MICV with reduced protection. Conceptual MICV was considered superior.
Army decided not to pursue the XM765 program.
FMC continued the development of the MX765 and it is now in service in the Dutch Army.
Cornell Labs contracted to conduct "Phase III" design study. CSA limited study to single hull, full tracked, diesel powered vehicles.
- 9-man crew size more effective in the attack.
- Ballistic protection produced the most significant change in vehicle protection and cost.
- 20 horsepower per ton was adequate for cross country speed.
- MICV with TOW alone cost more than the MICV with 25 mm and did not increase effectiveness in the attack.
- Conclusions were 12-man crew design mounting a 25mm cannon and offering protection against 14.5mm fire would be the least costly. Would weigh about 51,400 pounds.

1968
Project Manager for the MICV Program was chartered.
Qualitative Material Requirements (QMR) developed for the MICV and disapproved by VCSA.
- Frontal protection against 23mm armor piercing ammunition.
- Side and rear protection against 14.5mm.
- Overhead protection against 155mm artillery fire.
- Provide for a 10-man crew.
- Mount a 25mm cannon and 7.62mm coax machine gun.
- Swim.
- Cruising range of 400 miles.
- Collective NBC protection.
- Be C5 air transportable.
- Implied in the CDC proposal was a two-vehicle approach. One that met the QMR for Europe and a less sophisticated one for low intensity conflicts.
Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle Ad Hoc Study Group formed to study the MICV QMR (Casey Study). The study and new QMR recommended:
- C141 transportable.
- 12-man crew.
- 20-30 mm gun.
- 2-man turret.
- 37,000 pounds.
- Improving the M113 would not satisfy the IFV requirement of keeping up with tanks.
- Firmly established the need for a single Infantry Fighting Vehicle.

1969
Commander-in-Chief USAREUR expressed concerns about the protection levels of the MICV.
MBT-70 came under scrutiny and criticism and so did its companion infantry fighting vehicle (MICV).
Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle Alternatives Cost Effectiveness Study (MICV ACE) was directed.
- The MICV meeting the QMR requirements (XM723) was considered superior; Austere MICV was second.
PM started development of an austere MICV during preparation of MICV ACE.
- Pedestal mounted 20 mm.
- Smaller engine.
- Weight 33,750 pounds.

1970
MICV ACE and Austere MICV concepts presented to a special cost-effectiveness in-process review.
Austere MICV deemed more cost-effective.
QMR was modified to reflect the Austere MICV measures.

1971
Material Needs (MN) document for the MICV approved.
MICV Development Concept Paper (DCP) presented at the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC).

1972
OSD approved DCP. OSD said proposed development schedule was too long.
Army issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for MICV development.
FMC received the contract. Schedule called for a low rate initial production to begin in 1976 with the first operationally equipped unit occurring in 1978.

1973
Army started taking deliveries of the XM723 MICV prototype.

1974
Army stopped the development of the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle program and combined it with the MICV program.
Because of technical problems, PM realigned the MICV engineering development program.
GAO issued a report critical of the cost-effectiveness of the MICV and said the MICV ACE was outdated.
Because of continued concern over cost of the MICV and a less than impressive Bushmaster COEA, the Army directed a MICV Special Study Group be brought together.

1975
MICV Speical Study Group report issued:
- Confirmed the requirement of a fighting vehicle.
- Antitank capability for MICV desirable.
- Swim capability must be retained.
- Need for firing port weapons confirmed.
- Needed a turret-mounted long range cannon.
- Stabilized turret.
- Integral day-night weapons' sight.
- Dual feed capability for main armament.
The MICV still having problems with its transmission and the Bushmaster development was behind that of the MICV.
Hughes Helicopter given a 25-month contract tdevelop the 25mm chain gun. Shoot off competition scheduled for 1978 with first weapons scheduled for delivery in 1981.

1976
A special general officer review of the MICV operational issues (Larkin Study):
- Common chassis, turret, and upper hull for MICV be developed for the infantry and scout roles.
- Include a TOW capability.
- MICV be developed with a 2-man turret.
- Mechanized infantry battalions be equipped with 4 MICV per platoon, 13 per company and 41 per battalion.
Finding of the Larking Study approved by Secretary of the Army, MICV program restructured.

1977
VCSA approved the renaming of the vehicle to the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (XM2) and the Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (XM3)
Phase II development contract given to FMC.
- Continue development of a two-man turret,
- Upgrade MICV to IFV configuration.
IFV/CFV COEA directed as Phase II of the MICV Special Study Group effort.
Congress directed a study of a follow-on vehicle to the IFV. The IFV Task Force was formed (Crizer Study).
- Reconfirmed the requirement for an infantry fighting vehicle.
- Design review of the IFV indicated it was capable of performing its assigned mission.
- Conceptual follow-on vehicles with heavy armor were more effective but were offset by high investment costs, unacceptable delays in increased force readiness and medium to high technical risks.
- Recommended continued development of the IFV/CFV.
Army notified that all funding (procurement and R&D) for the IFV/CFV program had been deleted from the budget submit (22 Dec 1977).

1978
OSD agreed to continue R&D on the IFV but directed a study of less costly alternatives.
IFV/CFV Speical Study Group formed at Fort Leavenworth (Mahaffey Study).
Congress restored funding for long lead items for the IFV/CFV program.
IFV/CFV COEA completed:
- IFV/CFV with TBAT II turret was the most operationally effective.
- IFV equipped force was the only alternative which showed a possibility of mission success.
Mahaffey Study complete:
- Continue IFV/CFV development.
- Do not develop M113 derivatives as future fighting vehicles.
- Do not commit development funds to IFV derivatives as an ITV replacement at that time.
- Adding TOW on the IFV was a cost-effective means of adding antitank capabilities to the force structure.
Two prototype turrets delivered to the Army. TOW and gun system firings began.
First engineering developed vehicle delivered to the Army - Dec 1978.
Contractor testing started.

1979
By February, eight IFV/CFV pilot vehicles had been completed.
Government testing began in July.
Update COEA conducted.
- Results of previous studies remain valid.
- Threat improvements have not degraded effectiveness of IFV/CFV.
- The IFV/CFV remains the most cost-effective alternative.
ASARC III held on 20 December 1979:
- IFV/CFV approved for production.
- Production rate be increased to 90 vehicles per month as soon as possible.

1980
DSARC III held on 22 January 1980:
- IFV/CFV approved for production.
- Production rate to be increased from 50 vehicles per month to 90 per month by 1985.
- NFY 81 production funds would be released until a September Program review.
September Program Review to report on:
- Acceleration of the cost reduction program.
- Reevaluation of the Army survivability test plan.
- Correct the deficiencies in the Integrated Sight Unit.
- Examine a program to develop a long rod penetrator ammunition.
- Initiate a high priority effort to execute a competition production program.
September IFV program review held 16 October 1980.
OSD released FY 81 funds by Memorandum on 30 October 1980.
Vulnerability testing began - consisted of vaporifics and ballistics tests.

1981
First vehicle off the production line - May 1981.

1983
March - start of unit handoff.
December - Initial operational capability (IOC) unit.

1984
Additional vaporifics tests conducted.

1985
March - Vulnerability testing against overmatching weapons began.
May - M2A1/M3A1 production decision made.
December - Phase I vulnerability test report submitted to Congress.

и оно же там https://pastebin.com/raw/phwdAJwj с чуть иным форматированием
(в тексте есть несколько мелких изменений в местах которые я счёл опечатками/описками)
(и надеюсь ошибки распознавания я всё же все выловил)

...

1963
FMC presented several concepts for armored infantry fighting vehicles to the German Army

облик и некоторые характеристики этих концептов известны благодаря всплывавшим там http://ftr.wot-news.com/2014/03/26/the- … agdpanzer/ фотографиям страниц некой книги, вот те что касаются БМП (а не ПТ-САУ):
https://i.imgur.com/yGtUJx2l.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/z2FyTYrl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/oZTfXFKl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/gemTm8Sl.jpg

...
В середине 80ых скандал с Бёртоном и защищённостью Брёдли, в первую очередь от кумулятивных боеприпасов, развился достаточно сильно, и Армия США наконец занималась этой проблемой, в результате было создано минимум два прототипа (...а вообще, по идее должно было быть 4 конфигурации - обычная и кавалерийская)
https://i.imgur.com/CB9DPE1.jpg
если я правильно понимаю, хотя может тут и ошибаюсь, - вот на этой картинке, показанной на ютьюбе в одном из видеороликов из (являющейся пересказом Pentagon Wars Бёртона, и некоторых иных статей на тему, но ещё более тенденциозно) серии видео The REAL Bradley "Fighting" Vehicle! в контексте именно этих испытаний, - это именно та машина что обозначена как High Survivability:
https://i.imgur.com/XSV4zVpl.png
а что касается ASTB - созданного при участии Бёртона, - то у Ханниката на с.298 есть две фотографии этой машины:
https://i.imgur.com/I20GrLnl.png https://i.imgur.com/493MQbIl.png
и ещё одна фотография - с чуть иным расположением и открытой бортовой амбразурой - отыскалась в книге Бёртона Pentagon Wars:
https://i.imgur.com/iYx4gEYl.jpg
(с подписью The Minimum Casualty Baseline Vehicle. The author asked the Army to test this Bradley design in the second phase of the live-fire tests. Specific design features to reduce Bradley casualties are external fuel tanks, 25-mm ammunition compartments, external TOW stowage, improved 30-mm protection, and a spall liner. Dubbed by the Army “Burton’s F___ing Vehicle,” this is the actual vehicle that was tested.)
(А ДЗ он видимо считал излишней мерой, ставя важнейшей - задачу изоляции опасных для экипажа и десанта вещей внутри машины от людей, в том числе через вытаскивание наружу. Ну, на сколько я понимаю сказанное им в слушаниях "Capability of the Bradley fighting vehicle" апреля 1987)
(картинки кликабельны)

Отредактировано skylancer-3441 (2018-02-28 05:32:14)

310

skylancer-3441, дотошно вы копаете архивы. Книгу собираетесь писать?  :)

311

Это в общем не архивы, в строгом смысле этого слова. Всё из вполне доступных мест, ну то есть книг, журналов, стенограмм и прочего, онлайн доступных, разве что обычно разбросано а не концентрировано, а так - скажем по критериям "введения в научный оборот" - явно давно введено в таковой.
Про американскую разработку БМП основная книга, многое цитирующая из самых разных тех же публикаций, ну разве что бедно иллюстрированная, - уже есть - Bradley and how it got that way, 1999 года издания, есть в "ограниченном просмотре" на Гуглокнигах,  и ~137 из 160 страниц основного текста, а всего полторы сотни из двухсот страниц - вполне можно увидеть - ну, с некоторыми усилиями.

...
В стенограмме слушаний состоявшихся в январе 1986 года по теме "Department of Defense Test Procedures" с 21 страницы и далее - тоже была приведена краткая история американских разработок БМП, с 1964 года, кончавшаяся Бредли
- в виде презентации со слайдами и стенограммой текста докладчика (некоего Anthony Battista, если я правильно понимаю - в то время конгрессмен, участник комитета по R&D при комитете по Вооружённым Силам Сената США):

Свернутый текст

BRADLEY CHRONOLOGY
Joint US/FRG study of 1964 established the requirement for mechanized infantry to be able to fight mounted
MICV initiated in 1965
- a relatively simple follow on to the M-113
Army Vice Chief rejects early design proposals as too big, heavy, complicated in 1968
Casey board 1968 approved a smaller, lighter less costly 12 man vehicle with a 20mm cannon and firing ports

==>INCONSISTENT STORY

Now, I would like to switch over to the Bradley, and how not to build a weapons’ system, because the Bradley is a classic example. The Bradley’s history goes back about 28 years.
In fact, in the formal sense, it goes back to 1964. There was a joint study with the Federal Republic of Germany, and this study established the requirement for the infantry to fight from a vehicle. The MICV was initiated in 1965, was supposed to be a relatively simple follow-on to a $26,000 a copy vehicle called the M-113, and there was a lot of turmoil over the program at that time.
The Army Vice Chief, who was then Ralph Haines said, “Hey, look, these design proposals you are giving me are too complicated. This vehicle is too big. It is too heavy. It is too sensitive.”
“I don’t want it. I am looking for something that can get infantry troops up to the front lines to support my armor. Don’t tell me about engaging other vehicles.”
So, he, as a consequence of that concern, convened a board that was under Brig. Gen. George Casey called the Casey Board. In 1968 they approved a smaller, lighter less costly MICV, which is what the Bradley was called back then, the mechanized infantry combat vehicle [MICV].
However, in the spirit of compromise they came out with sort of a conflict. What they came up with was a stabilized cannon for this smaller low-cost lighter vehicle, and that I think served as the epic for the principal issue on the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and that it was supposed to be antipersonnel.

The Issue
Anti-personnel was the highest priority task but the 20MM stabilized cannon was not an anti-personnel weapon.

It was stated, this mission was stated as the as the army’s highest priority. However, the stabilized cannon, was not an anti-personnel weapon, so you can see the genesis of the turmoil.

BRADLEY CHRONOLOGY POST 1968
1969 MICV intended as a companion vehicle to MBT-70.
An austere MICV was judged to be nearly as effective as the MICV—Sheridan power train, suspension, simple cannon.
Approved by Army in 1970.
DEP SEC DEF approved DCP in 1972.
Within the year the DCP was amended: Simple weapon abandoned; added the Bushmaster.
Austerity was illustory.

If you look at the Bradley post 1968, the Army advertised this was going to be a companion vehicle to the MBT-70. This was still another calibration point in identifying this conflict that was going to take place, because if this thing was going to go up there and fight side-by-side with tanks it was going to get blown off the face of the Earth.
That is one thing I think you can state categorically regardless of the amount of testing the army does and there is plenty of evidence to support that. If you put this thing side-by-side with tanks it gets blown away.
That is why we put the kind of armor we did on the M-1 tank, and that contains a crew of four. It makes no sense to put a crew of nine in the same area with the protective vehicle with the standoff armor capability that Bradley’s have.
They decided again that the vehicle got too costly and complicated so they came up with an austere MICV. This was now a vehicle that was going to use the Sheridan power train, Sheridan suspension system, and kind of off the shelf of parts. They did a study on that and they concluded that the austere MICV was just as capable as the one that they had in design, and this was approved by the Army in 1970, and the Secretary of Defense approved that development concept paper in 1972.
However, within 1 year, the whole thing, the whole concept of austerity was lost, because somebody made the decision to put a Vehicle Rapid-Fire gun System on this thing, and again that added complexity, it added more capability to the system, and the whole concept of austerity became an illusion. It just wasn’t there.
Now, to show you how adding these things sounds simple, but is complex, let me say that if you wanted to go from armor protection against the 14,5 mm to a 23 mm, that would add about 4 tons in armor to the tank. If you wanted to change the horsepower to weight ratio by just a few, 2 to 5, that would result in about 5 percent increase in the weight you would add to that tank.
If you wanted protection against the 20-pound mine, that would add another 5,000 pounds to the tank. If you wanted protection against the 40-pound mine, it is not linear, that would add as much as 18,000 pounds to the weight of that APC, so what is happening is you have got a series of considerations here that change the vehicle characteristics significantly.
The program was not new in 1972. It was around since 1964, and everybody and his brother was perturbing the program and trying to put in what they wanted.

