APPENDIX B
HISTORY OF THE BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE ARMY DEVELOPMENT

1957
US Army Armor Policy Conference stated a requirement for an infantry carrier which would permit fighting while mounted.

1958
Infantry School completed a study which recommended an infantry fighting vehicle that supported mounted and dismounted operations.
- Firing ports.
- Antitank capability.
- Two automatic weapons - 20 mm cannon and 7.62 mm machine gun.
- Squad size of 5 plus driver.
- 6 to 8 Tons.
CONARC requested approval from Chief of R&D on Statement of Requirements, O&O Concept, and Qualitative Material Requirement on IFV.
Chief, R&D disapproved because expected employment not clear.

1963
FMC presented several concepts for armored infantry fighting vehicles to the German Army.
Germany said it needed an IFV but would not start a coproduction program unless it was adopted by the US Army.
JCS endorsed the need for an armored infantry fighting vehicle in NATO.
Combat Developments Command study, Alternatives for a Post-1965 Infantry Carrier Program completed.
- M113 incompatible with envisioned main battle tank.
- Three alternatives examined: M113, substantially modified M113, and new armored carrier.
- Must be more than a "battle taxi."
- Protection from shell fragments (155mm), small arms fire, antipersonnel mines.
- Air transportable.
- Recommended development of new armored personnel carrier.

1964
US/FRG Nechanized Infantry Doctrine for the 1965-1975 Time Frame study was approved by DA. Recognized mounted infantry doctrine.
Six prototype vehicles (AIFV-65 or MICV-65) ordered. Vehicles were also referred to as the XM701.
Vehicles were too big, too slow, and too heavy.

1965
Contract awarded to Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory to conduct a parametric design/cost effectiveness study.
- 49 design concepts were examined.
- Results were the Tentative Operational Characteristics for MICV-70.
- Single element, full track vehicle preferred.
- Aluminum armor better protection.
- Turret better than pedestal-mounted main armament.
- Stabilized main armament more effective.
- 12-man crew with 20 mm cannon most cost-effective.
Cornell Labs also commissioned to examine impact of putting TOW on MICV. Results inconclusive.

1967
Contract to FMC for two experimental carriers based on the M113. Designated the XM765.
Cornell Labs contracted to compare three vehicles: the XM765, a conceptual MICV and a conceptual MICV with reduced protection. Conceptual MICV was considered superior.
Army decided not to pursue the XM765 program.
FMC continued the development of the MX765 and it is now in service in the Dutch Army.
Cornell Labs contracted to conduct "Phase III" design study. CSA limited study to single hull, full tracked, diesel powered vehicles.
- 9-man crew size more effective in the attack.
- Ballistic protection produced the most significant change in vehicle protection and cost.
- 20 horsepower per ton was adequate for cross country speed.
- MICV with TOW alone cost more than the MICV with 25 mm and did not increase effectiveness in the attack.
- Conclusions were 12-man crew design mounting a 25mm cannon and offering protection against 14.5mm fire would be the least costly. Would weigh about 51,400 pounds.

1968
Project Manager for the MICV Program was chartered.
Qualitative Material Requirements (QMR) developed for the MICV and disapproved by VCSA.
- Frontal protection against 23mm armor piercing ammunition.
- Side and rear protection against 14.5mm.
- Overhead protection against 155mm artillery fire.
- Provide for a 10-man crew.
- Mount a 25mm cannon and 7.62mm coax machine gun.
- Swim.
- Cruising range of 400 miles.
- Collective NBC protection.
- Be C5 air transportable.
- Implied in the CDC proposal was a two-vehicle approach. One that met the QMR for Europe and a less sophisticated one for low intensity conflicts.
Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle Ad Hoc Study Group formed to study the MICV QMR (Casey Study). The study and new QMR recommended:
- C141 transportable.
- 12-man crew.
- 20-30 mm gun.
- 2-man turret.
- 37,000 pounds.
- Improving the M113 would not satisfy the IFV requirement of keeping up with tanks.
- Firmly established the need for a single Infantry Fighting Vehicle.

1969
Commander-in-Chief USAREUR expressed concerns about the protection levels of the MICV.
MBT-70 came under scrutiny and criticism and so did its companion infantry fighting vehicle (MICV).
Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle Alternatives Cost Effectiveness Study (MICV ACE) was directed.
- The MICV meeting the QMR requirements (XM723) was considered superior; Austere MICV was second.
PM started development of an austere MICV during preparation of MICV ACE.
- Pedestal mounted 20 mm.
- Smaller engine.
- Weight 33,750 pounds.

1970
MICV ACE and Austere MICV concepts presented to a special cost-effectiveness in-process review.
Austere MICV deemed more cost-effective.
QMR was modified to reflect the Austere MICV measures.

1971
Material Needs (MN) document for the MICV approved.
MICV Development Concept Paper (DCP) presented at the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC).

1972
OSD approved DCP. OSD said proposed development schedule was too long.
Army issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for MICV development.
FMC received the contract. Schedule called for a low rate initial production to begin in 1976 with the first operationally equipped unit occurring in 1978.

1973
Army started taking deliveries of the XM723 MICV prototype.

1974
Army stopped the development of the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle program and combined it with the MICV program.
Because of technical problems, PM realigned the MICV engineering development program.
GAO issued a report critical of the cost-effectiveness of the MICV and said the MICV ACE was outdated.
Because of continued concern over cost of the MICV and a less than impressive Bushmaster COEA, the Army directed a MICV Special Study Group be brought together.

1975
MICV Speical Study Group report issued:
- Confirmed the requirement of a fighting vehicle.
- Antitank capability for MICV desirable.
- Swim capability must be retained.
- Need for firing port weapons confirmed.
- Needed a turret-mounted long range cannon.
- Stabilized turret.
- Integral day-night weapons' sight.
- Dual feed capability for main armament.
The MICV still having problems with its transmission and the Bushmaster development was behind that of the MICV.
Hughes Helicopter given a 25-month contract tdevelop the 25mm chain gun. Shoot off competition scheduled for 1978 with first weapons scheduled for delivery in 1981.

1976
A special general officer review of the MICV operational issues (Larkin Study):
- Common chassis, turret, and upper hull for MICV be developed for the infantry and scout roles.
- Include a TOW capability.
- MICV be developed with a 2-man turret.
- Mechanized infantry battalions be equipped with 4 MICV per platoon, 13 per company and 41 per battalion.
Finding of the Larking Study approved by Secretary of the Army, MICV program restructured.

1977
VCSA approved the renaming of the vehicle to the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (XM2) and the Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (XM3)
Phase II development contract given to FMC.
- Continue development of a two-man turret,
- Upgrade MICV to IFV configuration.
IFV/CFV COEA directed as Phase II of the MICV Special Study Group effort.
Congress directed a study of a follow-on vehicle to the IFV. The IFV Task Force was formed (Crizer Study).
- Reconfirmed the requirement for an infantry fighting vehicle.
- Design review of the IFV indicated it was capable of performing its assigned mission.
- Conceptual follow-on vehicles with heavy armor were more effective but were offset by high investment costs, unacceptable delays in increased force readiness and medium to high technical risks.
- Recommended continued development of the IFV/CFV.
Army notified that all funding (procurement and R&D) for the IFV/CFV program had been deleted from the budget submit (22 Dec 1977).

1978
OSD agreed to continue R&D on the IFV but directed a study of less costly alternatives.
IFV/CFV Speical Study Group formed at Fort Leavenworth (Mahaffey Study).
Congress restored funding for long lead items for the IFV/CFV program.
IFV/CFV COEA completed:
- IFV/CFV with TBAT II turret was the most operationally effective.
- IFV equipped force was the only alternative which showed a possibility of mission success.
Mahaffey Study complete:
- Continue IFV/CFV development.
- Do not develop M113 derivatives as future fighting vehicles.
- Do not commit development funds to IFV derivatives as an ITV replacement at that time.
- Adding TOW on the IFV was a cost-effective means of adding antitank capabilities to the force structure.
Two prototype turrets delivered to the Army. TOW and gun system firings began.
First engineering developed vehicle delivered to the Army - Dec 1978.
Contractor testing started.

1979
By February, eight IFV/CFV pilot vehicles had been completed.
Government testing began in July.
Update COEA conducted.
- Results of previous studies remain valid.
- Threat improvements have not degraded effectiveness of IFV/CFV.
- The IFV/CFV remains the most cost-effective alternative.
ASARC III held on 20 December 1979:
- IFV/CFV approved for production.
- Production rate be increased to 90 vehicles per month as soon as possible.