BRADLEY CHRONOLOGY POST 1972
MICV (XM-723) test results were poor
Weight increased to 42.000 pounds
GAO critical of MICV in 1974
Mid—1974 Army cancelled Armored Recon Scout Vehicle (ARSV)
MICV identified as ARSV replacement
1976 study to put TOW on the MICV
1976 Sec Hoffman challenged MICV mission
Larkin study recommended TOW

==>MICV was now a troop carrier, scout and anti armor vehicle

Now let’s take the chronology from post-1972. The tests results were very bad. The weight had increased. It was now a 42,000-pound vehicle.
The GAO was very critical of the MICV. The army then in 1974 canceled something called the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle Program, and then somebody had the bright idea, let’s make the MICV, which is now the Bradley Scout Vehicle, which was a very silly idea.
It is sort of like trying to hide the Refrigerator in the Mormon Tabernacle Choir because this thing is now 10 feet tall. To use it in a scouting mission you would have to wonder about it. It is very, very big.
If you look at the BMP in contrast to the Bradley, the BMP is about 85 inches tall. I have sat in it. It is a little uncomfortable.
Russ Murray sat in it. Other people have suggested to raise the height 4 inches. It has a very low silhouette in comparison to the Bradley.
I am not giving you a qualitative analysis of the BMP against the Bradley. I am not in a position to do that across-the-board,
I am just giving you one aspect of it. In any event the program was getting challenged by Secretary Hoffman, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, and this in turn precipitated the Larkin study under General Larkin, and then what happened was that out of all of this came the requirement to put a two-man turret on the MICV, on the Bradley, and now you had a troop carrier, you had a scout vehicle, you had an antiarmor vehicle, and when you add up the characteristics of all of these things, you may come up with a null set, that is it does a lot of things very poorly instead of a few things very well.

Impact - MICV now carried 9, not 11-man crew because of the 2-man turret
Significance: Original requirement was to carry 12; driver, gunner, vehicle commander stay with vehicle providing a dismounted infantry squad of 6; 1978 study by the infantry school evaluated effectiveness of 9, 7, 5 man squads; five man squad was judged as less than 20 percent as effective as a 9 man squad; results confirmed by operational tests at Fort Carson July—November 1979.

Well, let’s look at the impact of this decision now to put the two-man TOW-Busfamaster turret on the MICV. Here is the impact.
Now it didn’t carry 11 men, it carries nine, because you needed that space for the 2-man turret.
Now what is the significance of this?
The original requirement for a fighting vehicle was for 12 men. Then we went to 11. Now we are down to 9.
Now if you go back and look at the infantry school study of 1978, they concluded the MICV needed a nine-man squad. If you go to a six-man squad, a five-man squad, or a seven-man squad, we lose a lot of effectiveness, that is a five-man squad is only 20 percent as effective as a nine-man squad, so you can see how adding a two-man turret to this thing now costs you capability in terms of its original mission, which was to take the squad, the nine-man squad up to the lines, in support of the armor.
Now, you may say well, that was just a study, how good is that? The results were confirmed by the operational tests at Fort Carson in 1979 during the period of July to November. In fact, I have got some quotes back in my office of the tester who said this just doesn’t cut it.
Now, there were other perturbations as well, and other documents to support the fact that this vehicle was being made so hybrid that it didn’t do anything very well. These are not my statements now. I will give you an example.
There is a message sent by Gen. Don Starry who at that time was the Commander of the Training Tactics and Doctrine Command, and in this message, in fact, I will give you the daytime group, it is 1614 November 14, 1977, if you want to go back and check it out.
In the message he implies, “Who in the hell decided to put this TOW on this fighting vehicle?”
He said, “If I am going to effectively use TOW, then I am going to be 3,000 meters from the order of battle, and therefore it can’t provide very good infantry support vehicle for armor.”
Now if you put this thing up where the battle is going on then TOW is maldeployed, so what are we doing here?
We really ought to be developing something else called a heavy infantry fighting vehicle. You can understand the political nuisance there. That message was quickly cast aside, but I will say one thing, even General Richardson who didn’t agree with General Starry at that time wrote a memo saying, “I think it was a mistake to put TOW on the MICV.”
All of this exists. I can give you all of the references chapter and verse on opinions expressed by generals and by people in positions of responsibility.
Now, it is interesting to note that during the Carter years, I think it was in 1977, the OMB made a decision to terminate the MICV. They said it is too expensive, and President Carter was going to uphold that decision, and Russ Murray at that time said, why don’t you give them one more year of R&D and also make them look at the alternatives, and in effect that kept the program going, and it was in 1977 when I appeared during the markup before the R&D Subcommittee, and said, I think we ought to terminate this and I think we ought to terminate it because its mission has been so diluted by adding capability that I don’t think it can really do its job.
That recommendation was not accepted, and I haven’t spoken out in favor of or in opposition to the Bradley since that date, until December 5 when Mr. Bennett, Mr. Dickinson and several other members of the subcommittee asked me about its survivability.
Let me talk about the main issue today before I get into just a quick critique of the tests. These are the Bradley issues today.

Bradley Issues Today
Main issue—What’s it for?
If used by infantry on the defense—how can it survive enemy weapons?
Overwatch—if it stays back its effect may be negligible
If used on offense—how can it see dug in enemy troops? How about its size? What about the loss of effectiveness because of the 6-man squad?

What is it?
What are you going to use it for?
I mean how do you resolve all of the inconsistencies in the stories that have been going around for the past 17 years?
In fact, I am sorry, it is 22 years right now. If it is going to be used by the infantry on the defense how is it going to survive the small weapons. If you are going to use it for overwatch, is its impact negligible by virtue of its standing back?
If you are going to use it on offense, how good is its visibility. These are the questions you have got to develop with the Army before you come to any conclusions on the results of the tests. I think you have got to ask how are you going to use it, and if you are going to put this thing up there side-by-side with the tanks, I will state unequivocally it gets blown away.
Now I can’t get into the specific details. I can tell you that in the tests of some armored vehicles loaded with a very modest supply of weapons, like the Soviets have, and like we have, if you put a round right through that stream you will have nothing but a crater there plus a piece of aluminum.

и как отдельно подготовленный текст от того же докладчика, без слайдов, и несколько иной по содержанию:

Свернутый текст

The History of the Bradley or How Not to Develop a Weapons System
I would like to turn now to the issue of the Bradley and show how a system that spends 17 years of its life in research and development can become so controversial.
In the normal development process, a service should start out with a stated requirement for a weapons system. Performance thresholds are established in what Is called a Development Concept Paper (DCP). In the case of a missile, for example, the altitude region in which the missile was to perform would be stated with a margin on both the low and the high side. Similarly, the launch envelope would be specified as well as the target characteristics. During the development phase, a program manager would be satisfied if the tests indicated that the missile could perform in accordance with the DCP and if things did not go too well, hope that it would not breach the thresholds.
The same approach would be used for the development of an aircraft, a tank, an armored personnel carrier or any other weapon system. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle and a host of other weapons systems did not follow this strategy.
The concept of the Bradley started over two decades ago, but in the formal sense, began in 1964. These was a joint U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany study in 1964 that established the requirement for the Mechanised Infantry to be able to fight from a vehicle - mounted. In 1965, after approving this study, the Army initiated the Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicle - the MICV - which ultimately became the Bradley.
It should be emphasized that the Army's concept at that time was to develop a relatively simple follow-on to the M-113. Within a few years, however, this simple follow-on was becoming more complex. In 1968, the Army Vice Chief, General Ralph Haines, rejected the design proposal because the proposed vehicle was too big, too heavy, and too complicated.
Later in 1968, a panel was convened under the direction of General Georgs Casey to review the design of the MICV. It is my understanding that General Haines believed that the principal function of the MICV was a transport and not for anti-vehicle applications. The Casey Board presented its findings later in 1968 and recommended a low-cost, small light vehicle - much different than the one proposed by the Army's Combat Development Command. Toward the end of 1968, General Palmer, who was then the Vice Chief of Staff, approved the MICV proposed by the Cacey Panel. This smaller, simpler vehicle would carry a crew of 12 with a stabilized cannon and firing ports for the infantrymen.
This was, in my opinion, the epoch for the ensuing controversy, conflict, disruptions and perturbations in the MICV program. On the one hand, some of the Army wanted a transport vehicle - a battlefield taxi - with an anti-persoonel capability. There were others, however, who wanted more than an anti-personnel capability, and in my judgement, the Casey Board provided a compromise by adding a stabilized cannon to a light, simple low-cost vehicle. The estimated cost of this vehicle was about $115,000 and its weight would be somewhere around 35,000 pounds.
It was in 1969 when the Army began talking about the MICV as a companion vehicle to the new main battle tank, the MBT-70. The controversy and conflict was beginning to heighten. Again, people in the Army and in the OSD questioned the requirement and configuration of the MICV. At that time there was still another study to evaluate an austere MICV. This vehicle would use a Sheridan power train, a simple pedestal mounted cannon and Sheridan suspension. This austere vehicle was shown to be nearly as effective as the MICV and in 1970, the Army apprpoved the development of the austere MICV. The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the Development Concept Paper in 1972 but again, within one year, the simple cannon was abandoned, the complicated Bushmaster gun was added and austerity rapidly became history.
In the post-1972 era, the MICV was showing rather poorly. Its weight was over 42,000 pounds, it had powertrain problems and collectively the problems led to a GAO report that was critical of the MICV in 1974.
An event that significantly perturbed the MICV program was still another change in its mission. In 1974, the Army terminated the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicie program (ARSV). The MICV was now identified as the replacement for the ARSV and now we had what I considered to be an anti-personnel, anti-vehicle, scout platform all of which would lead to a vehicle that did a lot at things very poorly rather than a single mission very well.
In 1976, after Secretary of Defense Schlesinger threatened to terminate the program because it was too expensive for the capability that it would provide, the Army conducted a study to put the TOW missile on the MICV. The need for the MICV was now being questioned by Army Secretary Hoffman which led to a study chaired by General Richard Larkin. The Larkin Panel recommended the development of a two-man turret. The conflict was reaching its pinnacle since the two-man turret now resulted in a vehicie that could carry not the 12 man recommended by the Casey Board, or the 11 man approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1972, but 9 man.
This was significant since we now had a 9-man vehicle of which three of the crew were dedicated to and would have to remain with the vehicle. It was significant because in 1978 the Army Infantry School conducted a study to evaluate the effectiveness of a 9, 7, and 5 man squad. The results of this showed that a five-man squad was lass than 20 percent as effective as a nine-man squad. Since three man were dedicated to the vehicle, we now had a six-man squad which was deemed ineffective by the Army's own studies.
While it's true that studies can be in error, the results of this particular study were actually verified in operational tests at Fort Carson, Colorado, between the period July-November 1979. I would also point out that the Army Chief of Staff advised the Congress in 1980 that if the MICV were to be designed in 1980, he would want it to carry more infantry.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle development program is a textbook example of how not to build a weapons system. If you review the history very carefully and in great detail, you could come to the conclusion that we have built an "operational kludge." The issue before you is really WHAT IS THE BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE SUPPOSE TO DO?

If it is to be used by the infantry on the defense, you have to carefully analyse the test results to determine if it can survive enemy weapons. My review of the data, albeit cursory, tells me that this vehicle cannot fight slde-by-side with tanks.
If it is to be used on offense, is the visibility of the crew such that it can see dug-in enemy troops? Additionally, how can the Army explain the loss of effectiveness as a consequence of the six-man dismounted squad?

Mr. Chairman, my brief review of the test results brings me to the conclusion that very little has been done to demonstrate the effectiveness and survivability of the Bradley. Some examples - the impact points and attack directions of the live fire shots were not random or representative of the locations of combat impacts. Ammunition in the Bradley contained inert fuzes which did not demonstrate the violence at the reactions of ammunition that takes on a direct hit.
My brief review of the test results generates more questions than answers. There is a need to do more dynamic testing. There is a need to use live fuses in evaluating the violence of ammunition strikes. Wa cannot fault the JLFT concept for these deficiencies. In fact, without the JLFT, the problems would never have surfaced. You might question the Army representatives who delineated the test plan why the testing was structured in such an unrealistic manner.

In all candor I could not give you e favorable recommendation on the basis of the tests conducted to date. So much more has to be done. The Procurement Subcommittee will conduct a more comprehensive review at the program and the test data.
Based on this review, there may be less costly, more effective alternatives to the Bradley. These alternatives would include the improved M-113 used by the Dutch - the XM-765.

(в тексте есть некоторые изменения в местах которые я счёл опечатками/описками)
(и надеюсь ошибки распознавания я всё же все выловил)

Бёртон ссылался на именно эти тексты данные выше. Собственно, вот его версия истории - из 8 главы Pentagon Wars:

Свернутый текст

I would like to explain what a Bradley Fighting Vehicle is, but that is not an easy task. The Army has been trying to explain it for twenty years, without much success. The Bradley is an armored vehicle that looks like a tank, sounds like a tank, travels in the company of tanks, and carries offensive weapons with which to shoot at enemy tanks, but the Bradley is not a tank. Tanks have big cannons to shoot at other tanks, and they have thick, heavy armor to provide protection against antitank weapons. The Bradley’s armor is very thin compared with the armor of a tank; it is more like that of a personnel carrier. The Bradley is not exactly a personnel carrier either, although that is what it started out to be. This attempt to define a Bradley reveals the root of most of its problems. What is the Bradley, and what is it supposed to do? These questions have plagued the Bradley for twenty years. To this day, they have not been fully answered.
In the early 1960s, the Army began to develop a simple, inexpensive replacement for its M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier. The M-113 was, and still is, a “battlefield taxi,” a vehicle that simply transports troops to and from the battle. An infantry squad of eleven men rides inside. The armor is thick enough to protect the squad only from small arms fire (rifles and machine guns). Anything larger than small arms will pass through the M-113, or any lightly armored vehicle, like a hot knife through butter. For this reason, troops over the years have refused to ride inside the M-113 when encountering enemy fire larger than small arms is a possibility. Instead, they ride on top.
The Bradley began as the M-113 replacement. Its job would be to transport an eleven-man infantry squad to the battlefield—a simple, straightforward task. The Bradley was in development for seventeen years, however; during that time, the Army kept changing its mind about what it wanted the Bradley to do. The notion of having the Bradley engage other vehicles crept into the picture. The Bradley would team up with the new M-1 tanks, and together they would engage enemy armored forces. In this situation, the Bradley would take return fire from enemy vehicles, which meant taking hits from weapons far larger than small arms, but the Bradley’s armor was not beefed up accordingly. Then, someone came up with the idea that the troops inside should be able to stick their rifles out through little portholes to shoot at the enemy. Long after the Bradley had entered production, this feature proved to be useless and the portholes were sealed up.
During the Bradley’s development, several committees were formed to review the program and decide on its mission and features. These included the Casey Board, Larkin Committee, and others. Each time a committee met, the mission changed and new design features were added. By the time production was approved in 1980, the Bradley had three missions. It confirmed the old adage that a camel is a horse designed by a committee.
I cannot help but compare the Bradley to the Air Force F-16. Thanks to the Fighter Mafia, the F-16 was the product of a highly disciplined design process. The combat tasks were decided first and were not allowed to vary during the design phase. This produced a superior design that was tailored to those specific tasks. The combat tasks of the Bradley, on the other hand, kept changing. Each change brought a new design feature that was simply added to the picture. The resulting product is a vehicle that performs a variety of tasks but does no task very well.
For example, as a personnel carrier, the Bradley can carry a squad of only six, not eleven. As an armored scout vehicle, it is supposed to seek out the enemy, probe its defenses, and sneak around behind the lines to see what is going on—all without being noticed (sneak, peek, and tell mission). Unfortunately, the Bradley is the largest vehicle on the battlefield and stands out like a sore thumb. It stands 10 feet tall, some 3 feet taller than its Soviet counterpart. It is hard to be inconspicuous when you are the largest guy at the party. Army Gen. Edwin Burba, commandant of the Infantry School, claimed on CBS’s 60 Minutes (15 February 1987) that the added height was an advantage. He could see farther from up there!
A 1976 decision to give the Bradley an antiarmor mission, in my view, was the key decision in the history of the program. A two-man turret was added to the vehicle so that TOW antitank missiles and a 25-mm cannon could be fired at enemy armored personnel carriers (APCs) as the Bradley fought alongside our M-1 tanks. This decision guaranteed that the Bradley would be subject to return fire from antitank weapons, yet its armor would provide little or no protection against any antitank weapons, whether of small, medium, or large caliber.
The turret decision also guaranteed that the troop compartment of the Bradley would be stuffed with dangerous ammunition and TOW missiles and that the compartment could hold only six riflemen instead of eleven, as in its smaller predecessor APC, the M-113.

...
упомянутая выше в публицистической статье "Барахло за 13 миллиардов" - такая же публицистическая, хоть и это ветер дующий другую сторону, статья из февральского нумера журнала Форбс за 1980 год, с.114. На английском.

БМПшное отставание

The IFV gap.
by Beth Brophy
Forbes
February 18, 1980

For 18 years the U.S. Army has been dreaming about a new kind of armored vehicle. The Soviets has been building them since 1967. We'll start next year. Maybe.

In a sprawling factory nestled in the fields opposite the airport at San Jose, Calif., several hundred FMC Corp. workers are beginning to tool up for a new Army vehicle. The first production model won't roll off until May of 1981, but before the run ends in ten years, thousands may be built and billions of dollars may flow to the contractors. The story of this "Infantry Fighting Vehicle" — a troop carrier that fights like a tank — illustrates the promises and pitfalls of the coming arms buildup.
The Army is talking about buying 6,900 of FMC's fighting vehicles at $500,000 each. The total bill will run $8 billion; $5 billion to $6 billion for vehicles and parts, $2 billion for support, ammunition and maintenance. That money will be spread around to other contractors, too: General Electric will make the transmission and turret drive system; Hughes Helicopter, the fast-firing—up to 200 rounds a minute—automatic 25mm cannon; Hughes Aircraft, the antitank missile launchers; Ford, the ammunition.
The new IFV, also called the XM-2, will be quite a buggy. It will weigh in at 24 tons and run 45 miles per hour on roads. It will be able to swim rivers, knock out opposing tanks day or night, blow down buildings and spray enough machine-gun fire in all directions to scatter the largest mobs, as well as carry a squad of nine infantrymen safely into the heart of the battlefield. The IFV is considered a partner to the new Army supertank, the Chrysler XM-1, for massive ground battles. But unlike the 60-ton XM-1, the IFV fits in a C-141, the workhorse of the airborne corps, and could prove important to the still-forming Rapid Deployment Force (Forbes, Jan. 22, 1979).
The history of this promising weapon is, however, a study in frustration. It's not easy to build weapons for a war that hasn't been fought. So, hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent before the first production model is completed.
The story starts in 1962. The old World War II M-113 was still in use, but the generals considered that an aluminum taxicab, offering no protection to troops in battle. They wanted a vehicle that would bring men up to the field and do some fighting, too. It wasn't a priority project during the Vietnam War, and the requirements kept changing.
“The development and refielding of a replacement for the M-113 armored personnel carrier has a record of stop-start and frustration since it was initiated,” says Brigadier General Philip Bolté, the Army's program manager for the weapons system. FMC, which made the old M-113, was in the IFV project from the beginning. Its first effort was called the MICV-65, or Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle-65. It had a small, one-man turret that, it was later decided, wasn't such a good idea, as the commander was exposed rather than protected by armor, and the 20mm cannon wasn't powerful enough. The teeth on the tracks broke, and the transmission had problems. Even so, the MICV-65 went all the way into prototype before rejection. Putting the best possible face on the delays, General Bolté says: "The best is always the enemy of the good enough in any research and development program."
With each failure, the Army embarked on a new study, changin the program several times along the way. The trouble, admits General Bolte, was that the Army didn't know what it was looking for. And like a cab driver uncertain of his destination, each wrong turn pushed the cost meter up. FMC, of course, has had its problems, too. Says Vice President Philip Devirian, who has been in on the project since 1972, "Our frustrations usually re late to money. We had to spend lots of time and effort working around the money problems, as well as the mechanical problems. But we never gave up."
Then came the 1973 Israeli-Egyptian War, Egyptian soldiers equipped with wire guided antitank missiles smashed the Israeli tank attacks. It marked the death of armor, critics said — and stil say. But the Army pushed on. Those missiles can be beaten, General Bolté says, by evasive maneurvers and by spraying gunfire at the men launching them; they can't duck and aim at once.
By 1976 Congress was so miffed at the delays, it wrote into the 1977 Appropriations Bill that the first vehicle must be produced by May 1981. The program was still being modified, though: The turret became a two-man bastion; TOW missiles were added; the vehicle's command station was moved. Costs kept rising, and by last year the projected unit was up to $495,000, compared with about $90,000 for the old M-113.
"No one ever made a complex turret with a combined gun-and-missile system and fire control to handle them. It cost more than either the Army or FMC estimated," Bolte says. What's more, says the Army, the old M-113 just isn't in the same league with the IFV-XM-2. The Army also says its new vehicle can knock out Russian BMP troop carriers at more than 2,000 meters and ranks high on the test results from Ft. Carson, Colo.
“Our prime difficulty was finding a vehicle that went fast enough to monitor it,” says Major Anthony Trifiletti at Ft. Carson. William Rutledge, the IFV program manager for FMC, says proudly that his vehicle is so fast that troops returning from the testing range were given a ticket for exceeding the 35-mph speed limit.
FMC, the prime contractor, has spent upwards of $50 million of its own in preparing the IFV for production, while the Army has pumped in $262 million over 18 years. Even if the orders come, FMC has the field to itself only until 1984, when the contract will be opened for new bidding, although FMC does have the edge because of its experience in its early development and production.
Is the project worth the fuss? Thirteen years ago the Russians decided the IFV was the coming thing. Today you see them on every TV news show, in newspapers and magazines, those low-tracked vehicles in rows at the Kabul Airport or racing down Afghan highways...

...
в журнале Soldiers за декабрь 1975 попалось ещё одно фото макета GLAADS на шасси XM-701
https://i.imgur.com/3hDu17Cl.jpg
(кликабельно)

Отредактировано skylancer-3441 (2018-02-28 05:02:51)

312

Помню тут обсуждали ленинградский проект 69021
Интересная, конечно штука.

Кое что про ее испытания - КОНСТРУКЦИЯ И ХАРАКТЕРИСТИКИ ХОДОВОГО МАКЕТА С ГМТ (69021) - http://btvt.info/5library/vot_1975_69021_2.htm
http://btvt.info/5library/vot_1975_69021_2.files/image001.jpg

А это - опубликовано в порядке дискуссии
http://btvt.info/5library/vbtt_1988_10_69021.htm

313

про разные варианты советских АЗ -
http://btvt.info/5library/vbtt_1978_04_az2.files/image003.jpg

из Вестник бронетанковой техники

314

Вариант А от какого проекта неизвестно?

315

https://topwar.ru/uploads/posts/2014-01/1389329017_xsdge.jpg
Видимо Объекта 225

316

Ет Д, сверху справа А, с барабаном.

317

Там по типу 780 автомат

318

экспериментальная 64-ка
https://imgprx.livejournal.net/f6c95f365d1fa2f976cac43b7df968fb7235c0e7/rs7Jumyf9nTOEMWp9BExMESKAF2-1IdbGKHAi__G8414cRfhJHWdonwdoeaL7omui-5h2vNpUAKZTb6gzLeN4ZQyL543XLl7EOEW-0s92PhxjutS63A9qKXw1UW90C4N

поставили в 64-ку двигатель 980 л.с.,  кинокамеру и далее ездить и стрелять на скорости 50 км. ч. Странно, почти не снизилась точность...

Для этой цели во ВНИИТрансмаш на базе современного серийного танка был создан быстроходный макет с двигателем В-60Ф мощностью 980 л. с., оборудо­ванный комплексом контрольно-измерительной ап­паратуры, размещенным в пылевлагонепроницае­мом контейнере на корме машины (рис. 1). Кон­трольно-измерительная аппаратура не мешала выполнению экипажем своих обязанностей и позво­ляла регистрировать действия всех членов экипажа по управлению вооружением и движением макета, обнаружению и опознаванию целей, точность наве­дения пушки и пулемета на цель, а также механи­ческие возмущения, обусловленные взаимодейст­вием ходовой части с неровностями грунта. Точ­ность наведения оружия на цель регистрировалась кинофотопулеметом, речевая информация записы­валась на пленку магнитофона, остальные пара­метры осциллографировались. Обработка материа­лов испытаний сводилась к определению зависи­мости дальности обнаружения и открытия «огня» по целям, вероятности попадания в цель из пушки и пулемета…
http://btvt.info/5library/vbtt_1972_05_gonka.htm

319

skylancer-3441 написал(а):

про ЗСУ GLAADS с использованием одного из прототипов в принципе известно http://strangernn.livejournal.com/359710.html
ну вот разве что ещё фото https://i.imgur.com/QJdS0mq.jpg

skylancer-3441 написал(а):

в журнале Soldiers за декабрь 1975 попалось ещё одно фото макета GLAADS на шасси XM-701 https://i.imgur.com/3hDu17Cl.jpg

в Army R&D за март-апрель 1976 попалось ещё одно фото
https://i.imgur.com/dMONHoWl.jpg
и в слушаниях о военбюджете на 1976 финансовый вот такое достаточно фигового качества
https://i.imgur.com/RMB1bwLl.png
(занятно, эта и следующая картинки ныне и в рувики есть, какой-то юзер те же стенограммы слушаний выложенные на hathitrust потрошит)
(мдя, найти бы публикацию откуда вот эта https://i.imgur.com/k6h0XPa.jpg картинка по GLAADS выкладывавшаяся на secretprojects)
и в слушаниях о военбюджете на 1974 финансовый использован вот такой рисунок художника (который какой-то конечно совсем отличающийся, кмк может быть в принципе вообще для другой программы нарисованным):
https://i.imgur.com/qp93EK8l.jpg
(картинки кликабельны)
...
в книге 1981 года издания Arsenal of democracy II - American military power in the 1980s and the origins of the new cold war, во втором томе, заявлено что "Each GLAAD vehicle, fullly-equipped, is expected to cost $504,000 in 1977 dollars".
Правда ссылок и сносок откуда взяли цену там во всяком случае на странице где это всё сказано - нету, как и к многим прочим которых они приводят во множестве.
...
ещё про GLAADS

Aviation Week & Space Technology - том 98 1973-04-23 с.11

General Dynamics is proposing to use a Mauser 27-mm high-rate-of-fire cannon for the Army's gun low-altitude air defense systems (GLAADS). The 247-lb. weapon, carried on a 48-in. ring mount, would fire 1,000 rounds/min. General Dynamics has a license for the cannon, which it would produce in this country if it wins the GLAADS competition now under way. Other GLAADS competitors are General Electric, Philco-Ford, Westinghouse and Sperry Rand.

Aviation Week & Space Technology - том 98 1973-05-07 с.45-46

Army's GLAADS approach calls for a 25-35-mm high-rate-of-fire anti-aircraft gun mounted in a turret on a tracked vehicle chassis and integrated with a closed loop fire control system using FLIR and the laser to thwart zero to 300 meters/sec. targets at ranges beyond 3,000 meters. The GLAADS gyro-stabilized sensors— FLIR, laser and gunner's eyes—have a common line of sight. The FLIR sensor will acquire targets at 7,000 yd. and display them on a cathode ray tube presentation, superimposed over a visual view of the sector on the gunner's stabilized optical sight. The laser-derived range also will be projected onto the sight through the tube. The target will be tracked automatically once the operator has localized it within a 10-milliradian acquisition gate. Target range and azimuth/elevation angles of the stable platform are to be fed into a digital processor that calculates pointing angles for the servo-driven gun.
The GLAADS FLIR will have two fields of view—20 × 40 deg. in the wide angle and 1 × 2 deg. in the narrow. Its image resolution will be one milliradian in the wide angle and 0.1-0.25 in the narrow. Accuracy will be within 1 mil.

_
_
очередная статья про Бредли и о разработке БМП в США, на английском, из журнала Army

Разрабатывая Бредли для Армии: плата за компромисс

Developing Army's Bradley: the wages of compromise
by Lon O. Nordeen Jr.
Army magazine
vol.37 July, 1987

==71==
It has been 25 years since the Army first began to define a requirement for an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), but only in the last few years have any appreciable number of them appeared in the field. In a vicious, tangled action-reaction spiral, the long gestation period exposed the concept to changing requirements and battlefield threats; and the incorporation of new requirements further stretched out the development process. All that travail, after having arrived at a design formula acceptable to many competing interests, is what makes the continuing controversy over the M2 Bradley IFV a source of extreme frustration for the Army's mechanized force.
If the Bradley is not necessarily the solution the Army would choose if it were starting from scratch today, neither is it exactly the vehicle the service wanted in the first place. The M2 version in particular was subject to some significant compromises imposed by the very outside authorities — Congress and the Defense Department — who are now critical of the results.
It is important to remember that the operational concept of mechanized infantry against which the Bradley was developed is primarily an offensive one: to provide the absolutely indispensable assistance which tanks require in maintaining the momentum of the armored attack. Part traditional infantryman, part pioneer, part clearance and recovery crewman, the "mech" trooper fights mounted or dismounted and deals with the enemy infantry and their antitank weapons; helps clear obstacles when calling up engineers would take too much time; provides manpower for maintenance and resupply tasks; and sees to security when vehicles are halted, through guard mounts and patrolling. Dismounted, mech infantry can fix enemy forces in place, occupying their attention and firepower while tanks maneuver to the flanks.
All of these functions are especially critical in what the Soviets would call the "break-in" battle against prepared defenses, where the battlefield is crowded, cover close, ranges short, visibility limited and the level of violence extreme.
Despite advances in electronics and optics, it is hard to see anything from inside a buttoned-up tank under fire. Even in open terrain, tanks have a close-in "blind zone" within which the crew cannot see the ground and a larger "dead zone" within which the weapons cannot be brought to bear. Without accompanying infantry, tankers would have to concentrate on watching each other's backs, with little attention to worthwhile main gun targets.