1980
DSARC III held on 22 January 1980:
- IFV/CFV approved for production.
- Production rate to be increased from 50 vehicles per month to 90 per month by 1985.
- NFY 81 production funds would be released until a September Program review.
September Program Review to report on:
- Acceleration of the cost reduction program.
- Reevaluation of the Army survivability test plan.
- Correct the deficiencies in the Integrated Sight Unit.
- Examine a program to develop a long rod penetrator ammunition.
- Initiate a high priority effort to execute a competition production program.
September IFV program review held 16 October 1980.
OSD released FY 81 funds by Memorandum on 30 October 1980.
Vulnerability testing began - consisted of vaporifics and ballistics tests.

1981
First vehicle off the production line - May 1981.

1983
March - start of unit handoff.
December - Initial operational capability (IOC) unit.

1984
Additional vaporifics tests conducted.

1985
March - Vulnerability testing against overmatching weapons began.
May - M2A1/M3A1 production decision made.
December - Phase I vulnerability test report submitted to Congress.

BRADLEY CHRONOLOGY
Joint US/FRG study of 1964 established the requirement for mechanized infantry to be able to fight mounted
MICV initiated in 1965
- a relatively simple follow on to the M-113
Army Vice Chief rejects early design proposals as too big, heavy, complicated in 1968
Casey board 1968 approved a smaller, lighter less costly 12 man vehicle with a 20mm cannon and firing ports

==>INCONSISTENT STORY

Now, I would like to switch over to the Bradley, and how not to build a weapons’ system, because the Bradley is a classic example. The Bradley’s history goes back about 28 years.
In fact, in the formal sense, it goes back to 1964. There was a joint study with the Federal Republic of Germany, and this study established the requirement for the infantry to fight from a vehicle. The MICV was initiated in 1965, was supposed to be a relatively simple follow-on to a $26,000 a copy vehicle called the M-113, and there was a lot of turmoil over the program at that time.
The Army Vice Chief, who was then Ralph Haines said, “Hey, look, these design proposals you are giving me are too complicated. This vehicle is too big. It is too heavy. It is too sensitive.”
“I don’t want it. I am looking for something that can get infantry troops up to the front lines to support my armor. Don’t tell me about engaging other vehicles.”
So, he, as a consequence of that concern, convened a board that was under Brig. Gen. George Casey called the Casey Board. In 1968 they approved a smaller, lighter less costly MICV, which is what the Bradley was called back then, the mechanized infantry combat vehicle [MICV].
However, in the spirit of compromise they came out with sort of a conflict. What they came up with was a stabilized cannon for this smaller low-cost lighter vehicle, and that I think served as the epic for the principal issue on the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and that it was supposed to be antipersonnel.

The Issue
Anti-personnel was the highest priority task but the 20MM stabilized cannon was not an anti-personnel weapon.

It was stated, this mission was stated as the as the army’s highest priority. However, the stabilized cannon, was not an anti-personnel weapon, so you can see the genesis of the turmoil.

BRADLEY CHRONOLOGY POST 1968
1969 MICV intended as a companion vehicle to MBT-70.
An austere MICV was judged to be nearly as effective as the MICV—Sheridan power train, suspension, simple cannon.
Approved by Army in 1970.
DEP SEC DEF approved DCP in 1972.
Within the year the DCP was amended: Simple weapon abandoned; added the Bushmaster.
Austerity was illustory.

If you look at the Bradley post 1968, the Army advertised this was going to be a companion vehicle to the MBT-70. This was still another calibration point in identifying this conflict that was going to take place, because if this thing was going to go up there and fight side-by-side with tanks it was going to get blown off the face of the Earth.
That is one thing I think you can state categorically regardless of the amount of testing the army does and there is plenty of evidence to support that. If you put this thing side-by-side with tanks it gets blown away.
That is why we put the kind of armor we did on the M-1 tank, and that contains a crew of four. It makes no sense to put a crew of nine in the same area with the protective vehicle with the standoff armor capability that Bradley’s have.
They decided again that the vehicle got too costly and complicated so they came up with an austere MICV. This was now a vehicle that was going to use the Sheridan power train, Sheridan suspension system, and kind of off the shelf of parts. They did a study on that and they concluded that the austere MICV was just as capable as the one that they had in design, and this was approved by the Army in 1970, and the Secretary of Defense approved that development concept paper in 1972.
However, within 1 year, the whole thing, the whole concept of austerity was lost, because somebody made the decision to put a Vehicle Rapid-Fire gun System on this thing, and again that added complexity, it added more capability to the system, and the whole concept of austerity became an illusion. It just wasn’t there.
Now, to show you how adding these things sounds simple, but is complex, let me say that if you wanted to go from armor protection against the 14,5 mm to a 23 mm, that would add about 4 tons in armor to the tank. If you wanted to change the horsepower to weight ratio by just a few, 2 to 5, that would result in about 5 percent increase in the weight you would add to that tank.
If you wanted protection against the 20-pound mine, that would add another 5,000 pounds to the tank. If you wanted protection against the 40-pound mine, it is not linear, that would add as much as 18,000 pounds to the weight of that APC, so what is happening is you have got a series of considerations here that change the vehicle characteristics significantly.
The program was not new in 1972. It was around since 1964, and everybody and his brother was perturbing the program and trying to put in what they wanted.

BRADLEY CHRONOLOGY POST 1972
MICV (XM-723) test results were poor
Weight increased to 42.000 pounds
GAO critical of MICV in 1974
Mid—1974 Army cancelled Armored Recon Scout Vehicle (ARSV)
MICV identified as ARSV replacement
1976 study to put TOW on the MICV
1976 Sec Hoffman challenged MICV mission
Larkin study recommended TOW

==>MICV was now a troop carrier, scout and anti armor vehicle

Now let’s take the chronology from post-1972. The tests results were very bad. The weight had increased. It was now a 42,000-pound vehicle.
The GAO was very critical of the MICV. The army then in 1974 canceled something called the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle Program, and then somebody had the bright idea, let’s make the MICV, which is now the Bradley Scout Vehicle, which was a very silly idea.
It is sort of like trying to hide the Refrigerator in the Mormon Tabernacle Choir because this thing is now 10 feet tall. To use it in a scouting mission you would have to wonder about it. It is very, very big.
If you look at the BMP in contrast to the Bradley, the BMP is about 85 inches tall. I have sat in it. It is a little uncomfortable.
Russ Murray sat in it. Other people have suggested to raise the height 4 inches. It has a very low silhouette in comparison to the Bradley.
I am not giving you a qualitative analysis of the BMP against the Bradley. I am not in a position to do that across-the-board,
I am just giving you one aspect of it. In any event the program was getting challenged by Secretary Hoffman, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, and this in turn precipitated the Larkin study under General Larkin, and then what happened was that out of all of this came the requirement to put a two-man turret on the MICV, on the Bradley, and now you had a troop carrier, you had a scout vehicle, you had an antiarmor vehicle, and when you add up the characteristics of all of these things, you may come up with a null set, that is it does a lot of things very poorly instead of a few things very well.

Impact - MICV now carried 9, not 11-man crew because of the 2-man turret
Significance: Original requirement was to carry 12; driver, gunner, vehicle commander stay with vehicle providing a dismounted infantry squad of 6; 1978 study by the infantry school evaluated effectiveness of 9, 7, 5 man squads; five man squad was judged as less than 20 percent as effective as a 9 man squad; results confirmed by operational tests at Fort Carson July—November 1979.

Well, let’s look at the impact of this decision now to put the two-man TOW-Busfamaster turret on the MICV. Here is the impact.
Now it didn’t carry 11 men, it carries nine, because you needed that space for the 2-man turret.
Now what is the significance of this?
The original requirement for a fighting vehicle was for 12 men. Then we went to 11. Now we are down to 9.
Now if you go back and look at the infantry school study of 1978, they concluded the MICV needed a nine-man squad. If you go to a six-man squad, a five-man squad, or a seven-man squad, we lose a lot of effectiveness, that is a five-man squad is only 20 percent as effective as a nine-man squad, so you can see how adding a two-man turret to this thing now costs you capability in terms of its original mission, which was to take the squad, the nine-man squad up to the lines, in support of the armor.
Now, you may say well, that was just a study, how good is that? The results were confirmed by the operational tests at Fort Carson in 1979 during the period of July to November. In fact, I have got some quotes back in my office of the tester who said this just doesn’t cut it.
Now, there were other perturbations as well, and other documents to support the fact that this vehicle was being made so hybrid that it didn’t do anything very well. These are not my statements now. I will give you an example.
There is a message sent by Gen. Don Starry who at that time was the Commander of the Training Tactics and Doctrine Command, and in this message, in fact, I will give you the daytime group, it is 1614 November 14, 1977, if you want to go back and check it out.
In the message he implies, “Who in the hell decided to put this TOW on this fighting vehicle?”
He said, “If I am going to effectively use TOW, then I am going to be 3,000 meters from the order of battle, and therefore it can’t provide very good infantry support vehicle for armor.”
Now if you put this thing up where the battle is going on then TOW is maldeployed, so what are we doing here?
We really ought to be developing something else called a heavy infantry fighting vehicle. You can understand the political nuisance there. That message was quickly cast aside, but I will say one thing, even General Richardson who didn’t agree with General Starry at that time wrote a memo saying, “I think it was a mistake to put TOW on the MICV.”
All of this exists. I can give you all of the references chapter and verse on opinions expressed by generals and by people in positions of responsibility.
Now, it is interesting to note that during the Carter years, I think it was in 1977, the OMB made a decision to terminate the MICV. They said it is too expensive, and President Carter was going to uphold that decision, and Russ Murray at that time said, why don’t you give them one more year of R&D and also make them look at the alternatives, and in effect that kept the program going, and it was in 1977 when I appeared during the markup before the R&D Subcommittee, and said, I think we ought to terminate this and I think we ought to terminate it because its mission has been so diluted by adding capability that I don’t think it can really do its job.
That recommendation was not accepted, and I haven’t spoken out in favor of or in opposition to the Bradley since that date, until December 5 when Mr. Bennett, Mr. Dickinson and several other members of the subcommittee asked me about its survivability.
Let me talk about the main issue today before I get into just a quick critique of the tests. These are the Bradley issues today.