□ US Army photo by Bill C. Walton - Supported by flotation screens, three Bradleys cross the Chattahoochee River during swimming operations at Ft. Benning, Ga.
==72==
реклама
==73==
Two of the requirements for an accompanying infantry vehicle are excellent all-around vision— including the infantry squad, whose members need to be able to see what is going on before they dismount — and the cross-country speed to keep up with the supported tanks; in fact, a margin ten percent better than tank speed is desirable, to regain time lost in dismounting and picking up the infantry squad. The M2 Bradley meets these criteria admirably with allowable cross-country speeds up to 30 mph, sophisticated day-night optics and armor glass vision blocks for each member of the infantry squad.
Another IFV requisite is main armament that can defeat other light armored vehicles and provide overwhelming fire support for the dismounted infantry squad. There has been some debate about whether the Bradley's 25-mm automatic cannon is the most effective weapon for the latter role, with the suggestion that higher-capacity high-explosive rounds from a low-pressure gun in the 73 to 75-mm class, such as those mounted in some Soviet and British vehicles, would be more effective against troops, unarmored vehicles and field fortifications. The point is a fine one: During the Korean and Vietnam wars, M10 and M42 tracked twin 40-mm automatic guns deployed by antiaircraft units — which, fortunately, had little else to do — were devastatingly effective in support of infantry; the Bradley, in effect, formally assigns that kind of firepower to the infantry for the first time. It is also worth noting in this regard that the Soviets discarded the low- velocity 73-mm gun in favor of a 30-mm automatic weapon in the later versions of their BMP IFV.
What the Bradley cannot do, however —and this is the nub of the current controversy — is advance against fire at the same rate as main battle tanks, because it simply lacks that level of armor protection and survivability. The M2's vulnerability to heavy antitank weapons was conclusively demonstrated in the two series of congressionally mandated tests (although it is fair to point out that a main battle tank would not have survived most of these hits), in which a stock-still combat-loaded Bradley was hit with 120-mm tank gun shaped-charge rounds, TOW missiles (whose warheads approximate the power of the Soviet AT-P-5 Spandrel) and the smaller (85-mm) warheads of the Soviet hand-held RPG-7g infantry antitank grenade launcher.
"You've got a problem: you may need two infantry vehicles" in the future, said Gen. Donn A. Starry, U.S. Army retired, referring to the heavy IFV contemplated by the Army at various times in the past and now a candidate concept in the Armored Family of Vehicles (AFV) study. "If you want a missile system on it, and you want to make a lighter vehicle of some kind," he said "you've got to recognize that it either has to overwatch or stand off someplace— it can't get out with the tanks and mix it up."
"Survival is the problem," Gen. Starry added. "You can't take the Bradley out there with the tanks; it won't survive. It has to stand off in overwatch or off to the side someplace."
Of course, the Bradley was never designed to withstand tank gun fire or heavy shaped-charge warheads. The vehicle's spaced and laminated aluminum armor (with some steel facing in critical areas) was intended to be and is proof against heavy machine guns (U.S. 0.50-inch or Soviet 14.5-mm calibers) and splinters from artillery airbursts up to the 155-mm class, estimated to represent with lesser weapons up to 95 percent of the threats the infantry squad might encounter in the attack. This level of protection is itself a considerable advance over the M113-series armored personnel carriers which the Bradley is intended to replace in mechanized units armed with the M1-series tanks.
Covering the remaining five percent gap — heavy, close-range direct fire — did not seem feasible when the Bradley design had to be fixed in the late 1970s, at least not without increasing size, weight, cost and operational complexity to the level of the main battle tank. All of those factors militate against the goal of an IFV fleet large enough to make a difference on the battlefield (approximately one for every two main battle tanks).
In fact, it will not be possible to build sufficient numbers of heavy IFVs in the

□ An M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle negotiates a downhill grade.
==74==
реклама
==75==
future, either, unless the Army adopts a development and procurement plan very close to the AFV program, so that the resulting economies of scale can be applied to the design and production of all armored vehicles.
In the meantime, to survive the very toughest going on the mechanized battlefield, the Bradley will have to rely on training, tactics and the vehicle's inherent mobility.
In his book Mechanized Infantry, the late Brig. Richard E. Simpkin had this to say about the issues now plaguing the Bradley:
Any shortcomings in an IFV's mobility will face the tanks with a choice between delaying or separating (from the accompanying infantry). So will any inferiority in protection. If the IFV is sometimes to lead — and American, German and Soviet teaching combine with the length of tank guns of the eighties to suggest that it should— it has to be able to take the enemy tank's punch on the nose ... To provide vehicles that live and fight with tanks with all-round protection inferior to the tank's is neither ethical nor at all sensible— specially in a force heavily constrained by manpower shortages. So there is always a good case for giving the IFV the same level of protection as the tank. In the future this case will be stronger, since compound armor covering the frontal arc can confer immunity to a high proportion of existing antitank weapon systems as well as to nonspecialized fires.
At the time Brig. Simpkin was writing, in the late 1970s, the Army's mechanized force designers were studying a turretless, heavily armored, 40-ton IFV for the assault role. "About 1978," Gen. Starry said, "we realized that we needed a heavy infantry fighting vehicle, and we tried to start a program to do that. But we couldn't sell it in Washington, either in the Pentagon or over on the Hill, so we backed away from it. We still need it."
Gen. Starry agrees that the Army, in fact, never really "sold" any IFV concept — heavy or standard. In the 1970s, the Army's proposed new mechanized infantry doctrine was mostly greeted by incomprehension in the Defense Department and Congress, where the decision makers consistently wondered what such a "fancy" vehicle could do that could not be accomplished by the thousands of M113s already in the inventory.
Automotive performance matching the M1; better, if not complete, protection; and heavy fire support for the infantry squad did not seem worth the cost and trouble of building a new vehicle, at that time the XM723 MICV (mechanized infantry combat vehicle), the Bradley's developmental predecessor.
In the mid-1970s, it must be recalled, the Army and official Washington were waking up to the fact that Soviet conventional force capabilities in central Europe had been expanding steadily since 1968. Moreover, the Soviets seemed to have mastered and incorporated into their newer weapons many of the technologies that had just been proved devastatingly effective in the 1973 Middle East war. The 1976 edition of the Army's operations field manual field manual was seen as having a defensive orientation; Sens. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and the late Dewey L. Bartlett (R-Okla.) were warning of NATO's vulnerability to a no-notice attack; and Department of Defense (DoD) thinkers were preoccupied with a Warsaw Pact advantage in main battle tanks estimated at three to one over NATO. In this atmosphere, a weapon whose primary virtues were offensive — sustaining the momentum of a mechanized attack — looked like an unaffordable luxury.
MICV was, in fact, going down the tubes in 1976 and had been formally canceled by DoD (MICV's predecessor, the XM701 armored infantry fighting vehicle, developed against a 1964 requirement, had been dropped in 1970). What revived the program and transformed it into the "fighting vehicle system" (the M2 and its companion M3 cavalry reconnaissance vehicle) was DoD's recognition from its own computer-modeled war-gaming studies that a vehicle as numerous on the battlefield as an IFV would have to be offered an excellent opportunity to proliferate antitank missile defenses.
DoD was then encouraging the Army to hang the highly effective (now marginally effective) TOW missile on everything that rolled or flew, and to get them under some kind of armor. Mechanized infantry doctrine had little or nothing to do with the decision to add the twin-tube TOW launcher to the Bradley design. Gen. Starry noted: "We, that is, we in TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command], decided to put the TOW on the MICV because we realized that if we did not put the TOW on the MICV, we would probably never have an MICV."
So the Army got its IFV, but only at a price that has seriously compromised the vehicle's offensive role, in two ways.

□ A TOW antitank missile Is launched by a Bradley at the Army's Tropic Test Center, Ft. Clayton, Panama.
==76==
The presence of a primary long-range (out to 3,750 meters) antitank weapon makes the Bradley a "must" target for enemy tank guns and antitank missiles, placing its crew and the mounted infantry squad at much greater risk than was ever intended. The danger is heightened by the need to carry additional antimateriel ammunition — up to five TOWs and 900 25-mm main gun rounds — which increases the chances of catastrophically destructive secondary explosions. The cost and complexity of the necessary electro-optic vision and fire control gear delayed the program by more than two years, by Gen. Starry 's estimate, and boosted vehicle unit costs over the million-dollar-a-copy threshold (about $1.2 million in the fiscal 1988 budget) which outside observers often mentally reserve for do-everything tanks. The M1A1 Abrams tank costs a little more than twice as much, a ratio that is not so different from when the M60-series tanks and the M113 were the cutting edge of the mechanized force, but the high price tag nevertheless discourages funding for economic rates of production.
The live-fire testing has demonstrated that Bradley survivability can be improved and, further, has forced the Army to make improvements which were known to be feasible, yet difficult and expensive. The main modification is the addition of Kevlar fabric armor antispall liners, such as are being installed in some M113s, to protect the occupants and the volatile ammunition from fragments spalled from the inside of the main armor envelope.
Unlike the M113, however, where the interior is a relatively clean box allowing the hanging of clear expanses of liner, the M2 layout is complicated by stowage arrangements and installed equipment that cannot be easily altered. Some of the ammunition is being restowed and spall protection is being provided for the electrical service; but the entire process is much more expensive than in the M113, and the level of protection cannot be as complete (although the Bradley's main armor envelope is much stronger). The live-fire tests also disproved some of the more hysterical assertions of Bradley critics. Vaporization of the aluminum armor when penetrated by shaped-charge warheads did not contribute in any measurable way to the momentary surge of interior blast, flash and pressure; in fact, this so-called vaporific effect was judged to have little effect on the crew or vehicle structure. In the tests, the tests, the Bradley's automatic fire suppression system worked as intended, instantly extinguishing fuel fires and making secondary fires of any kind — as opposed to explosions — unlikely. Also, spalled fragments had relatively

□ The XM723 MICV (mechanized infantry combat vehicle), the Bradley's developmental.
==77==
little effect on the ammunition, due to its sturdy packaging— the secondary explosions were caused by direct hits on the ammunition loads. The latest public flap over the Bradley concerns its swimming capability. Out of about 10,000 swimming operations worldwide, there have been a dozen confirmed sinkings. The national press insists there has been one other case, but that incident — which incurred the only Bradley drowning death — involved a vehicle not rigged for swimming which drove into a hidden water-filled sinkhole in a slush- covered field during maneuvers in West Germany last March. In most of the sinkings of swim-rigged vehicles, there was a collapse of the rubberized fabric screen which is erected to allow the vehicle to displace enough water. The Army further determined that in each case, the two hinges that attach the trim vane to the hull glacis plate failed to lock in the open position. The problem is regrettable but not insurmountable — Bradley swimming operations were suspended in April, pending the redesign of the hinges and retrofitting of the new hinges to all vehicles.
Since Bradley critics have called virtually every other aspect of the design into question — even its vastly increased firepower is seen as a double-edged sword — the Army's has stressed superior automotive performance, indispensable for operations with the M1-series tanks. Earlier this year, Sen. William V. Roth (R-Del.), one of the most persistent congressional critics, attacked these assumptions, claiming on the basis of a General Accounting Office (GAO) report which he requested and released that the Army's "standard troop carrier," the M113A3 has comparable off-road performance. In the first place, the product-improved M113A3 is not the "standard" troop carrier: relatively few of the 4,000 vehicles to be modified with the A3's more powerful engine, antispall liners and jettisonable external armored fuel tanks will be armored personnel carriers (APCs); most will be specialized vehicles based on the M113 chassis and expected to remain in the mechanized force for years to come, such as the M901 TOW vehicle, the M730 Chaparral air defense missile carrier and the M981 FIST-V (fire support team vehicle).
The first modified M901A2s and M981-A1s began reaching units this spring.
More important, while the M113A3's turbocharged engine (275 hp versus 215 hp in earlier diesel models) and new transmission give it a power-to-weight ratio and thus acceleration comparable to the Bradley, the A3's allowable cross-country speed is limited by the performance of its suspension. Roadwheel travel was improved to the limits of this 30-year-old design in the standard-powered M113A2, which increased maximum allowable cross-country speed to 19 mph over 16 mph in the M113A1. Despite greater power, this figure is improved to only 21 mph in the M113A3— about 30 percent less than the Bradley and M1 Abrams tank.
The GAO said its study was based on data compiled by the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Agency (AMSAA); however, the AMSAA data apparently concerned general trafficability, rating the smaller, lighter APC as more maneuverable in close quarters and on difficult forest trails.
The fact remains that the M113A3 simply cannot keep up with the M1 tank.
"Every time they call from the Hill and want to know 'What about the Bradley?' " Gen. Starry said, "I say, "You have got to go ahead with it,' because the alternative is not acceptable— not at all acceptable. The question is, how many of those do you want to buy before you buy something else?"
The drawn-out controversy over the Bradley that has turned the program into a kind of tarbaby has left a bitter residue in the minds of materiel developers for the Army's mechanized force: "We may never be able to procure another major piece of equipment," lamented a staff officer with the Armored Family of Vehicles task force. It has also created a determination to find a better, faster way to arrive at requirements, fix a design and produce vehicles for the field, so that programs will be less liable to compromise by extraneous factors essentially beyond the service's control.

□ The updated M113A3 armored personnel carrier with armor around the weapon station and spaced laminate armor bolted to the sides and the rear doors as additional defense against shaped- charge warheads. The projections at the rear of the hull are armored external fuel tanks, a standard feature of the A3 versionm which also has an uprated power train.

из неё вот это цитировалось в прочих сочинениях о Бредли:
Gen. Starry noted: "We, that is, we in TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command], decided to put the TOW on the MICV because we realized that if we did not put the TOW on the MICV, we would probably never have an MICV."