Bradley Issues Today
Main issue—What’s it for?
If used by infantry on the defense—how can it survive enemy weapons?
Overwatch—if it stays back its effect may be negligible
If used on offense—how can it see dug in enemy troops? How about its size? What about the loss of effectiveness because of the 6-man squad?

What is it?
What are you going to use it for?
I mean how do you resolve all of the inconsistencies in the stories that have been going around for the past 17 years?
In fact, I am sorry, it is 22 years right now. If it is going to be used by the infantry on the defense how is it going to survive the small weapons. If you are going to use it for overwatch, is its impact negligible by virtue of its standing back?
If you are going to use it on offense, how good is its visibility. These are the questions you have got to develop with the Army before you come to any conclusions on the results of the tests. I think you have got to ask how are you going to use it, and if you are going to put this thing up there side-by-side with the tanks, I will state unequivocally it gets blown away.
Now I can’t get into the specific details. I can tell you that in the tests of some armored vehicles loaded with a very modest supply of weapons, like the Soviets have, and like we have, if you put a round right through that stream you will have nothing but a crater there plus a piece of aluminum.

The History of the Bradley or How Not to Develop a Weapons System
I would like to turn now to the issue of the Bradley and show how a system that spends 17 years of its life in research and development can become so controversial.
In the normal development process, a service should start out with a stated requirement for a weapons system. Performance thresholds are established in what Is called a Development Concept Paper (DCP). In the case of a missile, for example, the altitude region in which the missile was to perform would be stated with a margin on both the low and the high side. Similarly, the launch envelope would be specified as well as the target characteristics. During the development phase, a program manager would be satisfied if the tests indicated that the missile could perform in accordance with the DCP and if things did not go too well, hope that it would not breach the thresholds.
The same approach would be used for the development of an aircraft, a tank, an armored personnel carrier or any other weapon system. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle and a host of other weapons systems did not follow this strategy.
The concept of the Bradley started over two decades ago, but in the formal sense, began in 1964. These was a joint U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany study in 1964 that established the requirement for the Mechanised Infantry to be able to fight from a vehicle - mounted. In 1965, after approving this study, the Army initiated the Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicle - the MICV - which ultimately became the Bradley.
It should be emphasized that the Army's concept at that time was to develop a relatively simple follow-on to the M-113. Within a few years, however, this simple follow-on was becoming more complex. In 1968, the Army Vice Chief, General Ralph Haines, rejected the design proposal because the proposed vehicle was too big, too heavy, and too complicated.
Later in 1968, a panel was convened under the direction of General Georgs Casey to review the design of the MICV. It is my understanding that General Haines believed that the principal function of the MICV was a transport and not for anti-vehicle applications. The Casey Board presented its findings later in 1968 and recommended a low-cost, small light vehicle - much different than the one proposed by the Army's Combat Development Command. Toward the end of 1968, General Palmer, who was then the Vice Chief of Staff, approved the MICV proposed by the Cacey Panel. This smaller, simpler vehicle would carry a crew of 12 with a stabilized cannon and firing ports for the infantrymen.
This was, in my opinion, the epoch for the ensuing controversy, conflict, disruptions and perturbations in the MICV program. On the one hand, some of the Army wanted a transport vehicle - a battlefield taxi - with an anti-persoonel capability. There were others, however, who wanted more than an anti-personnel capability, and in my judgement, the Casey Board provided a compromise by adding a stabilized cannon to a light, simple low-cost vehicle. The estimated cost of this vehicle was about $115,000 and its weight would be somewhere around 35,000 pounds.
It was in 1969 when the Army began talking about the MICV as a companion vehicle to the new main battle tank, the MBT-70. The controversy and conflict was beginning to heighten. Again, people in the Army and in the OSD questioned the requirement and configuration of the MICV. At that time there was still another study to evaluate an austere MICV. This vehicle would use a Sheridan power train, a simple pedestal mounted cannon and Sheridan suspension. This austere vehicle was shown to be nearly as effective as the MICV and in 1970, the Army apprpoved the development of the austere MICV. The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the Development Concept Paper in 1972 but again, within one year, the simple cannon was abandoned, the complicated Bushmaster gun was added and austerity rapidly became history.
In the post-1972 era, the MICV was showing rather poorly. Its weight was over 42,000 pounds, it had powertrain problems and collectively the problems led to a GAO report that was critical of the MICV in 1974.
An event that significantly perturbed the MICV program was still another change in its mission. In 1974, the Army terminated the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicie program (ARSV). The MICV was now identified as the replacement for the ARSV and now we had what I considered to be an anti-personnel, anti-vehicle, scout platform all of which would lead to a vehicle that did a lot at things very poorly rather than a single mission very well.
In 1976, after Secretary of Defense Schlesinger threatened to terminate the program because it was too expensive for the capability that it would provide, the Army conducted a study to put the TOW missile on the MICV. The need for the MICV was now being questioned by Army Secretary Hoffman which led to a study chaired by General Richard Larkin. The Larkin Panel recommended the development of a two-man turret. The conflict was reaching its pinnacle since the two-man turret now resulted in a vehicie that could carry not the 12 man recommended by the Casey Board, or the 11 man approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1972, but 9 man.
This was significant since we now had a 9-man vehicle of which three of the crew were dedicated to and would have to remain with the vehicle. It was significant because in 1978 the Army Infantry School conducted a study to evaluate the effectiveness of a 9, 7, and 5 man squad. The results of this showed that a five-man squad was lass than 20 percent as effective as a nine-man squad. Since three man were dedicated to the vehicle, we now had a six-man squad which was deemed ineffective by the Army's own studies.
While it's true that studies can be in error, the results of this particular study were actually verified in operational tests at Fort Carson, Colorado, between the period July-November 1979. I would also point out that the Army Chief of Staff advised the Congress in 1980 that if the MICV were to be designed in 1980, he would want it to carry more infantry.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle development program is a textbook example of how not to build a weapons system. If you review the history very carefully and in great detail, you could come to the conclusion that we have built an "operational kludge." The issue before you is really WHAT IS THE BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE SUPPOSE TO DO?

If it is to be used by the infantry on the defense, you have to carefully analyse the test results to determine if it can survive enemy weapons. My review of the data, albeit cursory, tells me that this vehicle cannot fight slde-by-side with tanks.
If it is to be used on offense, is the visibility of the crew such that it can see dug-in enemy troops? Additionally, how can the Army explain the loss of effectiveness as a consequence of the six-man dismounted squad?

Mr. Chairman, my brief review of the test results brings me to the conclusion that very little has been done to demonstrate the effectiveness and survivability of the Bradley. Some examples - the impact points and attack directions of the live fire shots were not random or representative of the locations of combat impacts. Ammunition in the Bradley contained inert fuzes which did not demonstrate the violence at the reactions of ammunition that takes on a direct hit.
My brief review of the test results generates more questions than answers. There is a need to do more dynamic testing. There is a need to use live fuses in evaluating the violence of ammunition strikes. Wa cannot fault the JLFT concept for these deficiencies. In fact, without the JLFT, the problems would never have surfaced. You might question the Army representatives who delineated the test plan why the testing was structured in such an unrealistic manner.

In all candor I could not give you e favorable recommendation on the basis of the tests conducted to date. So much more has to be done. The Procurement Subcommittee will conduct a more comprehensive review at the program and the test data.
Based on this review, there may be less costly, more effective alternatives to the Bradley. These alternatives would include the improved M-113 used by the Dutch - the XM-765.