...а вот это выделенное жирным шрифтом:
The vehicle's spaced and laminated aluminum armor (with some steel facing in critical areas) was intended to be and is proof against heavy machine guns (U.S. 0.50-inch or Soviet 14.5-mm calibers) and splinters from artillery airbursts up to the 155-mm class, estimated to represent with lesser weapons up to 95 percent of the threats the infantry squad might encounter in the attack.
автор взял видимо из стенограмм слушаний в Конгрессе, там такое упоминалось, причём в разные годы, например на слушаниях о 1980 финансовом - так:
https://i.imgur.com/Zecu6whl.jpg

а про вот это

At the time Brig. Simpkin was writing, in the late 1970s, the Army's mechanized force designers were studying a turretless, heavily armored, 40-ton IFV for the assault role. "About 1978," Gen. Starry said, "we realized that we needed a heavy infantry fighting vehicle, and we tried to start a program to do that. But we couldn't sell it in Washington, either in the Pentagon or over on the Hill, so we backed away from it. We still need it."

мне известно только одно упоминание проработок какой-то - неясно, без башни ли, но всё же 40-тонной - БМП, - вот это, из работы The Army needs a strategis armored gun system - Now! 1991 года, которая очевидно не про БМП, и последнее предложение в цитате тоже не о БМП но пусть будет:

1978 the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) established a Combat Vehicle Technology Directorate (CVTD) in conjunction with the Sytems Manager's Office to further conduct the ACVT study. The study plan concepts included:

- The Mobile Protected Weapons System (MPWS) - which was a pure anti-tank system in two separate versions:
--A helicopter-transportable USMC system.
--A 40-ton Army system.

- MPWS II - a 40-ton Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)

- MPWS III- a 40-ton Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (CFV)

Tht ACVT study, which was completed in 1982, recommended a system based on a 75mm main gun in a low profile turret, fire control and mobility equal to the M1 main battle tank, and armor protection from 14.5mm penetration on the vehicle front and sides.


...
В 1983 году какой-то человек написал в Массачусетском Технологическом докторский диссер по организации и процессу разработки нового оружия на примере БМП, судя по всему явно изучая как раз разработку Бредли. Два тома, всего 540 страниц. http://library.mit.edu/item/000195603
Увы в сети его совсем нема. А при том формально это не то что просто "введено в научный оборот", а вообще само по себе является научной работой.

_
_
В том же журнале Army, от того же автора, чуть раньше есть ещё одна статья на английском о разработке концепции БМП как в США так и вообще.

Участник общевойскового боя выдерживает семь кругов ада водиночку

A combined arms performer endures its purgatory alone
by Lon O. Nordeen Jr.
Army magazine
vol.37 July, 1987

==63==
The concentrated political attack on the Army's Bradley fighting vehicles that has been carried out in Congress and the press for some time now has had the deliberate effect of both spotlighting and isolating the program. The vehicle's swimming capability is only the latest point of controversy. The less-than-crippling design and production defects are, of course, greatly magnified; but more important, the M2 infantry version of the vehicle is stripped of its intended combined-arms operational context.
Thus isolated as if it were to be the sole weapon in the Army's mechanized arsenal, the Bradley can inevitably be made to look bad, because it is not invulnerable to the entire range of battlefield threats, from submachine gun bullets (which would chip the paint) to surface bursts by large-caliber artillery shells (which would tear the vehicle apart). Where is the vehicle yet devised that could meet such criteria? Interdependence among armored vehicles of differing purposes and types has always been and is ever likely to be a primary characteristic of mechanized operations. In fact, it is the vulnerability of main battle tanks to close-range infantry attack that has called into existence the whole class of modern infantry fighting vehicles which the M2 version of the Bradley represents.
This relationship can be traced back to its origins in World War I. The battle tank was introduced in 1916 as a means of breaching fortifications. Once static defenses were shattered, foot-mobile infantry would mop up the remaining defenders. Because of their mobility and survivability, tanks frequently outpaced the infantry. Unsupported, tanks were found to be vulnerable to attack by enemy infantry using artillery, explosive charges and flame throwers.
During the 1930s, the U.S. Army introduced into service armored half-track infantry carriers. The infantry element of World War II U.S. armored divisions was fully mechanized with more than 700 half-tracks. During attack and defense, the infantry usually dismounted from their half-tracks and moved up on foot to provide support and close-in firepower.
The open-top half-tracks were vulnerable to artillery and small arms fire and often were unable to keep pace with tanks. During the latter part of World War II, the United States developed tracked armored infantry carriers which could accompany tanks. The first such vehicles, the M39 and M44, were much modified versions of the M18 Hellcat tank destroyer. The M44 was not a successful vehicle, but its rectangular armored body, forward mounted engine and rear exit doors set the pattern for the M75 and M59 armored personnel carriers of the 1950s. The Army's M113 armored personnel carrier (APC) has been in production continuously since 1960, and more than 80,000 APCs and other variants have been produced for the U.S. Army and the military

□ Infantrymen exit the rear doors of an M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle during a demonstration at Ft. Banning, Ga.
==64==
реклама Gould Computer Systems
==65==
services of more than 40 countries.
Gasoline-powered versions were followed, beginning in 1964, by the M113A1 and subsequent diesel-powered models. The aluminum-alloy armored vehicle has been highly successful because of its combination of positive features including high mobility, reliability, amphibious capability and low unit cost.

The M44, M75, M59 and M113 were developed to be armored transport vehicles or battletaxis. This type of armored infantry carrier, while relatively cheap and highly versatile, has a number of shortcomings. Infantry riding in such vehicles cannot see or take part in the battle and must dismount to engage in combat. Most M113s are armed only with a single unprotected .50-caliber machine gun, and the vehicle's light armor provides protection only against small arms and artillery fragments. Mechanized infantry tactics for troops equipped with the M113 usually call for the troops to attack or defend on foot, relying on vehicle-mounted machine guns for supporting fire.
The M113 series of vehicles was involved in Vietnam combat from 1962, when it entered service with the South Vietnamese army, until 1975. The South Vietnamese armed their M113s with additional machine guns and other weapons. These modifications converted the M113 from a transport into a vehicle capable of mounted combat. U.S. forces adopted the idea, and modified M113s were known as armored cavalry assault vehicles (ACAVs). A variety of weapons were mounted on U.S. and allied M113s, including recoilless rifles, 40-mm automatic grenade launchers and heavy and light machine guns. ACAVs were highly effective in Vietnam because of their mobility, amphibious capability and high firepower.
The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese made extensive use of mines, which proved to be a serious threat to the M113. To improve survivability, troops lined the floor of their M113s with sandbags and usually rode on top of the vehicle. In 1969, the Army began equipping its M113s with titanium alloy belly armor and made other modifications which reduced the vehicles' vulnerability to mines. Recoil- less rifle and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire were also serious threats. A variety of stand-off armor schemes were fitted in the field using sheet steel, wire mesh, ammunition boxes, sandbags and other materials.
The modified M113 was a highly successful combat vehicle, but the vulnerability problem was never fully overcome. To put the vulnerability issue into proper perspective, however, it must be pointed out that the heavily armored M48 tank also proved to be very susceptible to destruction by mines, RPGs and recoilless rifles. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War reinforced the need for combined arms operations. The initial Arab assaults, made by armor and mechanized infantry, gained considerable ground. Israeli tank forces, thrown against Egyptian and Syrian positions, were beaten back by heavy missile and gun fire. The lesson from combat on both fronts was that armor could not make headway against the dense infantry antitank defenses unless it operated in a coordinated manner with infantry, combat engineers and artillery. Israeli commanders quickly adjusted their tactics to meet the demands of the changing modes of battle. The proportion of Israeli mechanized infantry assigned to armored battalions was significantly increased. Mechanized infantry fought with the same principles of speed and shock action as tanks. Israeli half-tracks, M113s and captured, Soviet-built wheeled BTR-50s had no overhead cover: soldiers were expected to have their heads and shoulders above the armor where they could observe events and rapidly direct firepower against threatening missile and gun positions. As many as five machine guns were mounted on each vehicle. Israeli armored infantrymen were taught to fight from their vehicles and dismount only when absolutely necessary.
Israeli combined arms tactics proved to be effective, but tanks and APCs were still lost as a result of mines, tank fire and antitank weapons. When armor, infantry, artillery, engineers and air support were properly coordinated and used aggressively, however, the battle was usually decided quickly, and losses were held to a minimum.
German World War II experience, primarily on the eastern front, led them to conclude that infantry accompanying armor should be able to use their individual weapons from moving or stationary personnel carriers to suppress or destroy enemy defenses. The postwar Bundeswehr was one of the first to call for the development of an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) capable of supporting tanks in mobile combat. The IFV differs from the APC or converted armored cavalry

LON O. NORDEEN JR., a marketing communications manager with McDonnell Aircraft Company, has written extensively on weapons, equipment and their employment. His book. Air Warfare in the Missile Age, was published by the Smithsonian Institution Press in 1985.

□ The Soviet BMP-1, the world's first modern infantry fighting vehicle, armed with a 73-mm gun and the AT-3 Sagger antitank missile; the improved BMP-2, mounting a 30-mm automatic cannon and the AT-5 Spandrel missile appeared in 1981.
==66==
реклама
==67==
assault-type vehicles in having greater armor protection, heavier mounted armament, weapons and vision blocks which allow the infantry squad to fight from within the vehicle and an improved power-to-weight ratio for increased cross-country mobility.
The heavily armored Marder, which entered West German service in the early 1970s, featured a turret-mounted 20-mm cannon and view ports and firing positions which allowed infantrymen to fire their weapons from within the vehicle. The Soviet BMP series features the Sagger or Spandrel antitank guided missiles, 73-mm or 30-mm turret-mounted weapons, amphibious capability, NBC (nuclear-biological-chemical) protection, vision blocks and firing ports which allow mounted infantry to participate in the battle. The Army's recently introduced M2 Bradley ranks with the best IFVs in mobility, armor protection and firepower.
The 23-ton vehicle carries a crew of three, a six-man combat squad and has a spaced laminate armor system which is designed to be effective against artillery and grenade fragments, small arms fire and armor-piercing projectiles up to 14.5 mm in caliber. The M3, used by cavalry and reconnaissance units, is similar to the M2. It differs only in internal layout and size of the crew, which consists of five men in the reconnaissance role. The M2/M3 has impressive firepower: the 25-mm Bushmaster chain gun can penetrate the BMP at ranges well over 500 meters, and the 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun can suppress enemy infantry. Both are stabilized to allow for accurate gunnery while moving across the battlefield.
The twin-tube TOW antitank missile launcher mounted on the turret in an armored box can defeat tanks out to 3,750 meters. The vehicle, however, must be moving slowly or stopped in order to fire the missile. The weapon aiming system includes a thermal-imaging sight which allows for combat at night and in reduced visibility conditions. The infantrymen have viewing ports and six ball-mounted 5.56-mm weapons available for close-in defense. In urban or forested terrain, the dismounted squad can engage the enemy using the Dragon medium antitank missile, M72 rockets and their personal weapons.
The Bradley is a significant plus in both offensive and defensive roles. Offensively, its cannon and machine gun firepower can suppress antitank weapons, destroy enemy light armor and pin down dismounted infantry. The TOW missile can take on threatening tanks at long range, thus increasing the effectiveness of the entire mechanized battle force. The M2 can also provide a high volume of fire in support of dismounted operations and defensive activities. It must be remembered that the M2/ M3 Bradley and similar systems are cavalry and infantry fighting vehicles and not main battle tanks. To give the M2 version the room to accommodate a crew of nine, ensure a high degree of mobility and keep weight under 25 tons (to allow for relatively easy transport by aircraft), armor protection was deliberately limited. Gen. Louis C. Wagner Jr., then the Army's deputy chief of staff for research, development and acquisition (now commanding the Army Materiel Command), discussed the Bradley's armor protection in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1985:
We wanted to stop the 14.5-mm round which is one of the most common [Soviet] weapons. We wanted it to make sure antipersonnel and small antitank mines would not kill the crew through the bottom. The Bradley is protected against 12.7-mm (rounds) all around, 155-mm air bursts and small land mines ... There is no question that there is no piece of equipment that is invulnerable. We knew if it [the Bradley) was hit by a big enough shaped-charge warhead, you could destroy that vehicle ... I can destroy any tank with a large enough warhead. We think with the weight limitation on it and the crew size, we probably have the best protection we could get for the weight and available materials at that time.
The Bradley has an aluminum armor hull, and spaced laminate steel armor plate is bolted onto the vertical sides. Steel armor also protects the turret face. An automatic halon fire extinguishing system is incorporated to quickly put out fires in the passenger and engine compartments.

□ A Bradley vehicle fitted with a new turret mounting an ARES Talon 35-mm cannon, as tested by the Army in 1984-85 for improved antiarmor pertormance against upgraded Soviet light vehicles, under the CVAST (combat vehicle armament system technology) program.
==68==
During the hearings. Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) asked, "What is the survivability of the Bradley compared to the M113 personnel carrier?"
Gen. Wagner explained, "It is much more survivable. I can penetrate the side of the M113 with armor piercing .50 caliber [12.7-mm]."
During the past several years, there has been extensive media discussion concerning the survivability of the Bradley. The M2/M3 has been criticized for costing too much, carrying too few troops and being too tall, thus presenting a highly visible target. The most serious claim was that when hit by a shaped-charge warhead, the aluminum armor of the Bradley vaporizes and burns, increasing the destructive effect within the vehicle.
In response to the controversy, the Army initiated a number of studies and was directed by Congress to perform a series of live-fire tests to learn how a fully loaded Bradley would react when hit by an enemy weapon. The first series of tests started in March 1985 and were completed by the end of the year.
Remarking on the test results. Gen. Wagner said, "What we found is that the automatic fire suppression system worked very well, suppressing every fuel fire." He added that media claims of a catastrophic vaporific phenomenon due to the use of aluminum armor was not borne out by the test results. According to Gen. Wagner, when a shaped-charge warhead large enough to cause an appreciable vaporific effect strikes, the blast and hot jet of gas from the chemical energy round are the primary causes of casualties, not the vaporific effects of aluminum armor.
"Wherever it hits you," said Gen. Wagner, "you're in trouble. If it hits you in the head, you're dead; it it hits you in the leg, it takes it off. But we've known this for a long time." Concerning the M2/M3 armor, he said that the test demonstrated that, "aluminum armor does not burn. If you get a sustained ammunition fire going, you can melt it, but it doesn't burn."