I would like to explain what a Bradley Fighting Vehicle is, but that is not an easy task. The Army has been trying to explain it for twenty years, without much success. The Bradley is an armored vehicle that looks like a tank, sounds like a tank, travels in the company of tanks, and carries offensive weapons with which to shoot at enemy tanks, but the Bradley is not a tank. Tanks have big cannons to shoot at other tanks, and they have thick, heavy armor to provide protection against antitank weapons. The Bradley’s armor is very thin compared with the armor of a tank; it is more like that of a personnel carrier. The Bradley is not exactly a personnel carrier either, although that is what it started out to be. This attempt to define a Bradley reveals the root of most of its problems. What is the Bradley, and what is it supposed to do? These questions have plagued the Bradley for twenty years. To this day, they have not been fully answered.
In the early 1960s, the Army began to develop a simple, inexpensive replacement for its M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier. The M-113 was, and still is, a “battlefield taxi,” a vehicle that simply transports troops to and from the battle. An infantry squad of eleven men rides inside. The armor is thick enough to protect the squad only from small arms fire (rifles and machine guns). Anything larger than small arms will pass through the M-113, or any lightly armored vehicle, like a hot knife through butter. For this reason, troops over the years have refused to ride inside the M-113 when encountering enemy fire larger than small arms is a possibility. Instead, they ride on top.
The Bradley began as the M-113 replacement. Its job would be to transport an eleven-man infantry squad to the battlefield—a simple, straightforward task. The Bradley was in development for seventeen years, however; during that time, the Army kept changing its mind about what it wanted the Bradley to do. The notion of having the Bradley engage other vehicles crept into the picture. The Bradley would team up with the new M-1 tanks, and together they would engage enemy armored forces. In this situation, the Bradley would take return fire from enemy vehicles, which meant taking hits from weapons far larger than small arms, but the Bradley’s armor was not beefed up accordingly. Then, someone came up with the idea that the troops inside should be able to stick their rifles out through little portholes to shoot at the enemy. Long after the Bradley had entered production, this feature proved to be useless and the portholes were sealed up.
During the Bradley’s development, several committees were formed to review the program and decide on its mission and features. These included the Casey Board, Larkin Committee, and others. Each time a committee met, the mission changed and new design features were added. By the time production was approved in 1980, the Bradley had three missions. It confirmed the old adage that a camel is a horse designed by a committee.
I cannot help but compare the Bradley to the Air Force F-16. Thanks to the Fighter Mafia, the F-16 was the product of a highly disciplined design process. The combat tasks were decided first and were not allowed to vary during the design phase. This produced a superior design that was tailored to those specific tasks. The combat tasks of the Bradley, on the other hand, kept changing. Each change brought a new design feature that was simply added to the picture. The resulting product is a vehicle that performs a variety of tasks but does no task very well.
For example, as a personnel carrier, the Bradley can carry a squad of only six, not eleven. As an armored scout vehicle, it is supposed to seek out the enemy, probe its defenses, and sneak around behind the lines to see what is going on—all without being noticed (sneak, peek, and tell mission). Unfortunately, the Bradley is the largest vehicle on the battlefield and stands out like a sore thumb. It stands 10 feet tall, some 3 feet taller than its Soviet counterpart. It is hard to be inconspicuous when you are the largest guy at the party. Army Gen. Edwin Burba, commandant of the Infantry School, claimed on CBS’s 60 Minutes (15 February 1987) that the added height was an advantage. He could see farther from up there!
A 1976 decision to give the Bradley an antiarmor mission, in my view, was the key decision in the history of the program. A two-man turret was added to the vehicle so that TOW antitank missiles and a 25-mm cannon could be fired at enemy armored personnel carriers (APCs) as the Bradley fought alongside our M-1 tanks. This decision guaranteed that the Bradley would be subject to return fire from antitank weapons, yet its armor would provide little or no protection against any antitank weapons, whether of small, medium, or large caliber.
The turret decision also guaranteed that the troop compartment of the Bradley would be stuffed with dangerous ammunition and TOW missiles and that the compartment could hold only six riflemen instead of eleven, as in its smaller predecessor APC, the M-113.

The IFV gap.
by Beth Brophy
Forbes
February 18, 1980

For 18 years the U.S. Army has been dreaming about a new kind of armored vehicle. The Soviets has been building them since 1967. We'll start next year. Maybe.

In a sprawling factory nestled in the fields opposite the airport at San Jose, Calif., several hundred FMC Corp. workers are beginning to tool up for a new Army vehicle. The first production model won't roll off until May of 1981, but before the run ends in ten years, thousands may be built and billions of dollars may flow to the contractors. The story of this "Infantry Fighting Vehicle" — a troop carrier that fights like a tank — illustrates the promises and pitfalls of the coming arms buildup.
The Army is talking about buying 6,900 of FMC's fighting vehicles at $500,000 each. The total bill will run $8 billion; $5 billion to $6 billion for vehicles and parts, $2 billion for support, ammunition and maintenance. That money will be spread around to other contractors, too: General Electric will make the transmission and turret drive system; Hughes Helicopter, the fast-firing—up to 200 rounds a minute—automatic 25mm cannon; Hughes Aircraft, the antitank missile launchers; Ford, the ammunition.
The new IFV, also called the XM-2, will be quite a buggy. It will weigh in at 24 tons and run 45 miles per hour on roads. It will be able to swim rivers, knock out opposing tanks day or night, blow down buildings and spray enough machine-gun fire in all directions to scatter the largest mobs, as well as carry a squad of nine infantrymen safely into the heart of the battlefield. The IFV is considered a partner to the new Army supertank, the Chrysler XM-1, for massive ground battles. But unlike the 60-ton XM-1, the IFV fits in a C-141, the workhorse of the airborne corps, and could prove important to the still-forming Rapid Deployment Force (Forbes, Jan. 22, 1979).
The history of this promising weapon is, however, a study in frustration. It's not easy to build weapons for a war that hasn't been fought. So, hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent before the first production model is completed.
The story starts in 1962. The old World War II M-113 was still in use, but the generals considered that an aluminum taxicab, offering no protection to troops in battle. They wanted a vehicle that would bring men up to the field and do some fighting, too. It wasn't a priority project during the Vietnam War, and the requirements kept changing.
“The development and refielding of a replacement for the M-113 armored personnel carrier has a record of stop-start and frustration since it was initiated,” says Brigadier General Philip Bolté, the Army's program manager for the weapons system. FMC, which made the old M-113, was in the IFV project from the beginning. Its first effort was called the MICV-65, or Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle-65. It had a small, one-man turret that, it was later decided, wasn't such a good idea, as the commander was exposed rather than protected by armor, and the 20mm cannon wasn't powerful enough. The teeth on the tracks broke, and the transmission had problems. Even so, the MICV-65 went all the way into prototype before rejection. Putting the best possible face on the delays, General Bolté says: "The best is always the enemy of the good enough in any research and development program."
With each failure, the Army embarked on a new study, changin the program several times along the way. The trouble, admits General Bolte, was that the Army didn't know what it was looking for. And like a cab driver uncertain of his destination, each wrong turn pushed the cost meter up. FMC, of course, has had its problems, too. Says Vice President Philip Devirian, who has been in on the project since 1972, "Our frustrations usually re late to money. We had to spend lots of time and effort working around the money problems, as well as the mechanical problems. But we never gave up."
Then came the 1973 Israeli-Egyptian War, Egyptian soldiers equipped with wire guided antitank missiles smashed the Israeli tank attacks. It marked the death of armor, critics said — and stil say. But the Army pushed on. Those missiles can be beaten, General Bolté says, by evasive maneurvers and by spraying gunfire at the men launching them; they can't duck and aim at once.
By 1976 Congress was so miffed at the delays, it wrote into the 1977 Appropriations Bill that the first vehicle must be produced by May 1981. The program was still being modified, though: The turret became a two-man bastion; TOW missiles were added; the vehicle's command station was moved. Costs kept rising, and by last year the projected unit was up to $495,000, compared with about $90,000 for the old M-113.
"No one ever made a complex turret with a combined gun-and-missile system and fire control to handle them. It cost more than either the Army or FMC estimated," Bolte says. What's more, says the Army, the old M-113 just isn't in the same league with the IFV-XM-2. The Army also says its new vehicle can knock out Russian BMP troop carriers at more than 2,000 meters and ranks high on the test results from Ft. Carson, Colo.
“Our prime difficulty was finding a vehicle that went fast enough to monitor it,” says Major Anthony Trifiletti at Ft. Carson. William Rutledge, the IFV program manager for FMC, says proudly that his vehicle is so fast that troops returning from the testing range were given a ticket for exceeding the 35-mph speed limit.
FMC, the prime contractor, has spent upwards of $50 million of its own in preparing the IFV for production, while the Army has pumped in $262 million over 18 years. Even if the orders come, FMC has the field to itself only until 1984, when the contract will be opened for new bidding, although FMC does have the edge because of its experience in its early development and production.
Is the project worth the fuss? Thirteen years ago the Russians decided the IFV was the coming thing. Today you see them on every TV news show, in newspapers and magazines, those low-tracked vehicles in rows at the Kabul Airport or racing down Afghan highways...