The Army's optimistic view of the 1985 Bradley live-fire test results did not win over all the critics of the vehicle. They cite the reports produced by Air Force Col. James G. Burton, formerly a staff member in the defense test and evaluation directorate of the then-Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. He evidently had criticized the tests for failing to simulate actual combat conditions as closely as they might have, noting that some of the test vehicles were loaded with inert ammunition and that the areas hit were carefully selected rather than resulting from "random fire."
Army-DoD (Department of Defense) disagreement over the test methodology caused suspension of the second phase of live-fire tests, which had begun in March 1986, to evaluate the improved survivability features of the M2A1 and M3A1 versions of the vehicle. Changes being evaluated include repositioning and redesign of fuel lines and fuel cells, relocation and shielding of fuel and cooling and lubrication components, fitting of fabric armor antispall liners inside and the addition of armor, both passive and reactive types.
Phase two testing was resumed last October and was completed earlier this year after 46 shots from weapons of all kinds against combat-loaded basic and improved vehicles. Also tested against fire was the so-called minimum casualty vehicle version, in which much of the fuel and ammunition is carried outside the armored hull envelope, thus separating the crew from secondary fires and explosions. Analysis of the test results is nearly complete, with conclusions and recommendations expected shortly.
Gen. Wagner remarked on the survivability enhancements: "It looks like if we hung all this on . . . that it would [increase the cost of each Bradley] by by $50,000 to $70,000." He added that another 3,000 pounds of armor and equipment "will not have an adverse effect on the agility of the weapons system."
Reflecting the lessons of battle, Israel has added armored external fuel tanks, internal spall shields and stand-off armor to many of its M113s to improve their survivability. The U.S. Army has begun to make similar modifications to a portion of its M113 fleet, as the M113A3. Since the Bradley is only replacing a portion of the M113 fleet and thus the vehicle will be in service well beyond the turn of the century, this seems to be a worthwhile investment. The $50,000 to $70,000 additional cost to upgrade the survivability of the Bradley to better protect the lives of the five to nine soldiers who man the vehicle also seems to be a smart move.

□ The half-track infantry carriers of World War II were little more than lightly armored trucks, with limited off-road mobility and no overhead cover. This much-modified U.S. M3 was one of many used until the 1970s by Israeli forces, which found them no more suitable for modern maneuver warfare.
==69==
The latest main battle tanks, such as the 60-ton M1 with composite armor, may be able to survive longer on today's battlefield than earlier-generation tanks, but the APCs and IFVs which accompany them are vulnerable to nearly all of the antiarmor weapons on the battlefield. If used as tanks are used, APCs/IFVs will suffer higher attrition and more casualties per hit because of their lower level of armor protection and larger number of personnel per vehicle (tanks carry three to four crewmen; APCs/IFVs, nine to 12 crewmen and infantrymen). During the 1985 Senate hearings, Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.) asked, "How extensive or widespread are these antitank weapons on the Soviet side?"

Gen. Wagner replied, "They are extensive on the battlefield. A lot of how you defeat those is the tactics. First of all, you suppress them where you can with artillery fire. Second, this [Bradley] fighting vehicle is really a fire team of an infantry rifle squad. He can stand off at 2,000 meters and destroy an equivalent vehicle in the Soviet army. With the TOW missile, he can stand off 3,750 meters and destroy enemy tanks. When he goes into an area where there are a lot of antitank weapons, we will use tactics to suppress enemy infantry and the antitank weapons; in some cases, we have to dismount and clean them out." A Soviet motor rifle division of 12,695 men has 220 tanks and 792 antiarmor weapons, while a 16,597-man U.S. mechanized infantry division has 290 tanks and more than 1,200 anti-armor weapons. In other words, the U.S. Army will undertake combined arms operations. Artillery, air support, terrain features and smoke will be used to blind and suppress antitank weapons operators, drive dismounted infantry into their foxholes and limit the vision and effectiveness of enemy tanks, APCs and IFVs. Tanks and IFVs would use "bounding overwatch" tactics — one group moves forward while the other watches for the enemy and fires on any enemy who becomes visible. Current U.S. tactics call for the tanks to lead while the IFVs lay back and provide support. With its TOW antitank missile system, 25-mm cannon and thermal-imaging sighting system, the Bradley can accomplish this task.
From the available evidence, it appears that the Bradley is a good vehicle that fulfills most if not all of its design requirements. (Swimming capability, for instance, will not be helped by the added weight of the up-armored versions.) It can shoot on the move with its 25-mm cannon, take out tanks and other heavily armored targets with its TOW missile system, operate in limited visibility because of thermal-imaging equipment and has good cross-country mobility and high dash speed (41 mph on roads). Compared to a unit equipped with the M113, Bradley units have much greater firepower, mobility, survivability and effectiveness.
Israel has examined a number of new solutions to the problem of different survivability levels in infantry vehicles and modern main battle tanks. The Israeli Merkava tank, in a pinch, can carry six infantrymen in its rear compartment. These troops cannot fight from the vehicle or observe the battle, however. While used primarily as a main battle tank, the Merkava has been used to transport troops under fire.
Israeli troops on occupation duty in Lebanon employed small numbers of Centurion tank hulls which had been equipped with a raised superstructure, armored side skirts and additional armor. Armed with numerous machine guns, the vehicles were used as close escorts for Israeli tanks. During World War II, British and Canadian forces likewise used modified Sherman tank and M7 howitzer chassis — known as Kangaroos — as infantry carriers.
Land warfare weapons, tactics and concepts are constantly evolving. The anti-armor systems of the 1980s and 1990s, such as missile-armed attack helicopters, scatterable mines, "smart" artillery munitions and top attack missiles, did not exist when the current family of American armored vehicles was designed and developed. The M2 Bradley and M1 Abrams will be upgraded, and new armored vehicles will be fielded to ensure that our armored forces keep current with the threat.

□ The heavily armored West German Marder infantry fighting vehicle was designed to requirements based on German World War II experience of tank warfare. The Marder carries a crew of nine, and its combat weight is 29 tons.

...
Из слушаний о бюджете на 1979 финансовый год - не слишком чёткий рисунок на тему переделки поздней XM-723 в уже-почти-Бредли, без командира в корпусе, и с двухместной башней и - то ли в данном положении то ли вообще - горизонтально расположенной ПУ ТОУ.
https://i.imgur.com/EEw99zGl.jpg
Как известно, у Ханниката на с.283 есть рисунки на примерно ту же тему
https://i.imgur.com/QHS5zHal.jpg

Ещё в этих слушаниях ситуацию с дурацкими и хитрыми процентами защиты от оружия советской дивизии довели до предела, в виде уже не просто целой а дробной цифры - "This results in this vehicle being protected against 91.6% of the weapons found in a front line Soviet Division"
а ещё заявили что ТБМП массой 60-65 коротких тонн (55-59 метрических) по их подсчётам будет стоить между 900 тысячами и миллионом. Или 800 тысячами и миллионом, как указано в другом месте. (Много - в сравнениями с тем что Procurement цена Бредли оценивалась тогда в 370 тысяч в долларах 78 финансового года (далее цены в них же). Что, впрочем, было временным и неверным, уже в 1979 она после пересчёта оценивалась в 472 тысячи, а в обсуждениях на 83 финансовый планировалось - выдав за предыдущие годы заказов на 1100 Бредли - заказать очередные 600 - по 878 тысяч каждая.)

...
один из рисунков БМП с башней с ТОУ опубликованный Ханникатом - нашёлся так же в большем размере в Armor за июль-август 1977
https://i.imgur.com/GGrEjHxl.jpg
...
В Инфантри за январь-февраль 1971 попался такой рисунок
https://i.imgur.com/jaDpKD4l.jpg
...
В тексте слушаний о военбюджете на 1973 год попался рисунок на тему MICV-70
(увы это издание слушаний только на гуглокнигах попалось, более качественного скана нема)
https://i.imgur.com/CgSjw6el.jpg
кмк чуток напоминающий это:

skylancer-3441 написал(а):

В журнале Army Logistician в нумере за май-июнь 1973 года в двух разных сканах попались фотографии макетов неких бмп:
https://i.imgur.com/ICWI9bMm.jpg

...
а ещё сей рисунок в отзеркаленном виде попал в Вестник Бронетанковой техники 1971-04
https://i.imgur.com/zi4f22Kl.jpg

Отредактировано skylancer-3441 (2018-04-11 01:27:44)

320

в Вестнике БТТ 1966-03 - в статье о расчёте на прочность тонкобронных корпусов - обнаружились схемы и поперечный разрез корпуса опытной колёсной БМП объект 1200
https://i.imgur.com/6fUTMI4l.jpg
(кликабельно)
...до сих пор про неё (во всяком случае мне) попадались какие-то весьма приблизительные рисунки с явно искажёнными пропорциями, даже в ОБМ т.3.
/надеюсь, когда в ТиВ Павловы дойдут до БТРов и БМП, там будет больше подробностей./

Отредактировано skylancer-3441 (2018-04-11 15:18:03)

321

skylancer-3441 написал(а):

а что касается ASTB - созданного при участии Бёртона, - то у Ханниката на с.298 есть две фотографии этой машины:
https://i.imgur.com/I20GrLn.png
https://i.imgur.com/493MQbI.png
и ещё одна фотография - с чуть иным расположением и открытой бортовой амбразурой - отыскалась в книге Бёртона Pentagon Wars:
https://i.imgur.com/iYx4gEYm.jpg

У так называемого "Архива Интернета" в разделе медиабиблиотеки, в поиске по текстам, я наткнулся на ранее неизвестные мне раздел и функцию - возможность "взять" некоторые книги (такие книги на которые ещё точно действует копирайт и которые иначе они посмотреть бы не дали никак, исполняя требования законов) на некоторый срок в пользование как в реальной библиотеке (что разблокирует её возможность просмотра для одного аккаунта, для просмотра на сайте, а всем прочим желающим - будет такие найдутся в это же время - предлагается встать в очередь).
Среди кучи довольно бесполезных (...мдя, а вот если бы это работало с архивом Google Books или Hathitrust, цены б ему не было... но увы это лишь договор нескольких библиотек) нашлось всё же что-то ценное для меня, в виде скана бумажной версии "Пентагоновских войн" (а не "изначально электронной", откуда картинка в цитате), в 11мп разрешении, и оттуда фрагмент с тем же изображением:
https://i.imgur.com/RvDxHHdl.jpg
(кликабельно)

Отредактировано skylancer-3441 (2018-04-26 13:00:30)

322

http://kengarex.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/1461354082_c262bcbff7_o.jpg
Sizaire-Berwick Wind Wagon”  1905г
вот так это видели тогда

323

Только он - 1915 года, а не 1905. В 1905 такой двигатель с таким шикарным винтом врят ли бы удалось найти. Да и Королевского воздушного флота еще не существовало.

324

skylancer-3441 написал(а):

В журнале Army Logistician в нумере за май-июнь 1973 года в двух разных сканах попались фотографии макетов неких бмп:
https://i.imgur.com/33YGIMRm.jpg

А ещё вот то же фото без обрезанного фона - в годовом отчёте главы GAO за 1973 год:
https://i.imgur.com/EoMMghel.jpg
И ещё пара фоток этого же макета - из октябрьского за 1972 и январского за 1973 годы выпусков журнала Army
https://i.imgur.com/fZrJbY7l.jpg https://i.imgur.com/XuZfnnXl.jpg

...
кроме того, в июньском выпуске Army за 1973 год попалось фото деревянного макета, использовавшегося для уточнения насчёт рассадки экипажа и десанта, обзора из машины, и хранения барахла:
https://i.imgur.com/Z2X1vfCl.jpg

...
Ещё в октябрьском номере Army за 1972 год попалось вот такое изображение (надеюсь что потом всё же найдётся скан где оно менее попорчено, но пока увы именно этот номер оказался доступен лишь в 1 скане):
https://i.imgur.com/dnqgEI4l.jpg
с вот таким текстом

The Army has also done some thinking about the old problem of having to siphon off tanks to support infantry assaults, a process which dilutes the concentrated offensive power of an armored force. One alternative might be what the Army calls the combined arms system-armor (CAS-A), a heavy infantry carrier with its own major-caliber gun for direct fire support. Some concepts considered so far resemble the self-propelled assault guns familiar in the Soviet and German armored forces, except that an armored fighting box for a 6- to 8-man infantry unit would be built in. One type of vehicle studied would use an M551 Sheridan gun-launcher turret, while another would have a front, ball-mounted 105-mm. gun with a limited traverse of 25 degrees. A third layout would have a turret-mounted 76-mm. liquid propellant gun. Liquid propellants, which have been examined in other contexts as well, have the advantage of better crew protection since the supply could be carried in an outside armored compartment, eliminating the dangers of internally-stowed ammunition.

правленный мною в меру понимания гуглоперевод:

Армия также задумалась о старой проблеме, связанной с необходимостью доставать всеми доступными способами танки для поддержки атак пехоты, - процесс, который разбавлял сосредоточенную наступательную силу бронетанкового кулака. Одной из альтернатив может быть то, что Армия называет общевойсковой системой - бронированной (CAS-A), тяжелой пехотовозкой с собственным оружием крупного калибра для прямой огневой поддержки. Некоторые концепции, рассматриваемые до сих пор, напоминают самоходные штурмовые орудия, известные в советских и немецких бронетанковых войсках, за исключением того, что у машины будет встроена бронированная рубка для отделения из 6-8 солдат. Один из вариантов предложенной машины вооружён башней от M551 Шеридана с пушкой-ПУ, в то время как другой имеет 105-мм пушку в шаровой установке с ограниченным углом горизонтального наведения в 25 градусов. Третий вариант получил башню с 76-мм пушкой с ЖМВ. Жидкие метательные вещества, которые рассматривались и в других случаях, имеют преимущество в улучшении защиты экипажа, поскольку запас ЖМВ может перевозиться во внешнем бронированном отсеке, устраняя опасность возникающую от хранящихся внутри боеприпасов.


/как видно в надписи к рисунку, CAS-A расшифровано как combat arms system-armor, а в тексте как combined arms system-armor. Это не моя описка, в журнале в тексте именно так https://i.imgur.com/E4LEXBb.jpg - так что это их описка и хз какой вариант верный./

...
попалось менее попорченное глюками сканирования, хотя и более пережатое и кажется чуть более тёмное:
https://i.imgur.com/ucIjscOl.jpg

Отредактировано skylancer-3441 (2018-10-04 17:39:39)

325

skylancer-3441 написал(а):

Ещё в этих слушаниях ситуацию с дурацкими и хитрыми процентами защиты от оружия советской дивизии довели до предела, в виде уже не просто целой а дробной цифры - "This results in this vehicle being protected against 91.6% of the weapons found in a front line Soviet Division"


именно дурацкими и именно хитрыми процентами - методология получения таковых, но на примере другого соединения, наглядна на картинке:
https://i.imgur.com/gfmOUJRl.jpg

Отредактировано skylancer-3441 (2018-10-28 08:14:01)

326

Более-менее сформировавшийся к концу 60ых годов, такой класс боевых машин как БМП - удовлетворяя требованиям авиатранспортабельности, плавучести и дешевизны - оказался представлен изделиями, которые по защищённости хоть превосходили бронетранспортёры 40-ых - 50-ых годов, но в общем не слишком значительно. И это при том, что им предполагалась более активная роль на поле боя. Глядя на иных участников ожидавшихся сражений, в виде танков, вопрос "может быть, пехотовозке всё же стоит иметь защищённость аналогичную танковой?" возникал в общем сам собой - но до поры до времени и мобильность и цена оказывались более приоритетными - может быть, излишне.
Впрочем известны например советские предложения - от ВНИИ-100, 1961 года, о размещении в танке вооружённом пушкой или пушкой-ПУ десантного отделения на 3-4 человек - ОБМ т.3 с.30-31 и

ТиВ 2008-07 с.55

https://i.imgur.com/KVLNEjz.jpg

- аналогично куда более поздней харьковской БМТ-72; и от ЛКЗ, 1963 года, о размещении в ракетном танке 2 десантников

ОБМ т.3 с.228

https://i.imgur.com/571L0Wpl.jpg

- но магистральным направлением конечно оказались совсем другие машины.
Американцы - с момента как они впервые задумались о БМП в 1957-1958 годах, видимо с оглядкой на новости из Европы о немецкой HS-30, и далее когда с 1963 они были заняты разработкой БМП постоянно, в этот раз точно будучи в курсе немецких идей и разработок (Роберт Макнамара хотел и повысить унификацию в армиях НАТО, и найти способ разрабатывать новую технику без задержек и перерасходов - породив программы сотрудичества с немцами по танку, БМП, танковому тягачу и так далее)  - выбирали варианты вполне мейнстримные, плавающие и влезающие обычно в C-141, с ценой на уровне 2-4 М-113 и с защищённостью в лучшем случае от (каких-то) 23мм снарядов, которую далее урезали до от 14,5 из КПВ.