General Dynamics is proposing to use a Mauser 27-mm high-rate-of-fire cannon for the Army's gun low-altitude air defense systems (GLAADS). The 247-lb. weapon, carried on a 48-in. ring mount, would fire 1,000 rounds/min. General Dynamics has a license for the cannon, which it would produce in this country if it wins the GLAADS competition now under way. Other GLAADS competitors are General Electric, Philco-Ford, Westinghouse and Sperry Rand.

Army's GLAADS approach calls for a 25-35-mm high-rate-of-fire anti-aircraft gun mounted in a turret on a tracked vehicle chassis and integrated with a closed loop fire control system using FLIR and the laser to thwart zero to 300 meters/sec. targets at ranges beyond 3,000 meters. The GLAADS gyro-stabilized sensors— FLIR, laser and gunner's eyes—have a common line of sight. The FLIR sensor will acquire targets at 7,000 yd. and display them on a cathode ray tube presentation, superimposed over a visual view of the sector on the gunner's stabilized optical sight. The laser-derived range also will be projected onto the sight through the tube. The target will be tracked automatically once the operator has localized it within a 10-milliradian acquisition gate. Target range and azimuth/elevation angles of the stable platform are to be fed into a digital processor that calculates pointing angles for the servo-driven gun.
The GLAADS FLIR will have two fields of view—20 × 40 deg. in the wide angle and 1 × 2 deg. in the narrow. Its image resolution will be one milliradian in the wide angle and 0.1-0.25 in the narrow. Accuracy will be within 1 mil.

Developing Army's Bradley: the wages of compromise
by Lon O. Nordeen Jr.
Army magazine
vol.37 July, 1987

==71==
It has been 25 years since the Army first began to define a requirement for an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), but only in the last few years have any appreciable number of them appeared in the field. In a vicious, tangled action-reaction spiral, the long gestation period exposed the concept to changing requirements and battlefield threats; and the incorporation of new requirements further stretched out the development process. All that travail, after having arrived at a design formula acceptable to many competing interests, is what makes the continuing controversy over the M2 Bradley IFV a source of extreme frustration for the Army's mechanized force.
If the Bradley is not necessarily the solution the Army would choose if it were starting from scratch today, neither is it exactly the vehicle the service wanted in the first place. The M2 version in particular was subject to some significant compromises imposed by the very outside authorities — Congress and the Defense Department — who are now critical of the results.
It is important to remember that the operational concept of mechanized infantry against which the Bradley was developed is primarily an offensive one: to provide the absolutely indispensable assistance which tanks require in maintaining the momentum of the armored attack. Part traditional infantryman, part pioneer, part clearance and recovery crewman, the "mech" trooper fights mounted or dismounted and deals with the enemy infantry and their antitank weapons; helps clear obstacles when calling up engineers would take too much time; provides manpower for maintenance and resupply tasks; and sees to security when vehicles are halted, through guard mounts and patrolling. Dismounted, mech infantry can fix enemy forces in place, occupying their attention and firepower while tanks maneuver to the flanks.
All of these functions are especially critical in what the Soviets would call the "break-in" battle against prepared defenses, where the battlefield is crowded, cover close, ranges short, visibility limited and the level of violence extreme.
Despite advances in electronics and optics, it is hard to see anything from inside a buttoned-up tank under fire. Even in open terrain, tanks have a close-in "blind zone" within which the crew cannot see the ground and a larger "dead zone" within which the weapons cannot be brought to bear. Without accompanying infantry, tankers would have to concentrate on watching each other's backs, with little attention to worthwhile main gun targets.

□ US Army photo by Bill C. Walton - Supported by flotation screens, three Bradleys cross the Chattahoochee River during swimming operations at Ft. Benning, Ga.
==72==
реклама
==73==
Two of the requirements for an accompanying infantry vehicle are excellent all-around vision— including the infantry squad, whose members need to be able to see what is going on before they dismount — and the cross-country speed to keep up with the supported tanks; in fact, a margin ten percent better than tank speed is desirable, to regain time lost in dismounting and picking up the infantry squad. The M2 Bradley meets these criteria admirably with allowable cross-country speeds up to 30 mph, sophisticated day-night optics and armor glass vision blocks for each member of the infantry squad.
Another IFV requisite is main armament that can defeat other light armored vehicles and provide overwhelming fire support for the dismounted infantry squad. There has been some debate about whether the Bradley's 25-mm automatic cannon is the most effective weapon for the latter role, with the suggestion that higher-capacity high-explosive rounds from a low-pressure gun in the 73 to 75-mm class, such as those mounted in some Soviet and British vehicles, would be more effective against troops, unarmored vehicles and field fortifications. The point is a fine one: During the Korean and Vietnam wars, M10 and M42 tracked twin 40-mm automatic guns deployed by antiaircraft units — which, fortunately, had little else to do — were devastatingly effective in support of infantry; the Bradley, in effect, formally assigns that kind of firepower to the infantry for the first time. It is also worth noting in this regard that the Soviets discarded the low- velocity 73-mm gun in favor of a 30-mm automatic weapon in the later versions of their BMP IFV.
What the Bradley cannot do, however —and this is the nub of the current controversy — is advance against fire at the same rate as main battle tanks, because it simply lacks that level of armor protection and survivability. The M2's vulnerability to heavy antitank weapons was conclusively demonstrated in the two series of congressionally mandated tests (although it is fair to point out that a main battle tank would not have survived most of these hits), in which a stock-still combat-loaded Bradley was hit with 120-mm tank gun shaped-charge rounds, TOW missiles (whose warheads approximate the power of the Soviet AT-P-5 Spandrel) and the smaller (85-mm) warheads of the Soviet hand-held RPG-7g infantry antitank grenade launcher.
"You've got a problem: you may need two infantry vehicles" in the future, said Gen. Donn A. Starry, U.S. Army retired, referring to the heavy IFV contemplated by the Army at various times in the past and now a candidate concept in the Armored Family of Vehicles (AFV) study. "If you want a missile system on it, and you want to make a lighter vehicle of some kind," he said "you've got to recognize that it either has to overwatch or stand off someplace— it can't get out with the tanks and mix it up."
"Survival is the problem," Gen. Starry added. "You can't take the Bradley out there with the tanks; it won't survive. It has to stand off in overwatch or off to the side someplace."
Of course, the Bradley was never designed to withstand tank gun fire or heavy shaped-charge warheads. The vehicle's spaced and laminated aluminum armor (with some steel facing in critical areas) was intended to be and is proof against heavy machine guns (U.S. 0.50-inch or Soviet 14.5-mm calibers) and splinters from artillery airbursts up to the 155-mm class, estimated to represent with lesser weapons up to 95 percent of the threats the infantry squad might encounter in the attack. This level of protection is itself a considerable advance over the M113-series armored personnel carriers which the Bradley is intended to replace in mechanized units armed with the M1-series tanks.
Covering the remaining five percent gap — heavy, close-range direct fire — did not seem feasible when the Bradley design had to be fixed in the late 1970s, at least not without increasing size, weight, cost and operational complexity to the level of the main battle tank. All of those factors militate against the goal of an IFV fleet large enough to make a difference on the battlefield (approximately one for every two main battle tanks).
In fact, it will not be possible to build sufficient numbers of heavy IFVs in the