И это продолжилось и в 70-е годы, пока не произошла война Судного дня, или точнее - пока её опыт не был осмыслен в разного рода публикациях.
В ней наглядно была продемонстрирована разрушительная сила современного оружия - заставившая и пересмотреть потребные для возможной войны в Европе резервы и задаться вопросом о выживаемости на поле боя и танков, и БМП. Как раз и БМП-1 выступила, как считалось, далеко не блестяще, показав себя заметно уязвимой.
Так что в 1974 году Ричард Огоркевич в своей статье "Infantry's combat vehicles", опубликованной в выпуске журнала Армор за сентябрь-октябрь, написал про Мардер и БМП-1 следующее:

Both are superior in some respects to all the earlier APCs. However, it may be doubted if they are greatly superior, overall, to the best of the more conventional APCs. What is more, it is very doubtful if either represents what is really needed.

Обе превосходят в некоторых отношениях все более ранние БТРы. Тем не менее, может быть подвергнуто сомнению, значительно ли они превосходят, в целом, лучших из более традиционных БТРов. Более того, очень сомнительно, представляет ли одна из этих двух машин то что действительно необходимо.

а дальше написал вот что:

If MICVs are to operate really close to battle tanks, and if infantrymen are to ride in them right on to their objectives, then they should logically be provided with the same degree of armor protection as battle tanks. This was, in fact, done by the British and Canadian Armies toward the end of World War II when they improvised heavily armored Kangaroo infantry carriers from contemporary battle tanks after removing their turrets. Were this example followed, it would be necessary to construct MICVs on the same chassis as battle tanks, but this should not create as many difficulties as might be feared. For instance, the Marder already weighs more than some battle tanks without their turrets do. Moreover, considerable logistics advantages might result from the use of the same chassis for infantry vehicles and for battle tanks, and this would also make further integration of the two much easier, as well as saving a great deal of development money.

Если БМП должны действовать очень близко к боевым танкам, и если пехотинцы должны ехать в них прямо к своим целям, тогда логически они должны обеспечиваться той же степенью бронезащиты, что и боевые танки. Фактически это было сделано британской и канадской армиями к концу Второй мировой войны, когда они, сняв башни, из современных боевых танков сделали тяжелобронированные эрзац-БТРы Кенгуру. Если следовать этому примеру, необходимо было бы построить БМП на том же шасси, что и боевые танки, но это не должно создавать столько трудностей, которых можно было бы опасаться. Например, Мардер уже весит больше, чем некоторые боевые танки без их башен. Более того, значительные логистические преимущества могут возникнуть в результате использования одного и того же шасси для пехотных машин и боевых танков, что также облегчит дальнейшую интеграцию этих двух, а также заметно удешевит разработку.

Далее, в 1976 году вышла статья Филиппа Карбера "Советская противотанковая дискуссия" - в Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Vol. 18 за май-июнь 1976, а так же перепечатанная в Military Review за ноябрь и в Арморе за ноябрь-декабрь того же года, которая была написана по статьям советской печати - и в которой например утверждалось, что из 50 с лишним статей больше половины касались только проблемы уязвимости БМП-1, и в некоторых советскими авторами (согласно пересказам Карбера) предлагалось вообще отказаться от БМП в пользу танковых десантов.

В это время идеей ТБМП заинтересовались в TRADOC, а к марту 1977 года дошло до слушаний в Сенате - куда позвали в том числе того же Кабрера

о чём упоминается в Press on! Selected Works of General Donn A. Starry т.1 с.234-235

Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle
Letter to General Bernard W. Rogers
Army Chief of Staff
25 March 1977

Last week I appeared before a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, together with Ed Miller and Howard Cooksey. The issue quickly resolved into a discussion about the MICV.
We, of course, supported the MICV and may have done some good. If we did make any impression on Senator Nunn (who was absolutely dead set against the MICV at the outset), it was largely because Dr. Phil Karber of BDM swung over to our side.
Three civilian witnesses were called by the committee, no doubt at the instigation of staffer Record and Senator Hart's assistant, Mr. Lind of 100-5 fame. They were: Karber, Luttwak, and Canby.
Karber had lunch with me before the hearing and we were able to persuade him that, although the MICV isn’t perfect, it is the best infantry fighting vehicle at this time and that we couldn't, in good conscience, send American soldiers into war in the M113 in Europe. This sounds like taking the credit for Karber’s performance. In fact, he did a better job than we did in pointing out that the M113 is first generation, the BMP and the Marder are second generation, and the MICV is third generation, at least in temis of mobility and firepower. He testified to this effect.
Karber is a very good man, honest and smart. He is concerned about the disparity in protection between the XM1 and the MICV. So is Luttwak, so are the Germans as pertains to the Leopard and the Marder, and so are the Russians as pertains to the T72 and the BMP. So are we concerned.
Phil Karber had originally intended to recommend that we discontinue development of the MICV and turn the XM1 chassis into a MICV. When he found out this would take some time, he reluctantly agreed to support the MICV as the only realistic option open to us at this time. Luttwak testified against the MICV, as did Canby. Luttwak, like Karber, wants more protection. Canby is just plain vague and confused and confusing.
For over a year I have been thinking about the requirement for an Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle which would have armor protection equal to the XM1. This thinking was prompted strongly by the Israeli solution to the vulnerability of armor by including a mechanized company organic to each tank battalion in wartime (in peacetime they can't afford the manpower). I have also been influenced by the fact that George Blanchard favors a composite battalion because he wants to train the way he plans to fight.
Because of the obvious impact on the MICV program and the nightmarish thought that we could find ourselves stuck with the M113 for another 10 years while we make yet another start on the MICV, I have kept these thoughts within TRADOC.
Day before yesterday I read in the International Defense Review that the British Army has resurrected its development program for a MICV, but this time plan to build it with Chobham armor. It seems to me that a combination of the Karber, Luttwak, Nunn, Hollingsworth, Bartlett concern, coupled with the British initiative on a heavily armored MICV, probably signifies the hopelessness of keeping this idea bottled up.
The more I think about this matter the more I believe that we must begin to move in the direction of a truly armored infantry fighting vehicle to be married organizationally with each tank battalion. These vehicles would no doubt be expensive—they certainly would be heavy— and probably be an overkill for the battalion formations of the mechanized infantry for which we would still need the MICV—we certainly don't want the M113.
Another thought which may help is that we are nearing the end of the MICV development—in fact, it would be essentially finished were it not for the revision of the turret and the Bushmaster development. As we look beyond the current set of new equipment which will be available by about 1985, there is very little on the drawing board. In other words, there will be a trough in the development program which we might just as well start to fill now.
The idea of an AIFV using special armor is being quietly examined at the Tank-Automotive Research and Development Command. However, the cat isn't too far out of the bag at this moment.
I suggest that you and Dutch and George Sammet and Shy Meyer and Howard Cooksey and I meet sometime in early April to discuss this issue and plot a course for the future. The sensitivity of it is obvious and the dangers to the MICV program are clear. Thus it would seem to warrant the best thinking of your top people involved in such matters.

правленный мною по мере понимания гуглоперевод

Боевая машина пехоты
Письмо генералу Бернарду В. Роджерсу
Начальнику штаба Армии
25 марта 1977 г.

На прошлой неделе я предстал перед подкомитетом Комитета Сената по вооруженным силам вместе с Эдом Миллером и Говардом Кукси. Вопрос быстро перешел в дискуссию о БМП.
Мы, конечно, поддерживали Бредли и, возможно, неплохо поработали. Если мы и произвели какое-то впечатление на сенатора Нанна (который был абсолютно против Бредли с самого начала), то во многом лишь потому, что д-р Фил Карбер из БДМ перешёл на нашу сторону.
Комитет созвал трех гражданских свидетелей - без сомнения, по инициативе штатного сотрудника и помощника сенатора Харта, г-на Лина, известного участием в принятии нового полевого устава FM 100-5 "Операции". Это были: Карбер, Луттвак и Кенби.
Карбер пообедал со мной до слушаний, и мы смогли убедить его, что, хотя Бредли не совершенна, это лучшая боевая машина пехоты в настоящее время и что мы не можем с чистой совестью отправить американских солдат на войну в Европе в M113. Пожалуй, это звучит как приписывание заслуг Карбера себе. Фактически, у него получилось это объяснить лучше нас, указав, что M113 - первое поколение, БМП-1 и Мардер - второе поколение, а Бредли - третье поколение, по крайней мере, в области мобильности и огневой мощи. Он засвидетельствовал об этом на слушаниях.
Карбер - очень хороший человек, честный и умный. Он обеспокоен несоответствием защиты между Абрамсом и Бредли. Так же и Люттвак, так же и немцы относятся к «Леопарду» и «Мардеру», и так же и русские относятся к Т-72 и БМП-1. Так и нас это беспокоит.
Фил Карбер первоначально планировал рекомендовать прекратить разработку Бредли и переделать шасси Абрамса в БМП. Когда он выяснил, что это займет какое-то время, он неохотно согласился поддержать Бредли как единственный реальный вариант, доступный для нас в это время. Луттвак дал показания против Бредли, как и Кенби. Луттвак, как и Карбер, хочет больше защиты. А речь Кнеби была расплывчатой, смущеной и запутанной.
Уже более года я подумывал о необходимости Бронированной БМП, которая имела бы бронезащиту, равную Абрамсу. Эта мысль была вдохновлена израильским решением проблемы уязвимости бронетехники, через придание роты мотопехоты для каждого танкового батальона - штатной в военное время (в мирное время они не могут позволить себе содержать столько личного состава). На меня также повлиял тот факт, что Джордж Бланшар выступает за смешанный батальон, потому что он хочет тренироваться так, как он планирует сражаться.
Из-за очевидного влияния на программу Бредли и кошмарной мысли, что мы можем застрять с M113 еще на 10 лет, пока мы ещё раз начнём с начала разработку БМП, я не выпускал эту идею из TRADOC (Командование учебных и научных исследований по строительству СВ США).
Позавчера я прочитал в Jane's International Defense Review, что британская армия воскресила свою программу разработки БМП, но на этот раз планирует построить ее с Чобхэмом. Мне кажется, что сочетание Карбера, Луттвака, Нанна, Холлингсворта, концерна Бартлетт в сочетании с британской инициативой насчёт тяжелобронированной БМП, вероятно, означает безнадежность скрывания этой идеи.
Чем больше я думаю об этом вопросе, тем больше я считаю, что мы должны начать двигаться в направлении по-настоящему бронированной боевой машины пехоты, которая была бы связана организационно с каждым танковым батальоном. Эти машины, без сомнения, будут дорогими - они, конечно, будут тяжелыми - и, вероятно, будут излишними для батальонов механизированной пехоты, для которых нам все равно понадобится Бредли - мы точно не хотим оставаться с M113.
Другая мысль, которая может помочь, заключается в том, что мы приближаемся к концу развития Бредли - на самом деле, оно было бы в общем уже закончено, если бы не переделка башни и тянущаяся разработка автопушки Бушмастер. И если мы посмотрим не на вооружение находящееся в разработке, которое будет доделано примерно к 1985 году, а взглянем дальше - то увидим что запланировано очень мало. Другими словами, в программе разработок будет пустота, которую мы в принципе можем начинать заполнять сейчас.
Идея Бронированной БМП, использующей "специальную броню", ещё тихо изучается в TARDEC (Автобронетанковый центр по исследованиям, созданию и модернизации боевых бронированных машин СВ США). Впрочем, пока ещё тайное не стало слишком явным.
Я предлагаю вам и Датчу, и Джорджу Саммету, и Шай Мейер, и Говарду Кукси и мне встретиться как-нибудь в начале апреля, чтобы обсудить этот вопрос и заложить курс на будущее. Чувствительность этого очевидна, и опасности для программы Бредли ясны. Таким образом, это вероятно гарантировало бы напряжение мозгов ваших лучших людей, участвующих в таких вопросах.

впрочем можно и на стенограмму самих слушаний посмотреть - впрочем, как видно, хоть упоминая и ТБМП, он всё же в итоге соглашался на синицу в руке (Бредли) вместо журавля в небе (ТБМП).

Ещё видимо где-то в то же время в TRADOC отдельно исследовали вопрос выживаемости легкобронированных машин на поле боя

о чём упоминается в Press on! Selected Works of General Donn A. Starry т.1 с.236-239

Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle
Message to Multiple Addressees 16 November 1977

1. The purpose of this message is to set forth TRADOC concepts regarding the heavy infantry fighting vehicle (HIFV) and its relationship to the infantry7 fighting vehicle (IFV) and to related weapons development programs.