□ An M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle negotiates a downhill grade.
==74==
реклама
==75==
future, either, unless the Army adopts a development and procurement plan very close to the AFV program, so that the resulting economies of scale can be applied to the design and production of all armored vehicles.
In the meantime, to survive the very toughest going on the mechanized battlefield, the Bradley will have to rely on training, tactics and the vehicle's inherent mobility.
In his book Mechanized Infantry, the late Brig. Richard E. Simpkin had this to say about the issues now plaguing the Bradley:
Any shortcomings in an IFV's mobility will face the tanks with a choice between delaying or separating (from the accompanying infantry). So will any inferiority in protection. If the IFV is sometimes to lead — and American, German and Soviet teaching combine with the length of tank guns of the eighties to suggest that it should— it has to be able to take the enemy tank's punch on the nose ... To provide vehicles that live and fight with tanks with all-round protection inferior to the tank's is neither ethical nor at all sensible— specially in a force heavily constrained by manpower shortages. So there is always a good case for giving the IFV the same level of protection as the tank. In the future this case will be stronger, since compound armor covering the frontal arc can confer immunity to a high proportion of existing antitank weapon systems as well as to nonspecialized fires.
At the time Brig. Simpkin was writing, in the late 1970s, the Army's mechanized force designers were studying a turretless, heavily armored, 40-ton IFV for the assault role. "About 1978," Gen. Starry said, "we realized that we needed a heavy infantry fighting vehicle, and we tried to start a program to do that. But we couldn't sell it in Washington, either in the Pentagon or over on the Hill, so we backed away from it. We still need it."
Gen. Starry agrees that the Army, in fact, never really "sold" any IFV concept — heavy or standard. In the 1970s, the Army's proposed new mechanized infantry doctrine was mostly greeted by incomprehension in the Defense Department and Congress, where the decision makers consistently wondered what such a "fancy" vehicle could do that could not be accomplished by the thousands of M113s already in the inventory.
Automotive performance matching the M1; better, if not complete, protection; and heavy fire support for the infantry squad did not seem worth the cost and trouble of building a new vehicle, at that time the XM723 MICV (mechanized infantry combat vehicle), the Bradley's developmental predecessor.
In the mid-1970s, it must be recalled, the Army and official Washington were waking up to the fact that Soviet conventional force capabilities in central Europe had been expanding steadily since 1968. Moreover, the Soviets seemed to have mastered and incorporated into their newer weapons many of the technologies that had just been proved devastatingly effective in the 1973 Middle East war. The 1976 edition of the Army's operations field manual field manual was seen as having a defensive orientation; Sens. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and the late Dewey L. Bartlett (R-Okla.) were warning of NATO's vulnerability to a no-notice attack; and Department of Defense (DoD) thinkers were preoccupied with a Warsaw Pact advantage in main battle tanks estimated at three to one over NATO. In this atmosphere, a weapon whose primary virtues were offensive — sustaining the momentum of a mechanized attack — looked like an unaffordable luxury.
MICV was, in fact, going down the tubes in 1976 and had been formally canceled by DoD (MICV's predecessor, the XM701 armored infantry fighting vehicle, developed against a 1964 requirement, had been dropped in 1970). What revived the program and transformed it into the "fighting vehicle system" (the M2 and its companion M3 cavalry reconnaissance vehicle) was DoD's recognition from its own computer-modeled war-gaming studies that a vehicle as numerous on the battlefield as an IFV would have to be offered an excellent opportunity to proliferate antitank missile defenses.
DoD was then encouraging the Army to hang the highly effective (now marginally effective) TOW missile on everything that rolled or flew, and to get them under some kind of armor. Mechanized infantry doctrine had little or nothing to do with the decision to add the twin-tube TOW launcher to the Bradley design. Gen. Starry noted: "We, that is, we in TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command], decided to put the TOW on the MICV because we realized that if we did not put the TOW on the MICV, we would probably never have an MICV."
So the Army got its IFV, but only at a price that has seriously compromised the vehicle's offensive role, in two ways.

□ A TOW antitank missile Is launched by a Bradley at the Army's Tropic Test Center, Ft. Clayton, Panama.
==76==
The presence of a primary long-range (out to 3,750 meters) antitank weapon makes the Bradley a "must" target for enemy tank guns and antitank missiles, placing its crew and the mounted infantry squad at much greater risk than was ever intended. The danger is heightened by the need to carry additional antimateriel ammunition — up to five TOWs and 900 25-mm main gun rounds — which increases the chances of catastrophically destructive secondary explosions. The cost and complexity of the necessary electro-optic vision and fire control gear delayed the program by more than two years, by Gen. Starry 's estimate, and boosted vehicle unit costs over the million-dollar-a-copy threshold (about $1.2 million in the fiscal 1988 budget) which outside observers often mentally reserve for do-everything tanks. The M1A1 Abrams tank costs a little more than twice as much, a ratio that is not so different from when the M60-series tanks and the M113 were the cutting edge of the mechanized force, but the high price tag nevertheless discourages funding for economic rates of production.
The live-fire testing has demonstrated that Bradley survivability can be improved and, further, has forced the Army to make improvements which were known to be feasible, yet difficult and expensive. The main modification is the addition of Kevlar fabric armor antispall liners, such as are being installed in some M113s, to protect the occupants and the volatile ammunition from fragments spalled from the inside of the main armor envelope.
Unlike the M113, however, where the interior is a relatively clean box allowing the hanging of clear expanses of liner, the M2 layout is complicated by stowage arrangements and installed equipment that cannot be easily altered. Some of the ammunition is being restowed and spall protection is being provided for the electrical service; but the entire process is much more expensive than in the M113, and the level of protection cannot be as complete (although the Bradley's main armor envelope is much stronger). The live-fire tests also disproved some of the more hysterical assertions of Bradley critics. Vaporization of the aluminum armor when penetrated by shaped-charge warheads did not contribute in any measurable way to the momentary surge of interior blast, flash and pressure; in fact, this so-called vaporific effect was judged to have little effect on the crew or vehicle structure. In the tests, the tests, the Bradley's automatic fire suppression system worked as intended, instantly extinguishing fuel fires and making secondary fires of any kind — as opposed to explosions — unlikely. Also, spalled fragments had relatively

□ The XM723 MICV (mechanized infantry combat vehicle), the Bradley's developmental.
==77==
little effect on the ammunition, due to its sturdy packaging— the secondary explosions were caused by direct hits on the ammunition loads. The latest public flap over the Bradley concerns its swimming capability. Out of about 10,000 swimming operations worldwide, there have been a dozen confirmed sinkings. The national press insists there has been one other case, but that incident — which incurred the only Bradley drowning death — involved a vehicle not rigged for swimming which drove into a hidden water-filled sinkhole in a slush- covered field during maneuvers in West Germany last March. In most of the sinkings of swim-rigged vehicles, there was a collapse of the rubberized fabric screen which is erected to allow the vehicle to displace enough water. The Army further determined that in each case, the two hinges that attach the trim vane to the hull glacis plate failed to lock in the open position. The problem is regrettable but not insurmountable — Bradley swimming operations were suspended in April, pending the redesign of the hinges and retrofitting of the new hinges to all vehicles.
Since Bradley critics have called virtually every other aspect of the design into question — even its vastly increased firepower is seen as a double-edged sword — the Army's has stressed superior automotive performance, indispensable for operations with the M1-series tanks. Earlier this year, Sen. William V. Roth (R-Del.), one of the most persistent congressional critics, attacked these assumptions, claiming on the basis of a General Accounting Office (GAO) report which he requested and released that the Army's "standard troop carrier," the M113A3 has comparable off-road performance. In the first place, the product-improved M113A3 is not the "standard" troop carrier: relatively few of the 4,000 vehicles to be modified with the A3's more powerful engine, antispall liners and jettisonable external armored fuel tanks will be armored personnel carriers (APCs); most will be specialized vehicles based on the M113 chassis and expected to remain in the mechanized force for years to come, such as the M901 TOW vehicle, the M730 Chaparral air defense missile carrier and the M981 FIST-V (fire support team vehicle).
The first modified M901A2s and M981-A1s began reaching units this spring.
More important, while the M113A3's turbocharged engine (275 hp versus 215 hp in earlier diesel models) and new transmission give it a power-to-weight ratio and thus acceleration comparable to the Bradley, the A3's allowable cross-country speed is limited by the performance of its suspension. Roadwheel travel was improved to the limits of this 30-year-old design in the standard-powered M113A2, which increased maximum allowable cross-country speed to 19 mph over 16 mph in the M113A1. Despite greater power, this figure is improved to only 21 mph in the M113A3— about 30 percent less than the Bradley and M1 Abrams tank.
The GAO said its study was based on data compiled by the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Agency (AMSAA); however, the AMSAA data apparently concerned general trafficability, rating the smaller, lighter APC as more maneuverable in close quarters and on difficult forest trails.
The fact remains that the M113A3 simply cannot keep up with the M1 tank.
"Every time they call from the Hill and want to know 'What about the Bradley?' " Gen. Starry said, "I say, "You have got to go ahead with it,' because the alternative is not acceptable— not at all acceptable. The question is, how many of those do you want to buy before you buy something else?"
The drawn-out controversy over the Bradley that has turned the program into a kind of tarbaby has left a bitter residue in the minds of materiel developers for the Army's mechanized force: "We may never be able to procure another major piece of equipment," lamented a staff officer with the Armored Family of Vehicles task force. It has also created a determination to find a better, faster way to arrive at requirements, fix a design and produce vehicles for the field, so that programs will be less liable to compromise by extraneous factors essentially beyond the service's control.

□ The updated M113A3 armored personnel carrier with armor around the weapon station and spaced laminate armor bolted to the sides and the rear doors as additional defense against shaped- charge warheads. The projections at the rear of the hull are armored external fuel tanks, a standard feature of the A3 versionm which also has an uprated power train.