2. First it is necessary to consider operational concepts:

a. When requirements for the mechanized infantry combat vehicle (M1CV) were first written, the operational scheme for its employment appears to have included the following:
(1) It was to be a combat vehicle system from which infantry fought, dismounting to assault or to fight dismounted in close terrain or builtup areas. It was not simply an amiored personnel earner intended to afford protection from small arms and fragmentation weapons to infantry squads being transported to battle.
(2) Its primary weapon was to be a cannon. The cannon was to provide high volume automatic fire for suppression while attacking mounted and fire support of the rifle squad fighting dismounted. The vehicle rapid fire weapon system (VRFWS), later named Bushmaster, was the developmental candidate. For reasons now not clear, its caliber and other essential characteristics were determined by studies which pitted it primarily against oilier like vehicles in the threat array. Its comparative effectiveness was set forth in like terms. It was for some time in its early development analyzed in a "war of the MICVs.''
(3) The rifle squad aboard the MICV was to be an eleven-man formation; dismounted it fought in two fire teams, like any other infantry squad. In this mode it was to be supported by automatic weapons fire from the MICV cannon.
(4) Antitank weapons for the MICV and its squad were to be those short-range weapons organic to the squad—Dragon and LAW.
(5) It was to accompany the tanks wherever possible—i.e., most of the time. While tanks would normally lead, terrain, builtup areas, and forests could cause infantry to lead, usually dismounted. It was also considered that tanks and infantry would normally attack together on the same axis, but that they would also move on separate axes, or tanks could overwatch by fire when obstacles, terrain, or other conditions dictated.

b. TRADOC s evaluation of the Yom Kippur War and other analyses led to a redefinition of MICV s operating concept. Thus, in early 1974, TRADOC s operational concept for MICV was redefined in tenns of requirements to support tank-led combat teams by:
(1) Providing long-range suppressive fires against enemy infantry antitank teams.
(2) Providing suppressive fire while moving cross-country with tanks
(3) Providing high volume of suppressive overwatch fires to support dismounted infantry attacking enemy infantry who haven't been suppressed.
(4) Defeating the BMP beyond the range of the 73mm smoothbore gun mounted thereon.
(5) Firing antitank guided missiles from an armor-protected station aboard the vehicle,
(6) Protecting the crew against automatic weapons fire of calibers up to 14.5mm.
(7) Dismounting, when required by terrain, enemy, vegetation, or scheme of attack, a fire team of four, five, or six men anned with machineguns and short-range antitank weapons, and overwatching that fire team with fire from the fighting vehicle.

3. Now, as between [these two concepts], what is the same and what changed?
a. The ideal of a fighting, not transporting, vehicle with a cannon system for suppression and protection for the crew remained essentially the same.
b. The fighting mode of mechanized infantry fighting dismounted changed considerably, from a squad with two fire teams supported by the vehicle cannon to a single fire team fighting with its fighting vehicle as the other element of a two-element fire and maneuver team at squad level. This change recognized, first, the reality that a frill eleven-man squad would never be present for duty and that a single fire team of four, five, or six men would likely be all that could ever be dismounted for operations. Secondly, the changed concept recognized that, in the initial battle, the density of systems and intensity of the fight would make command-control so difficult at lower levels that it was necessary to reduce echelons to be controlled, in this case from three to two at squad level. Tins would also make platoon and company commanders' tasks somewhat less demanding.
c. The primary function of the cannon changed somewhat, emphasizing in place of unquantified statements of suppression needs the clear need to stand off the BMP by outranging the 73mm smoothbore and the need to suppress dismounted long-range antitank teams.
d. New was the requirement for a long-range, armor-protected antitank system. This change reflected recognition that survivability of tanks in the central battle needed to, and could be, improved considerably by a long-range antitank capability as part of combat teams fighting there. This was the genesis of the need to add the TOW-Bushmaster armored turret (TBAT) on the MICV.

4. Recognizing that TBAT represented such a change in materiel requirements for the MICV that it would result in a considerable MICV program delay, TRADOC began to search for an interim armor-protected, long-range antitank capability—interim between today's exposed crews, dismounted or in M113s, and MICV's protected weapons and crews. The outcome of that search was the improved TOW vehicle (ITV) program. The ITV, however, was never seen as a competitor for MICV’s mission. It was and is a mobile, long-range antitank system with limited armor protection. It was intended to replace the then-fielded TOW vehicle which featured a pedestal-mounted TOW system erected above the M113 deck and fired by a completely exposed firing crew.

5. As time wore on, and our perception of the central battle sharpened, two things became apparent. The first had to do with the employment of TOWs as part of the antitank tactics in the central battle; the second perception was one of questioning the capability of MICV to survive at the same level as the tank in the central battle. The Hunfeld studies at Knox, and subsequent work in V Corps, clearly demonstrated that thin-skinned M113s and Sheridans did not survive on a dense battlefield in an intense fight. They are simply too vulnerable to too many enemy weapons. This led to a conclusion that, given the level of armor protection we had required on it, MICV was not much more survivable than M113s or M551s. Therefore to survive they all had to stand off—on flanks, overwatching or wherever, especially in the attack. Also it became increasingly clear that our infantry system suffered from a mismatch of short-range and long-range weapons which confronted it with two insurmountable dilemmas in tactics. First, with regard to TOWs with infantry in our present organizational distribution, it became apparent that, where the short-range infantry deployed with properly emplaced TOWs, the infantry was in the wrong place on the battlefield. Contrariwise, when TOWs deployed with properly deployed short-range infantry, the TOWs were in the wrong place. Neither, therefore, could do its job very well if encumbered by the presence of the other, and one team member was always malemployed. Secondly, with regard to TOWs on MICV in an integrated turret, while the long-range antitank capability certainly made MICV a more versatile system, it also brought along a built-in dilemma—the missions for which one could effectively use the cannon against hard targets like BMP did not require TOW, and against soft targets at greater ranges the TOW was obviously not the correct weapon at all. With tanks in the central duel TOW could provide longer range antitank fires than the tanks, standing off even tanks, but it could not survive nearly so well as tanks. TOW on MICV made it a tank killer, but MICV’s survivability level made of it a stand-off system. The counterargument to this is, of course, the one reflected in the BMP—that is the Soviet doctrine of complementariness. As the Sagger and 73mm smoothbore fit the Soviet concept of complementary systems in the same vehicle, so do the cannon and TOW on MICV. Winch is the correct view cannot be determined for super certain, but it does appear that neither the BMP nor MICV can stand mixed in with tanks in the central battle and survive. Soviet BMP employment doctrine reflects this fact.

6. What grew from the perceptions just outlined was the idea of a heavy infantry fighting vehicle. It would have survivability equivalent to XM1. It would fight integrated with XM1 in the central duel. It would carry an assault team which would dismount to pry out an enemy gone to ground, but who for the most part would fight mounted. It need not, indeed could not mount an ATGM, but it did need a good armor-defeating direct and rapid fire weapon of fairly long range which could reach out to destroy lighter skinned vehicles at longer ranges, giving some stand-off, but which could also defeat tanks at the closer ranges of the central duel itself. It could, in short, unstress our tanks in the main battle, first by defeating enemy armor vehicles and antitank systems and second by joining in with the tanks, a target obviously so dangerous as to require the attention of more enemy systems, drawing them away from our tanks. The only weapon on the horizon—that is, under development—which seemed to match this need was the ARPA 75mm automatic cannon. While not everyone agreed at the time on this gun-vehicle match, what was fairly well agreed upon by all was that the HIFV was neither a competitor nor a follow-on for MICV. The two clearly had important, separate, but complementary roles on the battlefield.
a. Survivability was key—HIFV equaled XM1
b. Direct rapid fire armor-defeating weaponry was essential, but an ATGM system appeared not survivable enough, and not fast-firing enough, and a small caliber cannon not lethal enough.
c. Fighting with the tank in the central battle, it represented a lethal capability to all enemy armor within range. Therefore it would be a target which the enemy could not ignore, all of which spelled a system which could help unstress our tanks.

7. A task force has been appointed to evaluate this concept. While the task force is obviously chartered to examine such conceptual excursions and variations as may be appropriate, it is still essential from TRADOC's view that the original concept be thoroughly wrung out. There appears some confusion between several TRADOC agencies as to precisely what the T11FV concept is; the purpose of this message is to provide that information.

8. In summary :
a. We need the IFV.
b. The HIFV makes sense.
c. The HIFV would have comparable survivability to XM1; capability to kill tanks at shorter ranges; comparable mobility to XM1; long-range suppressive fire capability, especially against armored vehicles other than the tank and against antitank teams.
d. The question remains open as to whether different organizations and different mixes of IFV/HIFV may be needed.

Вот это всё, вместе с критикой всё дорожавшей Бредли, столкнувшейся к тому же с поломками и вообще ненадёжностью, привело Конгресс к потребности создать очередную комиссию по исследованию оптимальной БМП, возглавленную генерал-лейтенантом Кризером, которой в том числе поручалось рассмотреть и ТБМП (кажется впервые так серьёзно).
Поскольку предполагалось использовать броню аналогичную той что у Абрамса, и поскольку таковая тогда именовалась в том числе просто "специальной бронёй", то вся машина упоминалась как Special Armor Infantry Fighting Vehicle, SAIFV.

...впервые я наткнулся на упоминание SAIFV пару лет назад, в публикации Федосеева - впрочем его заявление что построили аж опытный образец выглядит сомнительным; а ещё тут в списке http://otvaga.narod.ru/Otvaga/arm-usa.htm она тоже упоминалась. Потом год назад мне попалась вот эта статья https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-u- … fb6728dd11 с тремя рисунками, которые я принял за фантазии современного художника а не художника того времени, и уже лишь  текущем году - попались некоторые упоминания в стенограммах слушаний - и это всё есть выше в этой теме. Дальше был ещё отчёт Mobility analisys of IFV task force alternatives (1978-07), который впрочем не содержал картинок, и хотя содержал некоторые размеры и массы машин - но облик реконструировать выше уровня катков не получалось, так что я решил подождать.
И вот, недавно и совершенно случайно, через твиттер я у самого автора той статьи с картинками выяснил - что картинки он взял из отчёта, каковой свободно лежит в интернете вон там http://cdm16635.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ … 6079/rec/1

Итак, отчёт о 884 страницах, включая 8 глав из которых одна - это шесть приложений,
https://i.imgur.com/j5OHfLpl.jpg
содержит не только рисунки, но и некоторые схемы и достаточно подробные описания разных вариантов рассматривавшихся машин -
собственно 59-тонной (65 коротких) ТБМП с двухместной обитаемой башней бронированной примерно аналогично корпусу, с 25мм автопушкой и спаренной ПУ ТОУ
https://i.imgur.com/KKDb4eXl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/ZxT51pgl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/PtqcDpIl.jpg
варианта уменьшенной защищённости чтоб вписаться в 54,4 тонны (59-60 коротких), тем более соответствуя тогдашнему Абрамсу, и видимо несколько снижая риск появления проблем
https://i.imgur.com/loeWSJhl.jpg
варианта машины с установленными на лафете 25мм автопушкой и спаренной ПУ ТОУ - сэкономившего на бронировании башни массу и вписавшегося в 54,4 тонны (59-60 коротких)
https://i.imgur.com/FFALsDZl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/P1WMGg7l.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/uFzCcU2l.jpg
при этом есть схема варианта на шестикатковом шасси - кажется он упоминается в приложении D как 50-тонный (55 коротких).
https://i.imgur.com/mvaCDpkl.jpg
варианта с 75мм пушкой в низкопрофильной башне, и без ТОУ - на с.524-525 по нумерации пдфки упоминается что прикидки варианта с нормальной башней прекратились, когда стало ясно что вес машины достигает 63,5 метрических (70 коротких) тонн.
https://i.imgur.com/Ih8F7XTl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/kSgR1Pyl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/bw3zBwll.jpg

Как оказалось, отчёт Mobility analisys of IFV task force alternatives (1978-07) - содержится в чуть более ранней версии в приложении D - как Mobility analisys of IFV task force alternatives (1978-02) - и оттуда проще всего взять таблицу с характеристиками ещё и прочих машин которые они рассматривали:

Свернутый текст

https://i.imgur.com/Eiz8lza.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/Mrxhzv0.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/5CmnB8H.jpg

увы, схем или рисунков варианта с защитой аналогичной Бредли и двигателем от Абрамса в отчёте нет. Ещё, в приложении E среди рассмотренных по бронестойкости вариантов упоминается какой-то 54,4 тонный, с двухместной обитаемой башней, - не обеспечивавший требующуюся защиту от снарядов в лоб корпуса и башни, но имевший защиту от 81мм РПГ вкруг, и от 127 и 107мм кумы в бОльшем угле. Его картинок тоже нет.

Ещё в докладе есть схемы предложений как повысить вместимость Бредли не переделывая машину - компромиссами или по удобству или по размеру возимых солдат.

Свернутый текст

https://i.imgur.com/8pVVhLXl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/2PpSSh8l.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/3O4qFR7l.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/XSg8ZPjl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/U7beJ21l.jpg

впрочем, возвращаясь к приложению E - оценке уязвимости разных вариантов

Свернутый текст

https://i.imgur.com/g4e2QaIl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/B0NsAy8l.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/65JqgCgl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/kt2VP9nl.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/5IR11hal.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/WYxn6dzl.jpg

в приложениях F и B указаны, кроме всего прочего, цены на разные варианты машин
https://i.imgur.com/vYi5nl9l.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/lIcxmZRl.jpg
вот как раз unit procurement cost в 370 тысяч долларов за будущую Бредли, которые через пару лет выросли до 472 тысяч, а потом в 1982 году оценивалась в 884 тысячи (переводя в доллары 1978 года). Это ещё не считая того что до конца десятилетия были А1 и А2, выкидывание транспортабельности на C141, и плавучести, и навешивание стальной брони и разработка ДЗ, и так далее. Но именно такими методами - и теми процентами из предыдущего поста -
ну и ещё вот такими - доклад GAO  "Army's Proposed Close Combat Armored Vehicle Team" (12 декабря 1977) на с.23 рассуждает на тему что советы вероятно разрабатывают улучшенную замену БМП-1:
https://i.imgur.com/CLg7ikEl.jpg
а вот ответ руководителя проекта BFV (hearings on military posture and h.r. 10929, ч.2 из 7, с.183) несколько месяцев спустя (где-то в феврале-апреле 1978):
https://i.imgur.com/0bZyzcNl.jpg
было в итоге доказано что надо брать Бредли а не пытаться разработать ТБМП с вероятными сроками начала производства в 1984/1986/1988 (базовый/государственный пессимистичный/сторонний пессимистичный сценарии).
Ещё потом в 1978 работала ещё одна комиссия, Манаффея, - тоже рассматривавшая ТБМП - но только одну. Что за машина была, про то подробностей нет. Ну, а вывод был понятно какой:
https://i.imgur.com/URuydWgl.jpg

Впрочем, далее они занялись во второй половине 80-ых планированием разработки ТБМП с планами начала производства в первой половине 00ых. Правда после 1991 года эта программа в итоге известная как ASM - померла. Увы, вот насчёт неё отчёты наверное подольше будут секретными.

Отредактировано skylancer-3441 (2018-11-09 20:19:37)

327

Прекрасный пост, аплодирую стоя

328

skylancer-3441, спасибо огромное!

329

Хорошая работа, спасибо!

skylancer-3441 написал(а):

и в некоторых советскими авторами (согласно пересказам Карбера) предлагалось вообще отказаться от БМП в пользу танковых десантов

Любят амеры свои размышления кому-то приписывать, в отличии от СА где танковые десанты забыли, амеры их прописывают в своих FM по сей день ака езду на танке 8-)

Отредактировано Blitz. (2018-11-03 01:19:32)

330

Великолепная работа достойная печати.


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