A combined arms performer endures its purgatory alone
by Lon O. Nordeen Jr.
Army magazine
vol.37 July, 1987

==63==
The concentrated political attack on the Army's Bradley fighting vehicles that has been carried out in Congress and the press for some time now has had the deliberate effect of both spotlighting and isolating the program. The vehicle's swimming capability is only the latest point of controversy. The less-than-crippling design and production defects are, of course, greatly magnified; but more important, the M2 infantry version of the vehicle is stripped of its intended combined-arms operational context.
Thus isolated as if it were to be the sole weapon in the Army's mechanized arsenal, the Bradley can inevitably be made to look bad, because it is not invulnerable to the entire range of battlefield threats, from submachine gun bullets (which would chip the paint) to surface bursts by large-caliber artillery shells (which would tear the vehicle apart). Where is the vehicle yet devised that could meet such criteria? Interdependence among armored vehicles of differing purposes and types has always been and is ever likely to be a primary characteristic of mechanized operations. In fact, it is the vulnerability of main battle tanks to close-range infantry attack that has called into existence the whole class of modern infantry fighting vehicles which the M2 version of the Bradley represents.
This relationship can be traced back to its origins in World War I. The battle tank was introduced in 1916 as a means of breaching fortifications. Once static defenses were shattered, foot-mobile infantry would mop up the remaining defenders. Because of their mobility and survivability, tanks frequently outpaced the infantry. Unsupported, tanks were found to be vulnerable to attack by enemy infantry using artillery, explosive charges and flame throwers.
During the 1930s, the U.S. Army introduced into service armored half-track infantry carriers. The infantry element of World War II U.S. armored divisions was fully mechanized with more than 700 half-tracks. During attack and defense, the infantry usually dismounted from their half-tracks and moved up on foot to provide support and close-in firepower.
The open-top half-tracks were vulnerable to artillery and small arms fire and often were unable to keep pace with tanks. During the latter part of World War II, the United States developed tracked armored infantry carriers which could accompany tanks. The first such vehicles, the M39 and M44, were much modified versions of the M18 Hellcat tank destroyer. The M44 was not a successful vehicle, but its rectangular armored body, forward mounted engine and rear exit doors set the pattern for the M75 and M59 armored personnel carriers of the 1950s. The Army's M113 armored personnel carrier (APC) has been in production continuously since 1960, and more than 80,000 APCs and other variants have been produced for the U.S. Army and the military

□ Infantrymen exit the rear doors of an M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle during a demonstration at Ft. Banning, Ga.
==64==
реклама Gould Computer Systems
==65==
services of more than 40 countries.
Gasoline-powered versions were followed, beginning in 1964, by the M113A1 and subsequent diesel-powered models. The aluminum-alloy armored vehicle has been highly successful because of its combination of positive features including high mobility, reliability, amphibious capability and low unit cost.

The M44, M75, M59 and M113 were developed to be armored transport vehicles or battletaxis. This type of armored infantry carrier, while relatively cheap and highly versatile, has a number of shortcomings. Infantry riding in such vehicles cannot see or take part in the battle and must dismount to engage in combat. Most M113s are armed only with a single unprotected .50-caliber machine gun, and the vehicle's light armor provides protection only against small arms and artillery fragments. Mechanized infantry tactics for troops equipped with the M113 usually call for the troops to attack or defend on foot, relying on vehicle-mounted machine guns for supporting fire.
The M113 series of vehicles was involved in Vietnam combat from 1962, when it entered service with the South Vietnamese army, until 1975. The South Vietnamese armed their M113s with additional machine guns and other weapons. These modifications converted the M113 from a transport into a vehicle capable of mounted combat. U.S. forces adopted the idea, and modified M113s were known as armored cavalry assault vehicles (ACAVs). A variety of weapons were mounted on U.S. and allied M113s, including recoilless rifles, 40-mm automatic grenade launchers and heavy and light machine guns. ACAVs were highly effective in Vietnam because of their mobility, amphibious capability and high firepower.
The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese made extensive use of mines, which proved to be a serious threat to the M113. To improve survivability, troops lined the floor of their M113s with sandbags and usually rode on top of the vehicle. In 1969, the Army began equipping its M113s with titanium alloy belly armor and made other modifications which reduced the vehicles' vulnerability to mines. Recoil- less rifle and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire were also serious threats. A variety of stand-off armor schemes were fitted in the field using sheet steel, wire mesh, ammunition boxes, sandbags and other materials.
The modified M113 was a highly successful combat vehicle, but the vulnerability problem was never fully overcome. To put the vulnerability issue into proper perspective, however, it must be pointed out that the heavily armored M48 tank also proved to be very susceptible to destruction by mines, RPGs and recoilless rifles. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War reinforced the need for combined arms operations. The initial Arab assaults, made by armor and mechanized infantry, gained considerable ground. Israeli tank forces, thrown against Egyptian and Syrian positions, were beaten back by heavy missile and gun fire. The lesson from combat on both fronts was that armor could not make headway against the dense infantry antitank defenses unless it operated in a coordinated manner with infantry, combat engineers and artillery. Israeli commanders quickly adjusted their tactics to meet the demands of the changing modes of battle. The proportion of Israeli mechanized infantry assigned to armored battalions was significantly increased. Mechanized infantry fought with the same principles of speed and shock action as tanks. Israeli half-tracks, M113s and captured, Soviet-built wheeled BTR-50s had no overhead cover: soldiers were expected to have their heads and shoulders above the armor where they could observe events and rapidly direct firepower against threatening missile and gun positions. As many as five machine guns were mounted on each vehicle. Israeli armored infantrymen were taught to fight from their vehicles and dismount only when absolutely necessary.
Israeli combined arms tactics proved to be effective, but tanks and APCs were still lost as a result of mines, tank fire and antitank weapons. When armor, infantry, artillery, engineers and air support were properly coordinated and used aggressively, however, the battle was usually decided quickly, and losses were held to a minimum.
German World War II experience, primarily on the eastern front, led them to conclude that infantry accompanying armor should be able to use their individual weapons from moving or stationary personnel carriers to suppress or destroy enemy defenses. The postwar Bundeswehr was one of the first to call for the development of an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) capable of supporting tanks in mobile combat. The IFV differs from the APC or converted armored cavalry

LON O. NORDEEN JR., a marketing communications manager with McDonnell Aircraft Company, has written extensively on weapons, equipment and their employment. His book. Air Warfare in the Missile Age, was published by the Smithsonian Institution Press in 1985.

□ The Soviet BMP-1, the world's first modern infantry fighting vehicle, armed with a 73-mm gun and the AT-3 Sagger antitank missile; the improved BMP-2, mounting a 30-mm automatic cannon and the AT-5 Spandrel missile appeared in 1981.
==66==
реклама
==67==
assault-type vehicles in having greater armor protection, heavier mounted armament, weapons and vision blocks which allow the infantry squad to fight from within the vehicle and an improved power-to-weight ratio for increased cross-country mobility.
The heavily armored Marder, which entered West German service in the early 1970s, featured a turret-mounted 20-mm cannon and view ports and firing positions which allowed infantrymen to fire their weapons from within the vehicle. The Soviet BMP series features the Sagger or Spandrel antitank guided missiles, 73-mm or 30-mm turret-mounted weapons, amphibious capability, NBC (nuclear-biological-chemical) protection, vision blocks and firing ports which allow mounted infantry to participate in the battle. The Army's recently introduced M2 Bradley ranks with the best IFVs in mobility, armor protection and firepower.
The 23-ton vehicle carries a crew of three, a six-man combat squad and has a spaced laminate armor system which is designed to be effective against artillery and grenade fragments, small arms fire and armor-piercing projectiles up to 14.5 mm in caliber. The M3, used by cavalry and reconnaissance units, is similar to the M2. It differs only in internal layout and size of the crew, which consists of five men in the reconnaissance role. The M2/M3 has impressive firepower: the 25-mm Bushmaster chain gun can penetrate the BMP at ranges well over 500 meters, and the 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun can suppress enemy infantry. Both are stabilized to allow for accurate gunnery while moving across the battlefield.
The twin-tube TOW antitank missile launcher mounted on the turret in an armored box can defeat tanks out to 3,750 meters. The vehicle, however, must be moving slowly or stopped in order to fire the missile. The weapon aiming system includes a thermal-imaging sight which allows for combat at night and in reduced visibility conditions. The infantrymen have viewing ports and six ball-mounted 5.56-mm weapons available for close-in defense. In urban or forested terrain, the dismounted squad can engage the enemy using the Dragon medium antitank missile, M72 rockets and their personal weapons.
The Bradley is a significant plus in both offensive and defensive roles. Offensively, its cannon and machine gun firepower can suppress antitank weapons, destroy enemy light armor and pin down dismounted infantry. The TOW missile can take on threatening tanks at long range, thus increasing the effectiveness of the entire mechanized battle force. The M2 can also provide a high volume of fire in support of dismounted operations and defensive activities. It must be remembered that the M2/ M3 Bradley and similar systems are cavalry and infantry fighting vehicles and not main battle tanks. To give the M2 version the room to accommodate a crew of nine, ensure a high degree of mobility and keep weight under 25 tons (to allow for relatively easy transport by aircraft), armor protection was deliberately limited. Gen. Louis C. Wagner Jr., then the Army's deputy chief of staff for research, development and acquisition (now commanding the Army Materiel Command), discussed the Bradley's armor protection in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1985:
We wanted to stop the 14.5-mm round which is one of the most common [Soviet] weapons. We wanted it to make sure antipersonnel and small antitank mines would not kill the crew through the bottom. The Bradley is protected against 12.7-mm (rounds) all around, 155-mm air bursts and small land mines ... There is no question that there is no piece of equipment that is invulnerable. We knew if it [the Bradley) was hit by a big enough shaped-charge warhead, you could destroy that vehicle ... I can destroy any tank with a large enough warhead. We think with the weight limitation on it and the crew size, we probably have the best protection we could get for the weight and available materials at that time.
The Bradley has an aluminum armor hull, and spaced laminate steel armor plate is bolted onto the vertical sides. Steel armor also protects the turret face. An automatic halon fire extinguishing system is incorporated to quickly put out fires in the passenger and engine compartments.

□ A Bradley vehicle fitted with a new turret mounting an ARES Talon 35-mm cannon, as tested by the Army in 1984-85 for improved antiarmor pertormance against upgraded Soviet light vehicles, under the CVAST (combat vehicle armament system technology) program.
==68==
During the hearings. Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) asked, "What is the survivability of the Bradley compared to the M113 personnel carrier?"
Gen. Wagner explained, "It is much more survivable. I can penetrate the side of the M113 with armor piercing .50 caliber [12.7-mm]."
During the past several years, there has been extensive media discussion concerning the survivability of the Bradley. The M2/M3 has been criticized for costing too much, carrying too few troops and being too tall, thus presenting a highly visible target. The most serious claim was that when hit by a shaped-charge warhead, the aluminum armor of the Bradley vaporizes and burns, increasing the destructive effect within the vehicle.
In response to the controversy, the Army initiated a number of studies and was directed by Congress to perform a series of live-fire tests to learn how a fully loaded Bradley would react when hit by an enemy weapon. The first series of tests started in March 1985 and were completed by the end of the year.
Remarking on the test results. Gen. Wagner said, "What we found is that the automatic fire suppression system worked very well, suppressing every fuel fire." He added that media claims of a catastrophic vaporific phenomenon due to the use of aluminum armor was not borne out by the test results. According to Gen. Wagner, when a shaped-charge warhead large enough to cause an appreciable vaporific effect strikes, the blast and hot jet of gas from the chemical energy round are the primary causes of casualties, not the vaporific effects of aluminum armor.
"Wherever it hits you," said Gen. Wagner, "you're in trouble. If it hits you in the head, you're dead; it it hits you in the leg, it takes it off. But we've known this for a long time." Concerning the M2/M3 armor, he said that the test demonstrated that, "aluminum armor does not burn. If you get a sustained ammunition fire going, you can melt it, but it doesn't burn."

The Army's optimistic view of the 1985 Bradley live-fire test results did not win over all the critics of the vehicle. They cite the reports produced by Air Force Col. James G. Burton, formerly a staff member in the defense test and evaluation directorate of the then-Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. He evidently had criticized the tests for failing to simulate actual combat conditions as closely as they might have, noting that some of the test vehicles were loaded with inert ammunition and that the areas hit were carefully selected rather than resulting from "random fire."
Army-DoD (Department of Defense) disagreement over the test methodology caused suspension of the second phase of live-fire tests, which had begun in March 1986, to evaluate the improved survivability features of the M2A1 and M3A1 versions of the vehicle. Changes being evaluated include repositioning and redesign of fuel lines and fuel cells, relocation and shielding of fuel and cooling and lubrication components, fitting of fabric armor antispall liners inside and the addition of armor, both passive and reactive types.
Phase two testing was resumed last October and was completed earlier this year after 46 shots from weapons of all kinds against combat-loaded basic and improved vehicles. Also tested against fire was the so-called minimum casualty vehicle version, in which much of the fuel and ammunition is carried outside the armored hull envelope, thus separating the crew from secondary fires and explosions. Analysis of the test results is nearly complete, with conclusions and recommendations expected shortly.
Gen. Wagner remarked on the survivability enhancements: "It looks like if we hung all this on . . . that it would [increase the cost of each Bradley] by by $50,000 to $70,000." He added that another 3,000 pounds of armor and equipment "will not have an adverse effect on the agility of the weapons system."
Reflecting the lessons of battle, Israel has added armored external fuel tanks, internal spall shields and stand-off armor to many of its M113s to improve their survivability. The U.S. Army has begun to make similar modifications to a portion of its M113 fleet, as the M113A3. Since the Bradley is only replacing a portion of the M113 fleet and thus the vehicle will be in service well beyond the turn of the century, this seems to be a worthwhile investment. The $50,000 to $70,000 additional cost to upgrade the survivability of the Bradley to better protect the lives of the five to nine soldiers who man the vehicle also seems to be a smart move.

□ The half-track infantry carriers of World War II were little more than lightly armored trucks, with limited off-road mobility and no overhead cover. This much-modified U.S. M3 was one of many used until the 1970s by Israeli forces, which found them no more suitable for modern maneuver warfare.
==69==
The latest main battle tanks, such as the 60-ton M1 with composite armor, may be able to survive longer on today's battlefield than earlier-generation tanks, but the APCs and IFVs which accompany them are vulnerable to nearly all of the antiarmor weapons on the battlefield. If used as tanks are used, APCs/IFVs will suffer higher attrition and more casualties per hit because of their lower level of armor protection and larger number of personnel per vehicle (tanks carry three to four crewmen; APCs/IFVs, nine to 12 crewmen and infantrymen). During the 1985 Senate hearings, Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.) asked, "How extensive or widespread are these antitank weapons on the Soviet side?"

Gen. Wagner replied, "They are extensive on the battlefield. A lot of how you defeat those is the tactics. First of all, you suppress them where you can with artillery fire. Second, this [Bradley] fighting vehicle is really a fire team of an infantry rifle squad. He can stand off at 2,000 meters and destroy an equivalent vehicle in the Soviet army. With the TOW missile, he can stand off 3,750 meters and destroy enemy tanks. When he goes into an area where there are a lot of antitank weapons, we will use tactics to suppress enemy infantry and the antitank weapons; in some cases, we have to dismount and clean them out." A Soviet motor rifle division of 12,695 men has 220 tanks and 792 antiarmor weapons, while a 16,597-man U.S. mechanized infantry division has 290 tanks and more than 1,200 anti-armor weapons. In other words, the U.S. Army will undertake combined arms operations. Artillery, air support, terrain features and smoke will be used to blind and suppress antitank weapons operators, drive dismounted infantry into their foxholes and limit the vision and effectiveness of enemy tanks, APCs and IFVs. Tanks and IFVs would use "bounding overwatch" tactics — one group moves forward while the other watches for the enemy and fires on any enemy who becomes visible. Current U.S. tactics call for the tanks to lead while the IFVs lay back and provide support. With its TOW antitank missile system, 25-mm cannon and thermal-imaging sighting system, the Bradley can accomplish this task.
From the available evidence, it appears that the Bradley is a good vehicle that fulfills most if not all of its design requirements. (Swimming capability, for instance, will not be helped by the added weight of the up-armored versions.) It can shoot on the move with its 25-mm cannon, take out tanks and other heavily armored targets with its TOW missile system, operate in limited visibility because of thermal-imaging equipment and has good cross-country mobility and high dash speed (41 mph on roads). Compared to a unit equipped with the M113, Bradley units have much greater firepower, mobility, survivability and effectiveness.
Israel has examined a number of new solutions to the problem of different survivability levels in infantry vehicles and modern main battle tanks. The Israeli Merkava tank, in a pinch, can carry six infantrymen in its rear compartment. These troops cannot fight from the vehicle or observe the battle, however. While used primarily as a main battle tank, the Merkava has been used to transport troops under fire.
Israeli troops on occupation duty in Lebanon employed small numbers of Centurion tank hulls which had been equipped with a raised superstructure, armored side skirts and additional armor. Armed with numerous machine guns, the vehicles were used as close escorts for Israeli tanks. During World War II, British and Canadian forces likewise used modified Sherman tank and M7 howitzer chassis — known as Kangaroos — as infantry carriers.
Land warfare weapons, tactics and concepts are constantly evolving. The anti-armor systems of the 1980s and 1990s, such as missile-armed attack helicopters, scatterable mines, "smart" artillery munitions and top attack missiles, did not exist when the current family of American armored vehicles was designed and developed. The M2 Bradley and M1 Abrams will be upgraded, and new armored vehicles will be fielded to ensure that our armored forces keep current with the threat.

□ The heavily armored West German Marder infantry fighting vehicle was designed to requirements based on German World War II experience of tank warfare. The Marder carries a crew of nine, and its combat weight is 29 tons.